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ABSTRACT
Compensation is an area of research rife with debate among experts. These debates are
primarily concerned with the effectiveness of pay-for-performance. The pay variation and
performance relationship is a subset of this research where disagreement and inconclusive
findings are common. Is pay variation conducive to higher performance or is pay compression
ideal? This study contributes to the pay variation and performance debate by focusing on
performance-based pay variation and addressing fundamental assumptions of prior work.
Past research has treated pay variation as a proxy for allocation rules and incentive
intensity. Separating these two constructs rather than confounding them provides a more
comprehensive treatment. This study addresses the effects of these two policies, incentive
intensity and allocation rules, as separate, independent influences on performance outcomes.
Incentive intensity is treated as a range of potential pay outcomes, whereas the allocation rule is
an approach to distributing rewards either based on individual contribution or equally to
members of a group. While theories predict individual level performance is affected by pay
variation, tests of these theories are typically at the organizational level. In this study, the effects
of pay variation policies are tested at the individual level using an experimental design.
In addition to testing the relationship between pay variation policies and individual
performance, expectancy theory as an explanatory framework is explored. Allocation rules and
incentive intensity are predicted to affect the motivational mechanisms described by expectancy
theory, which in turn influence individual motivation and performance.
Results of a real pay/real effort experiment provide evidence that allocation rules affect
objective individual performance while changes in incentive intensity are not significant in
predicting objective performance. Objective performance is significantly higher in equity

allocation rule conditions than in equality allocation rule conditions. In addition, expectancy
theory components are affected as predicted; these components are positively related to
motivation, and motivation is positively related to both subjective and objective individual
performance measures.
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CHAPTER 1
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Human behaviors indicate that money matters to people. Examples abound. Around 50
percent of Americans play the lottery each year (Kearney, 2005, p. 2274), hoping for a large
monetary windfall. Enron executives deceived investors for money (Sims & Brinkman, 2003).
Money is instrumental in fulfilling physiological needs through the purchase of goods and
services; it is also viewed as a measuring stick for success. Interestingly, pay is especially
meaningful to people. Devoe, Pfeffer, and Lee (2013) conducted an experiment on the
importance of money, finding that the importance of money increased as pay increased for labor,
but the importance did not differ as pay increased when payments were randomly determined. In
studying the performance effects of pay, Nyberg, Pieper, and Trevor (in press) reported that payfor-performance increased future employee performance. The accumulated evidence provides a
strong argument that money, and specifically pay, has important implications for human attitudes
and behaviors. The way a firm chooses to allocate money through pay (i.e., the firm’s
compensation policies and practices) is likely to have meaningful effects. Understanding these
effects represents an important area of the human resources management literature.
It is surprising, then, how little is known about pay. Findings are inconclusive and
rigorous empirical tests are missing in many of the most important compensation areas (Risher,
2012). This lack has led to substantial ongoing debate in the field of compensation. For
example, Gupta and Shaw reviewed the accumulation of research on pay, and stated “Financial
Incentives are Effective!!” (1998, p. 26) while Kohn (1998) responded that paying for
performance was “behaviorist dogma” (1998, p. 27). This debate continues with Daniel Pink,
from a well-known TEDTalk on financial incentives (Pink, 2009), arguing that pay is an
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ineffective motivator and scholars writing rebuttals to his assertions (Gupta & Conroy, 2013;
Ledford, Gerhart, & Fang, 2013).
The nature of the relationship between pay variation and performance has also been at the
center of an ongoing academic debate in the compensation literature. Pay variation is the extent
of pay differences across employees and jobs in organizations, and is commonly measured as
pay dispersion or pay range (Gupta, Conroy, & Delery, 2012; Trevor, Reilly, & Gerhart, 2012).
Scholars working in this area of research have proposed competing arguments to explain pay
variation’s relationship with firm performance. On the one hand, it has been suggested that pay
must sufficiently vary based on performance across organizational members to encourage
desired behaviors, indicating that greater variation has positive effects on firm performance
(Gupta et al., 2012; Kepes, Delery, & Gupta, 2009). On the other hand, it has been argued that
high levels of pay variation lead to feelings of deprivation and other negative employee
reactions, meaning minimal differentiation is superior for ensuring high performance outcomes
(Bloom, 1999; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993).
Published evidence supports both views. Some research indicates that pay compression
has a positive influence on performance outcomes (Bloom, 1999; Ensley, Pearson, &
Sardeshmukh, 2007) and other work reports pay dispersion is more desirable (Firth, Leung, &
Rui, 2010; Heyman, 2005). Thus, empirical evidence has not sufficiently provided an answer
regarding the influence of pay variation on performance, reporting both negative (e.g., Martins,
2008) and positive (e.g., Lee, Lev, & Yeo, 2008) relationships. This unresolved debate has
important implications because it leads to inconsistent practitioner guidance and disparate
evidence for pay applications of theoretical frameworks.
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A thorough review of the pay variation literature points to several existing assumptions
that limit progress (Conroy, Gupta, Shaw, & Park, in press). One issue is that pay variation has
been confounded with concepts of equity and equality. Specifically, equality and equity
arguments have been applied to explain pay variation’s relationship with performance. This
confounding has occurred in various ways. A common approach is to suggest that pay variation
represents an equality to equity spectrum, such that low pay variation represents equality and
high pay variation represents equity (Pfeffer & Langton, 1993). Initial theorizing about pay
variation invoked equity (i.e., distributions of pay to employees based on individual contribution)
and equality (i.e., distributions of pay to employees based on group membership) allocation rule
arguments, hypothesizing differential effects of high and low pay variation using these
arguments. The allocation rule logic applied was that when equity allocation rules were in place
(operationalized as high pay variation), individuals would be more individually focused than
when equality allocation rules were in place (operationalized as low pay variation) (Pfeffer &
Langton, 1988, 1993). An implicit assumption that is made when applying this argument to pay
variation is that pay variations are based on individual contributions (e.g., individual
performance). This assumption is flawed in that pay variations are certainly not always based on
individual performance. For example, Kepes et al. (2009) reported that some pay variation was
politically-based.
Another approach to confounding pay variation with equity and equality concepts is the
treatment of pay variation as an indication of inequity, such that increasing the size of pay
differentials is an inequitable practice. In other words, this approach suggests that creating large
differentials creates feelings of inequity among employees. This is also problematic. If pay
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differences are based on performance, individuals are likely to view high pay variation as more
equitable than low pay variation (Werner & Ones, 2000).
Together, these examples illustrate that equity and equality should not be confounded
with pay variation. The confounding of equity and equality with pay variation is a serious
problem (Trevor et al., 2012). Disambiguating equity and equality from pay variation may allow
for theoretical progress in explaining pay variation’s effects on individual and firm outcomes.
This represents one of the purposes of this investigation.
Another limitation of prior work is that cross-level issues have rarely been addressed in
detail theoretically or empirically. Specifically, the pay variation and firm performance
relationship is tested most often from a single level perspective (Conroy et al., in press). Defined
as the pay differences across jobs and individuals, the construct itself is typically measured at the
firm level (Gupta et al., 2012). For example, researchers assess the pay of multiple jobs or
individuals in an organization and combine these values into a firm level measure, such as the
gini coefficient (Bloom, 1999), the coefficient of variation (Pfeffer & Langton, 1993), or the
range (Kepes et al., 2009). Based on this construct definition and measurement approach, pay
variation represents a firm level construct.
The firm level pay variation construct is tested to assess its effects on other firm level
constructs, with the ultimate dependent variable of interest being organizational performance
(e.g., Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 2002). But this firm level relationship is explained by applying
individual level theories. This represents a mismatch between theoretical and empirical
specifications. For example, equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965) and motivation theories (e.g.,
expectancy theory, Vroom, 1964; tournament theory, Lazear & Rosen, 1981) are used to explain
the organizational implications of pay variation. That is, it is proposed that pay variation
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influences individual motivation and attitudes (e.g., Kepes et al., 2009). These individual
reactions are then assumed to be additive from the individual to the firm level to explain firm
performance. The theorized causal relationship is pay variation individual
performance organizational performance, but the empirical test is often simply of the pay
variation organizational performance relationship.
Despite the use of individual level theory to explain this firm level relationship, there is
little empirical work in the management literature addressing what is happening at the individual
level in response to pay variations. The economics literature has some work in this area. For
example, Harbring and colleagues asked participants to choose their level of “work intensity” or
“effort” on a one to 100 scale in different pay spread conditions (Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2011;
Harbring & Luenser, 2008). The researchers reported that effort levels chosen were higher, on
average, when the spread was wide than when it was narrow (Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2011;
Harbring & Luenser, 2008). Abeler, Kube, Altmann and Wibral (2010) reported that effort
levels chosen on a one to ten scale were higher, on average, for individuals assigned to
conditions where pay could vary within dyads than for individuals assigned to conditions where
pay could not vary within dyads.
This research is valuable as it addresses individual responses to pay variation issues;
however, these studies have limitations. The primary limitation is that these studies are not real
effort studies. The dependent variable is a choice of effort level variable rather than an actual
effort or performance level. There is not a true performance dependent variable. Furthermore,
these studies do not address many of theoretical mechanisms believed to explain the relationship
between pay variation and performance (e.g., expectancy theory components).
Since most work empirically addressing pay variation issues is at the firm level and pay
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variation theories are at the individual level, it is necessary to begin work that tests more
appropriate models. Addressing the assumption that pay variation affects individual
performance represents another purpose of this study. Using a study design that creates a real
performance situation, this investigation extends tests completed in economics. The fundamental
assumption related to individual level reactions, specifically performance, is explored.
This analysis is focused on individual performance outcomes because this outcome is the
primary individual-level explanation for positive effects of pay variation on firm outcomes. That
is, when pay variation is performance-based, there is an assumption that larger pay differences
based on performance will increase individual motivation and this will increase performance.
Most empirical studies skip the individual level altogether and those that do not tend to skip over
motivation. Thus, in addition to studying the basic effect of pay variation on individual
performance, motivational mechanisms are explored in this study.
A final limitation of prior research is that the methods used in most management research
on pay variation have prevented causal inference despite the assumption that pay variation, as a
representation of firm policies, is the independent variable and performance is the dependent
variable. Foundational articles in the pay variation literature were in organizational settings with
non-experimental designs (e.g., Pfeffer & Langton, 1988, 1993). This work provided external
validity and indicated that there exists a pay variation and performance relationship in some
form. This approach, however, has not established the validity of causal inferences. Without the
causal connection, theorizing and development are stalled. For example, arguments that pay
variation causes individual performance outcomes are theoretical, but have not been supported
by sufficient empirical evidence. Considering the inconsistencies in the findings of this
literature, it is important to establish the causal foundations of pay variation’s influence.
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Therefore, the third purpose of this study is to address the assumption that there is a causal
relationship between pay variation and individual performance.
In sum, this study is focused on assumptions that have gone unaddressed and untested in
prior investigations of pay variation by (a) differentiating the pay policies that contribute to pay
variation, (b) making predictions about individual motivation and performance outcomes of pay
variation, and (c) conducting an experimental test of these predictions. A broad range of
motivation theories are discussed, including expectancy theory (Porter & Lawler, 1968; Vroom,
1964), tournament theory (Lazear & Rosen, 1981), equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965), and
relative deprivation theory (Crosby, 1976), to fully understand construct definitions and prior
research; expectancy theory is chosen as the organizing framework to understand individual
motivational responses to varied pay conditions. Due to the breadth of the pay variation
definition, boundary conditions are established. Only pay variations related to performance are
considered.
Hypotheses are tested in a laboratory setting with an experimental design to allow for
causal inferences. This approach has a number of important benefits. Using random assignment
and controlled manipulations strengthens internal validity (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).
Non-experimental, correlational research designs are more common to pay variation research,
but these designs are limited because they lack these two critical design characteristics. The
experimental research design makes it possible to look at objective performance outcomes of pay
variation-related strategies. In field research, it is often difficult to assess employee performance
levels (since performance appraisals are driven at least partially by non-performance factors,
Cleveland & Murphy, 1992). In the laboratory, objective performance criteria can be measured
to determine performance levels. A general lack of real pay/real effort studies of compensation
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policies makes this endeavor especially worthwhile. Addressing these assumptions can help
move the pay variation literature forward, beyond simple tests of positive or negative
relationships, to a more nuanced approach. Pay variation has been inconsistently tied to concepts
of equity and equality. By exploring this issue, I suggest pay variation should not be viewed as
an equity/equality proxy. In this study, allocation rules, where the equity and equality distinction
is appropriate, are separated from incentive intensity (the relative size of pay-for-performance as
compared to base pay, Bamberger & Levi, 2009), the extent to which pay can vary depending on
performance. This distinction allows for more nuanced theorizing regarding the theoretical
mechanisms that explain how pay variation and allocation rules influence individual motivation
and performance. Establishing the causal relationship between these variables provides evidence
that can strengthen arguments applying individual level theory to explain pay variation effects.
Expectancy theory has recently gained popularity in the pay variation literature (e.g., Downes &
Choi, 2014; Gupta et al., 2012). Testing its theoretical mechanisms provides evidence of the
validity of the expectancy theory application to pay variation.
From a practical standpoint, better understanding individual motivation and performance
is valuable for managers. This study focuses mainly on entry-level, low skill tasks where
performance is identifiable (i.e., can be measured), so the greatest benefit of this research is for
organizations that have a workforce engaged in this type of work. Managers are often
encouraged to make large distinctions among individual employees within workgroups. This
study can provide further information that may be helpful when making these allocation
decisions for primarily entry-level, low skill employee groups. Are large distinctions for
individual employees within groups preferable or are small distinctions better? Are large
between group distinctions motivational? For managers concerned with performance
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implications of pay approaches, this study provides evidence regarding the effects of pay policies
for entry-level jobs. Organizational decision makers can also benefit from findings that clarify
the influence of pay policies on employee outcomes. While contextual variables that are not
included in this study are also important for consideration (see for example, Gupta & Conroy,
2013), this study sheds light on two policies that are within the control of firm management.
In sum, this research investigates pay variation-related policies, allows for causal
inference in a real pay/real effort study, and explores critical assumptions in the pay variation
literature. All of these issues are important aspects of this complex research area. The variables
under investigation are HR practices over which managers have some control. This study can
benefit both the academic literature and managerial practice.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Overview
The first section of this chapter is devoted to reviewing the pay variation literature,
including a definition of the pay variation construct and a description of the theories applied to
explain the pay variation and performance relationship. Empirical findings are reviewed and
limitations of prior work are noted. Following this review, a relationship between pay variationrelated policies and individual performance is hypothesized. Expectancy theory is then applied
to develop a model that predicts the individual motivational mechanisms that explain the
performance outcomes of pay variation-related policies.
Construct Definition
Pay variation is the extent of differentiation in pay made within an organization. This
definition is certainly broad. This breadth can prevent precision in theorizing around the sources
and effects of pay variation. Recent work has suggested distinctions made about the pay
variation construct can improve theorizing (Gupta et al., 2012). When these distinctions are
made, the sources of pay variation become clearer. The effects of pay variation can then be
theorized with sources and types in mind. Here, the construct distinctions suggested by Gupta et
al. (2012) are discussed.
A review of prior work on pay variation points to three main types of pay variation that
are studied in the literature. The types are horizontal, vertical and overall (Gupta et al., 2012).
Before addressing these types, it is important to note what is meant by the term pay. Here, pay is
defined as monetary compensation for work. Pay comes in many forms. Common forms are
base pay (the wage paid for the job), pay raises (increases in base pay provided over time) and
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bonuses (one time payments). An individual’s annual salary at any given moment includes base
pay and the accumulation of wage adjustments (if pay reductions are assumed not to occur, these
adjustments can be viewed as pay raises). These annual salary amounts are common forms of
pay included in pay variation measures. For example, in computing pay variation measures,
researchers focused on sports teams have used the annual salaries of athletes (Depken, 2000; Gee
& Wen-Jhan, 2008) and researchers focused on education have used the annual salaries of
teachers (Heutel, 2009; Trevor & Wazeter, 2006). Understanding the forms of pay is helpful in
thinking about the types of variation.
Horizontal Pay Variation
Horizontal pay variation is variation in pay across individuals within a job (Gupta et al.,
2012; Siegel & Hambrick, 2005). Aligning this definition with empirical measures, this type of
pay variation can be assessed by collecting a pay value (e.g., salary, bonus) for every employee
within a job or job category, then creating a measure of the disparity. As noted, an employee’s
annual salary can be viewed as inclusive of two main components, base pay and the
accumulation of pay raises (base + raises). The job is constant. So, base pay is constant since it
is the wage paid for the job. This means that the differences in pay are the differences in wage
adjustments.
It is complicated to determine the precise source of these differences. Because the job is
constant, we can assert that the differences in pay are driven mainly by differences in
individuals. These differences include seniority, performance, knowledge, skill, and political
connections. They could also include factors considered at hire, such as negotiation skills and
gender. Despite its complexity, understanding the source of the variation is important to
predicting its effects. For example, Kepes et al. (2009) isolated performance sources and
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political sources of horizontal pay variation and reported that pay variations with performance
sources were positively related to workforce performance; pay variations with political sources
were negatively related to workforce performance. In this example, performance and politics
were the sources of the pay differences among employees in the job. Pay variation was the
extent that performance and politics were rewarded. That is, pay variation is associated with the
size of pay differences associated with a source of pay (i.e. reward intensity).
Vertical Pay Variation
Vertical pay variation is variation in pay across jobs. Its optimal operationalization
would be to collect a value for each job in the organization. This value could be the lower limit
of each job level or the midpoint for a job level. In market pricing systems, it could be the value
associated with each market priced job (Milkovich, Newman, & Gerhart, 2014). It could also be
estimated using the average, median or mode value associated with each job. This array of
values can then be used to create a disparity measure. Here, the pay values are a result of the
difference in the value associated with each job for the organization.
Vertical pay variation represents the firm’s philosophy on the values of various jobs. For
example, in a job evaluation system, each job is assigned points based on its assessment
compared to compensable factors (Milkovich et al., 2014). These compensable factors are
chosen by organizational leadership to represent what is important to the firm. Because these
values are associated with jobs rather than people, differences in the values can be explained by
differences in the job, such as differences in the labor market for the job (e.g., market pricing
structures) or differences in job evaluations (e.g., job evaluation systems). Brown, Sturman, and
Simmering (2003) studied the issue of vertical pay variation in hospitals by creating a measure of
pay dispersion (using the gini coefficient) across nine job categories. In the vertical context, pay
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variation does not represent an intensity of reward for individual behaviors as directly as it does
in horizontal pay variations. Rather, as in the case of the Brown et al. (2003) study, it is
representative of the difference in pay structures, specifically elitist (where there is great
dispersion among jobs) versus egalitarian (where there is little difference among jobs).
Overall Pay Variation
The last type of pay variation is overall pay variation. This variation includes both
vertical and horizontal variation. Overall pay variation involves combining both job differences
and individual differences. It is inclusive of the sources of pay for individuals and the sources of
pay for jobs. This means it is representative of both intensity of individual reward systems and
elitist/egalitarian pay structures. Because of the variety of factors that can explain the
differences in pay, teasing out the explanations for overall pay variation is difficult. Still, this
type of variation has been at the center of much pay variation research (Belfield & Marsden,
2003; Clark, Kristensen, & Westergard-Nielsen, 2009; Heyman, 2005; Tsou & Liu, 2005).
Unfortunately, findings are difficult to interpret because the reasons for the variation are rarely
specified in the empirical models.
Summary
Based on the above review of the pay variation construct, it is clear that research in this
area has two primary construct definition issues that must be clarified early in the research
process. One is that the type of pay variation must be specified. The second is that the source
(also called the “basis” of pay, Gupta et al., 2012) of the variation must be clear. In this study, I
focus on performance-based horizontal pay variation. My focus on performance sources of pay
differences allows me to draw on the pay-for-performance literature and to contribute to the
underlying arguments associated with the motivational effects of pay variation. Horizontal pay
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variation holds the job constant. By holding the job constant, I can ensure a true performancebasis for pay differences (i.e., the source of pay variation is performance).
Theories of Pay Variation and Performance
Pay variation has attracted the interest of many disciplines, including economics,
management, and finance. As such, theoretical explanations for pay variation’s influence on
performance are diverse. Theories that have regularly appeared in the literature include equity,
relative deprivation, agency, and tournament theories. More recently, expectancy theory has
received attention. While the specific definition of performance as an outcome varies in
empirical studies, most of the work is primarily focused on the organizational or workforce
performance outcomes of pay variation. At the same time, all of the theories are focused on
individual responses as an outcome of pay variation; these responses are assumed to lead to
higher level organizational and workforce performance outcomes. Here, I outline the
fundamental tenets of each of these theories.
Equity Theory
Equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965) is commonly applied in the management literature to
explain the effects of pay variation on performance (e.g., Ang, Hauser, & Lauterbach, 1998;
Brown, 2006; Brown et al., 2003; Carpenter & Sanders, 2004; Cowherd & Levine, 1992). This
theory suggests that individuals compare their own perceived input/outcome ratios to the
perceived input/outcome ratios of comparison others (Adams, 1963, 1965). Inputs refer to
anything a person is perceived to contribute to the organization, e.g., effort, education.
Outcomes refer to anything perceived to be received by the person from the organization, e.g.,
pay, promotion. Inputs and outcomes are perceptions of the focal person. That is, equity theory
is based on each individual’s view of inputs and outcomes of himself/herself and of others
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viewed as relevant (i.e., referent others). To the extent ratios of inputs/outcomes between oneself
and relevant others are not equal, a person is expected to experience inequity. Inequities lead
individuals to experience tension that must be relieved. The way this tension is relieved depends
on the type of inequity experienced.
Positive inequity (overpayment) is experienced when one feels he or she contributes less
than others for the same or greater outcomes or contributes the same as others for greater
outcomes. An overpayment behavioral response is to increase one’s own contributions (i.e.,
inputs) to balance the ratio. Interestingly, in a pay context, increasing one’s inputs may lead to
increased future pay, making a continued imbalance in the ratio likely. Research indicates that
feelings of overpayment are rare in western society (Levine, 1993; Pinder, 1998). Thus, issues
of overpayment receive much less attention than issues of underpayment. Negative inequity
(underpayment) is experienced when one feels he or she contributes more than others for the
same or lower outcomes or contributes the same as others for lower outcomes. Research
indicates that underpayment leads to negative reactions, such as reducing performance (i.e.,
lowering contributions, Cowherd & Levine, 1992; Levine, 1993) or leaving the situation
(Adams, 1963, 1965). In sum, equity theory is an individual-level theory that considers the
inputs and the outcomes of oneself and others, uses social comparisons as a fundamental
building block, and suggests negative inequity can lead to problematic individual responses in
organizations.
Since pay variation represents a difference in outcomes among employees, it has been
proposed that greater pay variation represents greater pay inequity (Pfeffer & Langton, 1993).
This “pay variation = pay inequity” is a fundamental assumption of many equity theory
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applications that may not be accurate, a point addressed in the limitations section. Here, the
logic, if this assumption is accepted, is briefly reviewed.
Pay variation represents greater variation in outcomes. When focusing on horizontal
variations, the job is the same, leading to the assumption that inputs are equal. As such,
employees are theorized to respond to negative inequities created by pay variation by quitting or
reducing effort, both of which are expected to negatively influence performance outcomes for
firms. Since overpayment beliefs are uncommon, all but those at the top of the distribution are
believed to experience negative inequities. The prediction follows that greater variation
increases the inequity tension experienced for most employees in a job, and that this negatively
affects individual performance, and subsequent firm performance.
Relative Deprivation Theory
According to relative deprivation theory, feelings of deprivation are experiences of
resentment about not having something (Crosby, 1976). Certain conditions create feelings of
deprivation, and deprivation is entirely relative (i.e., social comparison-based). Seeing others
with something one desires and to which one feels entitled leads to deprivation. Deprivation, as
a negative feeling of resentment, can lead to negative behavioral reactions. This is especially
likely when the lack of something is assumed to be outside of one’s control. These negative
responses could include reducing effort or retaliating against the organization.
Applications of relative deprivation theory to pay variation research are similar to
applications of equity theory. Differences in pay variation are assumed to represent differences
in receipt of a desirable resource (i.e., pay/money). When variations are greater, these
differences are perceived to be greater, increasing the deprivation experienced by those who are
not at the top of the distribution. As such, all but those at the top of the distribution are expected
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to experience deprivation. This deprivation is expected to be increasingly experienced as the
variation increases. Thus, high pay variation should have negative effects on most individual
employees, effort should be reduced and/or counterproductive behaviors increased, and
organizational performance should suffer. As with equity theory, there are problematic
assumptions in this application; these assumptions are addressed in the limitations section.
Tournament Theory
Tournament theory (Lazear & Rosen, 1981) is one of the most prevalent economics
theories applied to explain the performance effects of pay variation. Unlike equity and relative
deprivation theories, tournament theory was specifically formulated with the intent of explaining
vertical pay variations and responses to vertical pay variations. According to this theory, pay
differences across levels are more motivating to those at lower levels when there are large pay
gaps between jobs than when the pay gaps are small (Lazear & Rosen, 1981).
This theory suggests that greater pay differentials between jobs create competition to be
the best relative performer within a job so that one can be promoted to the higher paying job. As
a result of this competition and the large prize for 'winning' (i.e., getting the promotion),
individuals are especially motivated to be the best performer in the group of competitors. This
increased motivation, then, is proposed to explain why pay variation should be positively related
to firm performance. Since this theory is specified for vertical variations, which are between-job
variations, tournament theory is not an ideal theory for explaining horizontal variations (i.e.,
within-job variations).
Agency Theory
According to agency theory, employees are agents engaged in contracts with
organizations (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As agents, employees have their own goals and
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agendas. Similarly, organizations are entities with goals and agendas. In order to ensure
employees contribute to the organization’s goals, the employee’s goals must be aligned with
those of the organization. This can be done through monitoring, in which an employee is
watched and must behave in a manner consistent with the organization’s expectations. It can
also be done through incentives, by aligning employee incentives with the organization’s
interests. Introducing these incentives aligns the employee’s and the organization’s goals. The
employee desires the pay associated with the incentive and behaves in ways to access the
monetary payout associated with the incentive. Assuming incentives are aligned with the
organizations goals, the use of incentives should increase organization-focused behaviors (e.g.,
high performance) among employees.
Applying agency theory to pay variation, increasing pay variation is assumed to represent
increasing incentives (e.g., Lee et al., 2008). Through this increased use of incentives, the firm is
aligning employee interests with firm interests. This results in higher employee motivation and
performance, which increases subsequent firm performance. Limitations and assumptions are
also present in applications and tests of agency theory. These are addressed later.
Expectancy Theory
Expectancy theory has been applied to pay research for many years (e.g., Lawler, 1973).
In the area of pay variation, it has received increasing attention recently (e.g., Gupta et al., 2012;
Kepes et al., 2009). Expectancy theory is based on three fundamental perceptions that
individuals have regarding the exertion of effort (Porter & Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964). These
three perceptions are combined to determine motivational force. Increasing employee
motivational force toward performing well should lead to increased individual performance.
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The first factor in expectancy theory proposed to influence motivation is effort to
performance expectancy or E P expectancy (Porter & Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964).
Essentially, E P expectancies are the answer to the individual's question, "if I exert effort, will I
perform?" That is, E P expectancies are the individual's perceptions of the probability that
effort leads to performance. Lawler (1973) identified multiple factors which influence E P
expectancies, including the actual situation, past experiences, and self-esteem.
The second component in the expectancy motivation equation is performance to outcome
expectancy, i.e., P O expectancy (Lawler, 1973; Porter & Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964). P O
expectancies, also known as instrumentalities, answer the question, “if I perform, will it lead to
outcomes?” Because there are multiple outcomes of which an individual may concern himself or
herself, people can have several P O expectancies. Pay is the primary outcome for
consideration in pay research. Lawler (1973) proposed that P O expectancies were influenced
by multiple factors, including the actual P O relationship (i.e., the objective situation), past
experience, and communication from others. Much of the research on pay focuses on the P O
link because of all the links, it is likely to be most controllable for the organization (“most easily
and directly influenced by organizations,” Lawler, 1973, pp. 57-58). That is, an organization
may develop policies to address the extent that outcomes are tied to performance and these
policies are likely to directly affect P O expectancies.
Valence refers to the value an individual places on the outcome of performance (Porter &
Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964). As noted earlier, a number of outcomes may be considered by an
individual. In addition to pay, individuals may consider outcomes such as peer relationships,
respect and recognition from one’s supervisor, and feelings of achievement. While there are
multiple outcomes likely to be considered for any specific action, individuals can cognitively
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manage only a limited number of outcomes and are likely to satisfice in making effort decisions
(Lawler, 1973).
Each of the factors discussed (E P expectancies, P O expectancies, and outcome
valences) come together to determine motivational force. The specific formulation of this
relationship is: Motivation Force (MF) = E P * ∑ (P O * Valence of Outcome). The sum
sign (∑) indicates that there are multiple outcomes for which P O expectancies and outcome
valences are assessed. All of the values associated with outcomes are added together. The
multiplication signs indicate that the theory is multiplicative (Nagengast, Marsh, Scalas, Xu,
Hau, & Trautwein, 2011; Vroom, 1964). That is, if either E P or ∑(P O*valence) equal 0
(e.g., effort is not believed to influence performance, performance will not lead to valued
outcomes), then there is no motivational force and motivated effort will not occur.
It is important to note that expectancy theory is a choice-based theory. That is, it
suggests individuals may have many different equations to determine which level of effort is
optimal. So in a given performance situation, the individual must choose whether or not to exert
effort toward the task, and if effort is exerted, how much will be exerted. In a task performance
situation, the individual’s level of motivation is the effort level that is chosen.
Applications of expectancy theory to explain pay variation have focused mainly on P O
expectancies and valences (Gupta et al., 2012; Kepes et al., 2009). In pay variation contexts,
P O expectancies can be interpreted as P Pay expectancies, which are expected to be
strongest when pay is performance-based. The valences associated with pay in these
performance-based pay environments should be higher when there is greater pay variation
because the potential rewards for high performance are of greater value compared to the
outcomes of poor performance, assuming pay is valued. Specifically, pay variation based on
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performance is viewed as a measure of the intensity associated with the incentive system. As a
result, performance-based pay variations are theorized to be positively related to individual
motivation and performance, which influences firm performance.
Empirical Findings of the Pay Variation and Performance Relationship
One set of theories suggests a negative effect of pay variation on satisfaction (i.e., equity,
relative deprivation) and another set suggests a positive effect of pay variation on motivation
(i.e., tournament, agency, and expectancy). Of course, I propose that it is more complicated than
this (e.g., negative effects would depend on how people feel about pay differences), but here I
discuss the typical treatment of these theoretical arguments in prior research.
Empirical research has dealt with this theoretical tension by describing the theories as
competing arguments to explain the effects of pay variation (e.g., San & Jane, 2008). These
competing arguments are then tested by assessing the pay variation and organizational
performance relationship with authors reporting which effect is stronger based on the results
(e.g., “Our empirical results are more in line with the ‘fairness, morale, and cohesiveness’
models than the ‘tournament’ models,” San & Jane, 2008, p. 886). I review the published
findings supporting each perspective, particularly those with a focus on horizontal pay variation.
Negative relationships have been reported in a variety of samples, including professional
athletes (Bloom, 1999; Depken, 2000), top management teams (Fredrickson, Davis-Blake &
Sanders, 2010), and faculty members (Pfeffer & Langton, 1993). Findings of a positive
relationship have also been reported in a variety of samples, including professional athletes
(Becker & Huselid, 1992), truck drivers (Kepes et al., 2009), and students (Harbring & Luenser,
2008). Methodological differences may illuminate these disparate results.
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Negative relationships are typically found when the pay variation of interest is not
performance-based or legitimate (Downes & Choi, 2014; Gupta et al., 2012). For example,
Kepes et al. (2009) reported pay variation was negatively related to performance when it was
based on politics. Other studies have controlled for performance-based pay, leaving only nonperformance-based pay variation as the independent variable (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; e.g.,
Pfeffer & Langton, 1993).
When methods ensure performance as the source of pay differences (e.g, sports samples
where individual performance is clearly measured or studies where organizations report the
influence of both political and performance factors in determining pay), positive relationships are
often reported. For example, the Kepes et al. (2009) study reported a positive relationship with
firm performance for performance-based pay variation. Trevor et al. (2012) reported that pay
variations explained by individual input were positively related to team performance in the
National Hockey League. Other sports samples where individual performance is the clear
determinant of rewards have also supported a positive relationship. Specifically, race car drivers
(Becker & Huselid, 1992), professional tennis players (Gilsdorf & Sukhatme, 2008), and
marathon runners (Frick & Prinz, 2007) have all been found to increase performance as prize
spreads increase.
A Critique of Prior Research
A number of limitations are apparent from the preceding review. This study aims to
address many of these limitations, which are outlined below.
Pay Basis
Theoretical frameworks all point to the critical role that the performance source or basis
for pay variation plays in a positive relationship between pay variation and firm performance.
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For pay to be motivating, expectancy theory proposes P O expectancy links must be high,
which is essentially representative of the pay and performance link. Similarly, agency theory
indicates tying pay to performance increases alignment of employee behaviors with firm
performance goals. Tournament theory suggests promotion of the highest performer to the next
level leads to higher individual performance. Equity theory indicates that inputs must be
balanced with outcomes. Performance represents an input viewed as one of the most legitimate
in a work context (Werner & Ones, 2000). Pay represents an outcome. Alignment of pay with
performance should be tied to equity perceptions. Relative deprivation theory proposes that
control over pay differences may alleviate feelings of negative deprivation (Crosby, 1976).
From this perspective, performance-based pay may not create feelings of deprivation to the
extent that an employee is able to perform the job (i.e., he or she has control over making
additional money).
Despite the clear importance of the basis for pay variation, it has not been viewed as a
central issue in pay variation research until recently. Empirically, many of the early models of
pay variation did not ensure that performance-based pay variation was central to the analysis.
Rather, it was implicitly assumed that pay variation was performance-based. In reality, pay is
not always performance-based. For example, Kepes et al. (2009) reported that some pay
variation was based on politics in a sample of truck drivers. Research on the determinants of
wages indicates that pay is partially driven by worker productivity, but not fully (Bishop, 1987).
Part of the issue may be that it is difficult to ensure pay variation measures are
performance-based. Even performance appraisals are not fully performance-based (Cleveland &
Murphy, 1992). Research that makes explicit the source of pay variation both theoretically and
empirically is important as work on pay variation moves forward.
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Incentive Intensity versus Pay Allocation
In trying to understand pay variation’s effects, a variety of pay constructs have been
viewed as related and sometimes as equivalent to pay variation. Consider the arguments made
above in various theoretical applications. Terminology for expectancy, agency, and tournament
theory focuses on incentive intensity and pay-for-performance. Terminology for equity and
relative deprivation theory tends to focus on equity and inequity. Pay variation tests are viewed
as tests of equity and equality allocation approaches and/or as tests of incentive intensity. For
example, one approach taken by researchers has been to propose competing arguments for a pay
variation and performance relationship (e.g., San & Jane, 2008). Incentive intensity arguments
based on theories such as tournament or agency theory are applied to explain a positive
relationship and allocation rule arguments based on theories such as equity or relative
deprivation are applied to explain a negative relationship.
The application of these terms is related to the mechanisms through which individuals are
believed to respond to pay variation, i.e., fairness/equity and motivation. The fairness view
based on relative deprivation (Crosby, 1976) and equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965) has focused
on terms such as equity or inequity, equality or inequality (e.g., Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1992).
As noted, the theoretical logic is that employees interpret large gaps in pay compared to others as
inequitable, which has negative performance consequences.
The motivation view based on agency (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), expectancy (Porter &
Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964) and tournament (Lazear & Rosen, 1981) theories describes pay
variation as pay-for-performance and incentive use (e.g., Franck & Nuesch, 2011). The takeaway is that higher pay variation is representative of greater pay-for-performance or greater
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incentive use, and this leads to higher motivation and subsequent performance for individual
employees.
These two views essentially have their own language to define what pay variation
represents; this leads to confusion. Are pay variation, equity, equality, inequity, inequality, payfor-performance, and incentive intensity all addressing the same basic construct? Or are there
important differences between the constructs? The latter seems more likely, as clarified below.
Pay-for-Performance and Incentive Intensity. Pay-for-performance is “pay that varies
with some measure of individual or organizational performance…” (Milkovich et al., 2014, p.
686) while incentive intensity can be defined as “the overall magnitude of the incentive as a
proportion of total pay” (Bamberger & Levi, 2009, p. 302; Zenger & Marshall, 2000). At first
glance, it might appear that pay variation is an accurate representation of incentive intensity for
performance. In reality, it is not so simple. One issue is that pay variation may or may not be
performance-based (Kepes et al., 2009) as noted above.
Aside from the performance-basis issue, an additional issue is that pay variation is an
aggregate measure, a snapshot of the pay distribution or range in an organization at a moment in
time. Data on specific pay strategies, such as the incentive policy of the firm, may be difficult to
obtain; data on the range or dispersion of pay, in some cases, is available publicly (e.g.,
professional sports, academic salaries). These samples have been the predominant samples of
management research in this area. The pay variation measures developed from these samples are
typically based on individual salaries of each member of the organization. Rather than
measuring the actual pay policy of the firm, the range or dispersion in values is assumed to
represent the incentive intensity of the firm. Thus, a measure of pay variation is a proxy for
incentive intensity. A problem arises because this proxy includes more than simply incentive
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intensity. For example, if the firm has high incentive intensity for employees in a job (i.e., there
is a large amount of money that can be awarded for high performance), this will be wellrepresented by a pay variation measure only if there is heterogeneity in the performance
criterion. If performance is homogeneous, there will be little variability in a performance-based
pay variation measure. In sum, the level of variation is created by both the pay policies that are
implemented in a firm as well as the heterogeneity of employees and groups on reward criteria.
The arguments made using pay-for-performance and incentives to describe the
relationship between pay variation and performance are concerned mainly with individual
motivation. Since pay variation acts as a measure of incentive intensity, a stronger test of these
arguments would be to ensure a performance basis of pay and to isolate the incentive intensity
that is driving employee motivation from heterogeneity of performance.
Equity and Equality. Foundational management articles addressing pay variation were
largely rooted in equity and equality allocation arguments. Authors have argued that pay
variation represents an equity allocation approach while pay compression (i.e., low pay
variation) represents an equality allocation approach (e.g., Pfeffer & Langton, 1988, 1993).
Findings about the pay variation and performance relationship are then used to draw inferences
about equity versus equality allocation approaches to pay distribution (e.g., Bloom, 1999; Pfeffer
& Langton, 1993). Table 1 lists the use of the (in)equity and (in)equality terminology in some of
the most influential articles in the pay variation literature. In looking across the definitions, a
number of flaws are notable.
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Table 1
Prior Uses of Equality and Equity Terminology
Article
Pfeffer &
Langton (1988)

Equity/Equality Reference
Equality and dispersion distinction treated as ends of a continuum (p.
588, 589); Dispersion treated as synonymous to inequality (p. 593)

Pfeffer &
Langton, (1993)

“Pay compression or even pay equality is desirable to promote
harmonious social relations” (p. 382); Salary dispersion is described
as a measure of inequality (p. 391)

Bloom, (1999)

High dispersion treated as unequal allocation, which is treated as the
same as inequity (p. 26, p. 38)

Bloom & Michel,
(2002)

Dispersion treated as synonymous with inequality (p. 33)

Shaw, Gupta, &
Delery, (2002)

Salary dispersion is described as a measure of inequality (p. 500)

Trevor, Reilly, &
Gerhart, (2012)

Argue that inequality and inequity are often confounded in prior work
(p. 585)

One flaw occurs when pay variation is treated as a proxy for an equity allocation
approach (i.e., the distribution of rewards based on individual contributions). In reality, there are
different issues that should be considered when theorizing around allocation approaches versus
pay variations. Equating the two involves the assumption that high pay variation is
representative of equity allocations. However, pay variation in organizations may not be the
result of legitimate sources (Downes & Choi, 2013; Gupta et al., 2012; Kepes et al., 2009).
Perceptions of equity tend to be higher when pay differences are the result of performance
differences (Werner & Ones, 2000) versus other sources. In order for high pay variations to be
symbolic of equity allocation approaches, it is necessary that the distributions are based on
performance or other bases that are viewed by employees as legitimate (Downes & Choi, 2013).
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In fact, Leventhal’s (1976) conceptual definition of equity allocation rules defined them as
distributions within a group based on individual contributions. If pay variation is high, pay
differences may be related to individual contributions, but they may not. Thus, the suggestion
that high pay variation is a proxy for an equity allocation rule is tenuous.
Another flaw with suggesting equity is the same as high pay variation and equality is the
same as low pay variation is that allocation rules may vary from work group to work group. So,
while pay variation is largely conceptualized as an organizational phenomenon, allocation rules
are not necessarily conceptualized at this level. Wang and He suggested this distinction in their
work developing a team pay model:
“Note that most studies on pay compression and pay differentiation are conducted at the
firm level, whereas team-based versus individual-based compensation plans are discussed
at the team level. For nondedicated cross-functional team members, an equal team
compensation plan could result in pay differentiation at the firm level...” (2008, p. 763)
An equity allocation approach where high performers are rewarded differentially than low
performers may be the preferred approach by some managers while others may be more prone to
equality allocations. Firms may have large pay differentials across the organization, despite
equal allocations by some managers. In fact, a firm with high incentive intensity based on group
performance may have high pay variation despite an equality allocation rule approach. It seems
unreasonable to assume pay variation is a fair representation of the equity/equality distinction.
Further complicating the application of equity and equality arguments to pay variation
research is that some authors have treated equity and equality as synonymous (rather than a
antonymous as described above) such that high pay variations are viewed as inequality, and this
is assumed to be inequitable (e.g., Bloom, 1999, noted by Trevor et al., 2012). Specifically, pay
variation represents varied pay outcomes among employees, leading to the proposition that
greater pay variation represents both greater pay inequality and inequity (Pfeffer & Langton,
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1993). These pay variation arguments assume that different outcomes (different pay levels)
create inequity, but they ignore the role of inputs (Gupta et al., 2012). Inputs are fundamental in
equity considerations (Adams, 1963, 1965). If pay differences are performance-based, the inputs
are different when high pay variation exists. Greater variation indicates larger pay differences
based on inputs, something that equity theory implies would lead to feelings of equity, not
inequity. In fact, research suggests inequity is perceived when wages are the same but
performance varies (Werner & Ones, 2000). An assumption that pay variation is representative
of both inequity and inequality is inaccurate when pay is performance-based.
In sum, at least two faulty assumptions of equating equity and equality arguments to pay
variation exist, 1) that equity and equality are two ends of the pay variation spectrum, and 2) that
pay variation is equivalent to both inequity and inequality. Application of these assumptions
may simplify the study of firm pay policies by linking pay variation to equity/equality allocation
theoretical arguments. However, considering the issues raised here, the inconsistent findings of
this research stream, and the importance of construct clarity to the management discipline, it is
important to explore these issues, and empirically separate the constructs.
Methodological Approach
Methodologies used in the bulk of pay variation research have approached both pay
variation and performance as firm level constructs. On the one hand, this provides ease in study
design and analysis as the variables are at the same level of analysis; these studies are also field
studies, allowing for stronger external validity. On the other hand, this approach misaligns
theoretical applications and empirical models.
All five of the theories described suggest individual level responses can explain the
effects of pay variation on firm performance; yet, individual level responses have received
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limited attention. These theories suggest that the causal chain is: pay variation related policies
(measured as pay variation)

individual motivation and performance (unmeasured)

organizational performance (measured as workforce productivity or firm financial performance).
There is a need to explore the assumption that these policies influence individual performance.
The theoretical mechanisms described by motivation theories, such as valences and P O
expectancies, have not been tested in response to pay variations. In order to understand if and
how these policies influence individuals, these mechanisms also require attention.
It should be noted that in the economics literature, experimental design has been more
common than in the management literature. The findings of this work are interesting and suggest
value in this approach. For example, Abeler et al. (2010) reported that when wages were
allowed to vary, students intended to exert greater effort (representing high motivation).
Harbring and Luenser (2008) found that student effort intentions were higher for high rather than
low prize spreads. Unfortunately, the methods used in these studies are limited. One issue is
that effort allocation is an intention rather than actual effort, i.e., selected performance when
performance is not actually required or selected effort when effort is not actually required. This
does not fully address the individual performance response of interest. This work also tends to
take a tournament theory focus (Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2008, 2011; Harbring & Luenser, 2008),
where individuals compete with others to win the prize, rather than creating a group environment
where there are some common goals among individuals.
Summary and Implications
This study is designed to deal with the limitations described as a way of moving the pay
variation literature forward. As noted earlier, I make explicit two main construct boundaries in
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my investigation, 1) a focus on horizontal pay variation only and 2) a focus on performancebased pay variation only. The rest of this investigation follows with these constraints in place.
The preceding discussion also indicates two compensation policies especially relevant to
the study of pay variation and its consequences, 1) equity and equality allocations, and 2)
incentive intensity. Thus, in this study, I define and operationalize these constructs separately,
which allows for separate theorizing for each.
I define equity and equality within the allocation rule framework (Leventhal, 1976).
Allocation rules guide the distribution of rewards in a group; equity and equality rules are
predominant types of allocation rules (Leventhal, 1976). An equity allocation rule exists when
pay is distributed within a group based on individual contributions to the group; an equality
allocation rule exists when pay is distributed within a group equally.
Incentive intensity is the variable proportion of pay. Specifically, I conceptualize this in
terms of the pay-for-performance range of pay for engaging in work. Larger ranges represent
greater incentive intensity since there is an increased difference between what is paid for low or
average performance and what is paid for high performance. A pay range involves two main
considerations. Pay floors are the amounts that will be paid regardless of performance (Brown &
Huber, 1992). That is, floors are determined by the value of the job to the organization, and are
independent of performance. As pay for the job, differences in floors are likely to be tied to
economic concerns such as labor supply and demand. Floors can be low where one makes very
little for performing poorly or high where even low performance results in a high level of
compensation. Pay ceilings are an aspirational amount. That is, a pay ceiling is the amount that
is possible, that could be paid, if performance is high. Pay ceilings set a cap on what is possible.
Together, the pay floor and the pay ceiling create the pay range (Kepes et al., 2009), or the range
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of possible pay outcomes depending on performance. This pay range represents incentive
intensity, or the proportion of pay that is variable.
In sum, an allocation rule can be viewed as a decision made regarding distributions to
individual members, while pay range is the size of differences established by pay-forperformance plans. These two factors coexist in a compensation system when group
performance creates a pool of rewards to be allocated. Specifically, the potential amount of
money to be distributed to members of a group depends on the pay range of the firm’s pay-forperformance plan. The way this reward pool is distributed depends on allocation rules. In the
case of equality distributions, individual pay outcomes depend on the pay range and the group’s
performance; in the case of equity distributions, individual pay outcomes depend on the pay
range and the individual’s performance (though it should be noted that group performance is
relevant to the creation of the pool). Figure 1 depicts how these issues have been treated in the
past and the treatment approach used in this study. Table 2 juxtaposes the two policies.
The model built and tested in this study is focused on performance-based horizontal pay
variation and separates pay range and allocation rule constructs as different policies. Definitions
of important terms, as defined in prior research, are included in Table 3 for definitional clarity.
These are the definitions used in this study.
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Figure 1
Pay Variation, Incentive Intensity, and Allocation Rules

Table 2
Pay Range and Allocation Rules
Pay Range
Narrow Pay Range
(Low Incentive
Intensity)

Equality Allocation Rule
Narrow range of potential pay
outcomes; Allocated equally
across group members

Equity Allocation Rule
Narrow range of potential pay
outcomes; Allocated based on
individual contributions

Wide Pay Range
(High Incentive
Intensity)

Wide range of potential pay
outcomes; Allocated equally
across group members

Wide range of potential pay
outcomes; Allocated based on
individual contributions
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Table 3
Definitions
Term
Ability
Allocation Rule
Effort
Performance
Expectancy
Equality Allocation
Rule
Equity Allocation
Rule
Incentive Intensity

Definition
The combination of knowing what to do and how to do it (Campbell,
1990)
“principles or values as the basis for distributing outcomes” (Kabanoff,
1991, p. 417; Leventhal, 1976)
(E P) “the perceived likelihood that effort will result in the desired
performance” (aka, expectancy, Nyberg et al., in press, p. 4; Vroom,
1964)
“give all recipients the same, regardless of their contributions”
(Leventhal, 1976, p. 94)
“outcomes are distributed according to input” (Kabanoff, 1991, p. 418)
“distribute rewards and resources in accordance with recipients’
contributions” (Leventhal, 1976, p. 94)

Pay Basis

“the overall magnitude of the incentive as a proportion of total pay”
(Bamberger & Levi, 2009, p. 302; Zenger & Marshall, 2000)
“a set of energetic forces that…initiate work-related behavior…” (Pinder,
1998, p. 11; Pinder, 1984)
(MF) “a multiplicative function of valence…instrumentality…and
expectancy” (Nyberg et al., in press, p. 4; Porter & Lawler, 1968;
Vroom, 1964); A task performance situation has multiple motivational
forces associated with different effort levels; Individuals are expected to
exert effort associated with the highest motivational force.
“decisions regarding how to pay” (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003, p. 115)

Pay Ceiling

Pay maximum, the highest possible pay amount

Motivation
Motivational Force

Pay Floor

“the amount of pay that he or she [the employee] can be certain to take
home” (Brown & Huber, 1992, p. 280); Pay minimum, the lowest
possible pay amount
Pay-for-Performance (PFP) “pay that varies with some measure of individual or organizational
performance…” (Milkovich et al., 2014, p. 686)
Pay Range
“size of the difference between the highest pay rate and the lowest pay
rate” (Kepes et al., 2009, p. 507); “the pay difference across employees
in the same job” (Kepes et al., 2009, p. 500)
Pay Variation
“the extent to which pay varies within a collective” (Gupta et al., 2012, p.
104)
Performance
Engaging in “behaviors relevant to the goals of the organization” (Klehe
& Anderson, 2007, p. 978)
Performance Pay
(P Pay) “the perceived likelihood that the desired performance will be
Expectancy
rewarded [with pay]” (aka, instrumentality, Nyberg et al., in press, p. 4;
Porter & Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964)
Valence of Pay
“perceived value of the reward [pay]”(Nyberg et al., in press, p. 4; Porter
Outcome
& Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964)
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Hypothesis Development
Hypotheses are developed as follows. First, the relationships between pay range,
allocation rules, and individual performance are proposed. A critical part of this investigation is
testing the relationship between performance-based pay variation and individual performance.
The review of the literature indicated that this test should involve the policies creating the pay
variation rather than a pay variation measure as used in prior non-experimental, field research.
Pay variation is best conceptualized from a policy perspective as pay range; allocation rules are
fundamentally different despite the use of allocation rule logic to explain pay variation’s
relationship with performance. Following these hypotheses, expectancy theory is applied in
detail to the pay variation and performance model to develop hypotheses about the mechanisms
through which pay variation may affect individual motivation and performance.
Main and Interaction Effects of Pay Policies on Performance
In the review of the literature, it was noted that performance-based pay variation is
primarily a function the incentive intensity (conceptualized as pay range in this investgation).
Thus, an ideal test of the pay variation and individual performance assumption isolates the pay
range policy. The theories outlined above (e.g., agency, expectancy) all point to positive effects
of pay range, assuming performance is the source of pay differences. Specifically, wide pay
ranges have greater separation between pay floors and pay ceilings. As the aspirational amount
that can be earned increases, motivation to earn the reward for high performance should increase.
All else equal, larger rewards are more desirable than small rewards, and so motivation is
expected to be higher as pay ranges increase.
A separate issue is the effect of allocation rules on individual performance. Allocation
rules, specifically equity and equality distributions, have been confounded with pay variation in
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the past. While allocation rules are different from pay variation and should not be treated the
same conceptually, it is worthwhile to test the relationship of allocation rules with individual
performance as well. Equity allocation rules focus individuals on their own individual
performance, strengthening the line of sight between the behavior and the reward. Equality
allocation rules allow for free riding (i.e., exerting less effort due to group pooling of efforts,
Shepperd, 1993) as the reward is less clearly related to one’s individual performance. These line
of sight effects make equity allocation rules likely to create a stronger situation for encouraging
individual performance than equality allocation rules.
Widening pay ranges increase reward intensity. As the range increases, equity-based
allocation rules should lead to stronger individual motivational effects. By contrast, equalitybased allocation rules are likely to weaken individual motivation because of a weaker link
between individual performance and pay (i.e., weaker line of sight, conceptualized as P O
expectancies when applying expectancy theory). This is because individual effort may be
viewed as less likely to influence the performance outcomes of the group, which are the primary
determinant of the pay that will be earned when equality allocation rules are used. Reward
intensity should strengthen the effect of allocation rules on individual behavior. Individual
performance is rewarded when equity allocation rules are in place while group performance is
rewarded when equality allocation rules are in place. Thus, increasing the reward intensity
should have a stronger effect on individual performance outcomes under equity allocation rules
than under equality allocation rules.
The preceding logic leads to the following three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Individual performance is higher in high pay range conditions than in low
pay range conditions.
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Hypothesis 2: Individual performance is higher in equity allocation rule conditions than
in equality allocation rule conditions.
Hypothesis 3: Individual performance depends on the interaction of pay range and
allocation rule such that: Individual performance will be significantly higher in high pay
range conditions than in low pay range conditions under equity allocation rules, while
the effect of pay range on individual performance will be weaker or non-significant
across pay range conditions under equality allocation rules.
Expectancy Theory Components
Theoretical framework. Specific theoretical frameworks that explain the relationships
proposed in hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are rarely tested. Thus, I focus on applying expectancy
theory as the theoretical mechanism for pay variation’s effects, and testing these relationships.
Expectancy theory is chosen for several reasons. One, expectancy theory is a
parsimonious and comprehensive theory of motivation. It is parsimonious because it narrows
down the multitude of factors that influence motivation to three – effort to performance
expectancies (from here on, E P expectancies), performance to outcome expectancies (from
here on, P O expectancies), and outcome valences. It is comprehensive because most factors in
the environment or in the individual that are likely to influence motivation can be understood
based on their relationship with these three factors. In fact, expectancy theory can accommodate
both tournament theory and agency theory. Tournament theory involves individual desires for
the large prize (i.e., high valences) in high pay variation contexts. It also explains that
employees compete through performance for this prize, meaning that performance must be
believed to be the reason for gaining the prize (i.e., strong P O expectancies). Agency theory
also suggests incentives align the interests of employees and organizations because they are
based on desired employee behaviors (i.e., P O expectancies) and valued (i.e., valence).
Expectancy theory has been well-applied to pay contexts. Lawler, a well-known scholar
in pay research, often applied expectancy theory to explain work motivation as it relates to pay
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(e.g., Lawler, 1971, 1973). As such, in much of his work, he applied expectancy theory to
explain why organizations may struggle to appropriately motivate using compensation. More
recently, scholars have used the expectancy framework to explain the pay variation and firm
performance relationship (e.g., Gupta et al., 2012; Kepes et al., 2009). Here, I apply the theory at
the individual level. This test of the theory to pay variation responses at the individual level is
rarely conducted but makes logical sense based on the theory's attributes. Recent theorizing in
pay variation research has emphasized the value of expectancy theory in explaining pay
variation’s relationship with employee outcomes (e.g., Downes & Choi, 2014; Gupta et al.,
2012), yet there has not been an empirical test of the individual-level theoretical mechanisms of
the theory as applied to pay variation. In this study, I test these effects directly.
Formulation. Here, important expectancy theory issues relevant to the development of a
pay variation and individual responses model are noted. The three expectancy theory
components are E P expectancies, P O expectancies, and valences (see the literature review
and Table 3 for definitions). These three components combine to predict motivational force.
The equation is: Motivation Force (MF) = E P * ∑ (P O * V). Prior research on pay has
often assumed E P expectancies are constant (Gupta et al., 2012). In reality, E P
expectancies are likely to vary based on differences in situations and people. Objectively, some
situations lead to higher E P expectancies than other situations. For example, a sales person
assigned to a high sales volume territory is more likely to perform given a certain level of effort
than a sales person assigned to a low sales volume territory. Furthermore, people vary, such that
some people are likely to perceive their effort as more likely to lead to performance while others
do not, given the same situation. Much of the research focused specifically on expectancy theory
suggests E P expectancies have significant predictive power for motivation and performance.
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For example, Van Eerde and Thierry (1996) reported an average r of 0.22 between E P
expectancies and performance across 21 between-subject studies in a meta-analysis of
expectancy theory. The average r was even higher for intention to exert effort (r=0.38 for three
studies). It seems clear the E P expectancies are important to the prediction of performance.
Thus, I include E P expectancies to develop a more complete model of individual motivation
and performance.
The second part of the equation, ∑ (P O * V), states that all (P O * V) terms are to be
summed. This is because there are multiple outcomes of a behavior that may be considered, pay
is only one of the many outcomes. Individuals can cognitively manage a limited number of
outcomes (Lawler, 1973). In addition, an experimental design is used in this study such that the
only outcome that should vary across conditions is pay. Thus, the theorizing is focused on pay
outcomes, dropping the sum sign of the expectancy equation. The revised equation is: MF =
E P * P Pay * VPay.
Expectancy theory is inherently a choice theory. It suggests that individuals consider
multiple motivational forces at once associated with various behaviors or effort levels, and select
the behavior and effort level associated with the highest motivational force. Because multiple
choices are under consideration, some scholars view expectancy theory as a theory that should be
tested within-subjects (Kennedy, Fossum, & White, 1983). It can predict across subjects as well,
however. Individuals may respond to certain conditions with high E P expectancies, P Pay
expectancies, or valences while other conditions may lower these values. We can predict that
motivation will be higher between subjects across conditions that have differential effects on the
high effort motivation force components.
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The choice nature of expectancy theory is acknowledged here by recognizing multiple
equations may be considered by individuals, and focusing on the most important of these
equations to explaining motivation. Two of the main motivational force equations are the high
effort and the low effort equations. These two equations represent the motivation to perform and
the motivation to slack. The high effort equation is essentially the best case scenario from a
motivation perspective while the low effort equation is essentially the worst case scenario.
The high effort equation involves beliefs that exerting high effort will lead to high
performance, beliefs that this performance will lead to the high pay, and the valence of high pay.
Relating the high pay outcome to the pay range, it is represented by the pay ceiling. That is, the
highest amount possible for performing the task well is the pay ceiling. Thus, the valence of the
pay ceiling is the outcome valence of interest in the high effort motivational force equation.
The low effort equation involves beliefs that exerting low effort will lead to low
performance, beliefs that this low performance will lead to low pay, and the valence of low pay.
Relating low pay to the pay range, this is represented by the pay floor. That is, the lowest
amount that will be paid for performing the task poorly is the pay floor. Thus, the valence of the
pay floor is the outcome valence of interest in the low effort motivational force equation.
While both equations may be relevant, the high effort equation is especially important to
explaining motivation to perform well. As the MFHE (i.e., the motivation force to exert high
effort) increases, higher motivation to perform is expected since performing well is perceived as
likely, being rewarded for performing well is perceived as likely, and the rewards for performing
well (i.e., the pay ceiling) are valued. Kepes et al. (2009) reported that the pay ceiling, rather
than the pay range or pay floor drove performance effects of pay variation in a sample of truck
drivers. Thus, in the theorizing and test presented here, the primary equation applied is (where
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HE=high effort): MFHE = E P * P Pay * VPay. As needed, the MFLE (i.e., the motivational
force to exert low effort) is discussed for comparison purposes.
In sum, the following model has important characteristics that distinguish it from other
applications of expectancy theory in the pay variation context. E P expectancies are treated as
relevant to the pay context. Pay is assumed to be the primary outcome under consideration.
Valences for different pay levels are included. Finally, as the motivational force to exert high
effort increases, motivation is expected to increase.
Effort to Performance Expectancies. As noted, E P expectancies are perceptions that
one’s effort will lead to certain performance outcomes. Referring back to the two MFs, the E P
expectancy for MFHE is more likely to vary among individuals than the E P expectancy for the
MFLE equation. That is, we can assume that beliefs that low effort leads to low individual
performance will be high. Doing little to nothing almost certainly results in low performance.
The more variable E P expectancy is the one associated with high effort. While some
individuals may exert high effort and still perform poorly, others may exert high effort with
better results. An example may clarify the distinction made here. An individual may consider
the effort level to exert in a marathon race. The MFHE is the force associated with working
toward a fast running time; the MFLE is associated with running a slow time. In these equations,
the E P expectancy for running slowly (i.e., the belief that exerting low effort leads to a slow
individual running time) is likely to be high for most individuals; the E P expectancy for a fast
running time (i.e., the belief that exerting high effort leads to fast individual running time) is
likely to vary greatly across individuals.
Most pay variation research does not incorporate E P expectancies. This is likely
because pay itself is more proximal to the other two expectancy factors (P Pay expectancy,
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valence). There are important interactions among the expectancy components, however, such
that E P expectancies are relevant to overall motivation in conjunction with the other
expectancy components that are influenced by pay. Thus, a proximal factor likely to explain
E P expectancies associated with exerting high effort (the MFHE) is identified and incorporated
into the model. The term E P expectancy going forward refers to the E P expectancy for the
MFHE equation, unless otherwise specified.
Campbell (1990) defined ability (i.e., what one is capable of) as including declarative
knowledge and procedural knowledge and skill. Declarative knowledge is one’s ability to “state
the relevant facts and things,” and procedural knowledge and skill is “the knowledge attained
when knowing what to do (i.e., declarative knowledge) has been successfully combined with
knowing how to do it” (Klehe & Anderson, 2007, p. 978). For any given performance task, then,
ability can be viewed as knowing what to do and how to do the given task. Individuals who have
high ability are likely to perceive themselves as capable of completing a task when effort is
exerted since they are likely to have objectively higher E P probabilities (Lawler, 1973). Thus,
ability should be positively related to E P expectancies.
Performance to Outcome Expectancies. Performance to outcome expectancies are
perceptions that one’s performance will lead to certain outcomes (Porter & Lawler, 1968;
Vroom, 1964). P O expectancies in this study are reduced to include only one outcome, such
that only P Pay expectancies are considered. The P Pay expectancy for MFHE involves the
belief that high performance will lead to the high pay outcome.
P Pay expectancies are likely to vary as a result of the pay system. For this reason, pay
research invoking expectancy theory often focuses on this link in the expectancy theory equation
(e.g., Kepes et al., 2009). In the marathon runner example, it is possible to see how prize
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structure (similar to attributes of a pay system) may influence P O expectancies. If the
marathon is a contest where many prizes are given, the runner is likely to have higher P O
expectancies for the high effort equation than if only one prize is given.
The allocation rule in this study appears most likely to influence P Pay expectancies for
exerting high effort (i.e., for MFHE). Specifically, allocation rules that emphasize rewards for
individual performance (i.e., equity allocation rules) should be associated with higher P Pay
expectancies for the MFHE than those that emphasize rewards for group performance (i.e.,
equality allocation rules). Equity allocation rules indicate that the higher performing individuals
receive pay in line with their contributions; equality allocations imply that individual
performance differences are ignored in pay allocations within a group (Leventhal, 1976). Pay in
the equality case, then, is a reflection of group performance alone, over which individuals have
less control, weakening P Pay expectancies associated with the MFHE (Schwab, 1973). True,
individuals contribute to group performance. The contributions of others are uncertain,
especially the extent to which they will perform well. Thus, one’s own performance has a
weaker relationship with pay outcomes for MFHE when equality determines allocation amounts.
Equity allocation rules should lead to a stronger line of sight between individual
performance and outcomes since the individual’s contributions determine individual pay
outcomes (Lawler, 1973). A group that is working toward a pool of pay to be distributed may
perform individually at varied levels. The amount of the pool earned by the group is then
distributed to group members based on each member’s contribution. Assuming a non-zero
reward pool, an equity rule may lead to a large payout for the individual even when the group
performs poorly because the small pool is distributed according to contribution. A small pool
may result in high pay for an individual if she is performing highly and a large pool may still
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result in low pay for an individual if he/she is performing poorly. Overall, then, the individual’s
performance is the primary determinant of her reward when equity allocation rules are in place.
Supporting the superiority of equity allocation rules for individual performance purposes,
Karau and Williams (1993) provided meta-analytic evidence for social loafing in collective
contexts. Based on an integrative model drawing on expectancy theory, the Collective Effort
Model (CEM), the authors reasoned that the relationship between individual performance and
group performance was important to effort exertion. As this link weakens, beliefs that individual
performance will lead to valued outcomes decrease (lower P O*V values). Corroborating this
idea, Schwab (1973) found that individual pay plans were associated with higher P O
expectancies than group incentive plans in a study of production workers.
More recent evidence regarding equity and equality allocations for motivation also
supports the idea that MFHE, and thus overall task motivation, should increase for equity
compared to equality. For example, social loafing (a sign of low motivation) was lower in
groups when an individual incentive component was included, rather than an entirely groupbased reward system (Pearsall, Christian, & Ellis, 2010). In another study, Barnes, Hollenbeck,
Jundt, DeRue, and Harmon (2011) reported that group incentives that included an individual
component led to faster, i.e., higher quantity, performance outcomes (a sign of high motivation)
than group incentives without individual differentiation.
Valence. Valence refers to feelings about an outcome. The outcome of interest in the
MFHE equation is the pay ceiling. Though some have proposed that pay is low in importance to
employees (e.g. Herzberg, Mausner, Petersen, & Capwell, 1957), it is likely that low reporting
on pay importance is an issue of socially desirable responding rather than actually feelings about
pay (Rynes, Gerhart, & Minette, 2004). Several studies show that pay is an important motivating
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influence (Guzzo, Jette, & Katzell, 1985; Locke, Feren, McCaleb, Shaw, & Denny, 1980).
Evidence, then, generally suggests that pay is an outcome of positive valence for most
individuals.
Similar to P Pay expectancies, the value assigned to the pay outcome may be affected
by the pay system in place. The marathon runner may put much higher valence on a one million
dollar reward for a fast running time than a one hundred dollar reward. Similarly, the ceiling of
the range of pay outcomes for performance on a task will affect the valences assigned to a high
effort MF equation. For an employee making a decision about whether or not additional effort is
worthwhile, pay range information, and specifically the pay ceiling, indicates how much pay is
possible if performance is high.
In general, money has an increasing value as the amount increases. Of course, this is a
foundational assumption of much of the economics literature. The function may be linear or
non-linear depending on the theory, but it is generally increasing at low and moderate levels of
pay (Hey & Orme, 1994). Behavioral choices are often predicted based on payout maximization.
Based on rational choice theory, it is assumed that given two alternatives, individuals will select
the alternative with the greatest utility, which can be calculated by assigning monetary values to
potential outcomes (Mellers, Schwartz, & Cooke, 1998). In fact, economists are known for their
ability to assign monetary valuations to non-monetary concerns (e.g., health care, sustainability,
Hanley, Ryan, & Wright, 2003).
Pay is money received in exchange for work. Pay has all the value characteristics
associated with money, but also has symbolic value (Furnham & Argyle, 1998; Mitchell &
Mickel, 1999). In fact, a recent article indicated that the importance of money earned as pay for
effort is more affected by increasing amounts than the importance of money from random
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sources (Devoe et al., 2013). Thus, from both an instrumental perspective and a symbolic
perspective, higher ceilings should have higher valences than lower ceilings.
Expectancy Theory Hypotheses. These basic hypotheses are valuable as support will
demonstrate that allocation rule and pay ceilings do indeed influence the components of the
expectancy equation. The preceding logic leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4: Individual E P expectancy is positively related to individual ability.
Hypothesis 5: Individual P Pay expectancy is higher in equity allocation rule
conditions than in equality allocation rule conditions.
Hypothesis 6: Pay valence is higher in high pay ceiling conditions than in low pay ceiling
conditions.
Individual Motivation
Applications of the expectancy components to individual motivation and performance
have been conceptualized in two ways. One, the expectancy components can be viewed as
predictors of overall motivation (Van Eerde & Theirry, 1996) which then predicts performance
outcomes. Two, the expectancy components can be combined as in the MF function (MFHE =
E P * P Pay * VPay) to create the motivational force for performance. The MF value is then
tested as an antecedent to performance.
The first approach allows for the separation of expectancy components from motivation,
and adds a variable between the expectancy components and performance (expectancy
components

motivation

performance). The second approach is somewhat truer to the

original conceptualization of expectancy theory (Kennedy et al., 1983) and requires attention to
the specific MF of interest. With this approach, there is no mediator (E P * P Pay * Valence
of Pay Outcome = Motivational Force

Performance). Predictions are made according to the

first approach for motivation here. These predictions allow for consideration of the nature of the
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expectancy component’s interaction. For purposes of testing the motivation to performance
relationship (addressed in the next section), both the motivation
MF

performance view and the

performance views are applied.
To the extent the MFHE is high, individuals should be highly motivated. There is

evidence that each factor associated with the high effort equation has an effect individually in
addition to potential interactions. Specifically, in a meta-analysis of expectancy theory
components, Van Eerde and Thierry (1996) reported that all three components positively
predicted effort and intention.
Considering the marathon runner example illuminates this point. If she believes she can
run fast, believes that running fast will lead to a prize, and values that prize, she is likely to exert
the effort to run faster. Assuming none of the factors is equal to zero, there should be a basic
direct effect of every component on motivation. Each of the factors associated with exerting
high levels of effort is expected to increase motivation.
The multiplicative nature of the theory has been debated by scholars because evidence of
the interactions is weak (Lawler, 1994). In fact, Van Eerde and Theirry stated, “Vroom’s models
do not yield higher effect sizes than the components of the models. This suggests that the
models lack validity” (1996, p. 581) as a conclusion in their meta-analysis on expectancy theory.
Since expectancy theory is formulated to be multiplicative (Arnold, 1981; Nagengast et al., 2011;
Porter & Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964), the interactions of the components on motivation are
predicted here. Thus, there is not agreement among scholars regarding the interaction of the
expectancy components. A test of this interaction in the context of pay variation is lacking. It is
valuable to test these interactions, thereby contributing to application of expectancy theory to pay
variation research and to the debate on the multiplicative nature of expectancy theory.
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Predicting the nature of the interaction effects is possible by applying the equation
outlined earlier and mathematically testing the effect of changes in the components on
motivation force. The revised equation provided earlier removed the summation of outcomes
and focused on the pay outcome only: MFHE = E P * P Pay * VPay. Because values for E P
expectancies and P Pay expectancies are probabilities, they are represented in this illustration
within a range of 0 to 1; valences can be positive or negative. Here, positive valences of pay are
assumed based on the logic that money is valued. To ensure a standard scale, valences for pay
outcomes are also treated with values between 0 and 1 in this illustration.
The equations are estimated in Table 4. A wide range of values could have been
considered. The values presented here are simply for illustrative purposes. For two-way
interaction predictions, the third factor is assumed to be held constant. Constants are assigned a
value of 0.50; high probabilities and valences are assigned a value of 0.90; low probabilities and
valences are assigned a value of 0.10. Assigning values allows for prediction of the nature of the
interaction effect, which is plotted in Figure 2. Two-way interactions are similar across factors.
It should be noted that two-way interactions are primarily included for the sake of
completeness. The unmodified expectancy theory formulation is Motivation Force (MF) = E P
* ∑ (P O * Valence of Outcome). Thus, the only two-way interaction that is true to the
original formulation of expectancy theory is the P Pay expectancy by pay valence interaction.
The three-way interaction is best for incorporating E P expectancy. However, to test the threeway interaction, all two-way interactions must be included. Thus, all two-way interactions are
hypothesized.
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Table 4
Illustration of Expectancy Two-way Interaction Equations
Valence Constant
Low P Pay
High P Pay

Low E P
MF = 0.10 * 0.10 * 0.50 = 0.005
MF = 0.10 * 0.90 * 0.50 = 0.045

High E P
MF = 0.90 * 0.10 * 0.50 = 0.045
MF = 0.90 * 0.90 * 0.50 = 0.405

P Pay Constant
Low Valence
High Valence

Low E P
MF = 0.10 * 0.50 * 0.10 = 0.005
MF = 0.10 * 0.50 * 0.90 = 0.045

High E P
MF = 0.90 * 0.50 * 0.10 = 0.045
MF = 0.90 * 0.50 * 0.90 = 0.405

E P Constant
Low P Pay
High P Pay
Low Valence
MF = 0.50 * 0.10 * 0.10 = 0.005
MF = 0.50 * 0.90 * 0.10 = 0.045
High Valence
MF = 0.50 * 0.10 * 0.90 = 0.045
MF = 0.50 * 0.90 * 0.90 = 0.405
Note. The basic expectancy equation is: MFHE = E P * P Pay * Valence of Pay Outcome

Figure 2
Nature of Expectancy Two-way Interactions

49

A simple way to demonstrate the potential for a three-way interaction is to look at the
motivation force equation. Effects of zero would make this illustration especially strong because
all but the high E P expectancy, high P Pay expectancy, and high pay valence environment
would lead to zero motivation force; however, zero values seem unlikely in a work context. That
is, because someone is in a job that he is qualified for, he is unlikely to have a zero value for
E P. Similarly, assuming that pay is performance-based, even when equality allocations are
used, there should be some probability for performance to lead to pay. Finally, pay is assumed to
have a positive value, especially the pay ceiling (i.e., the pay valence incorporated into the high
effort MF equation). All values are represented as non-zero.
The theory and formula lead to the prediction that when all expectancy components are
high, motivational force will be much higher than if any one factor is low. As with the two-way
interactions, these values across possible scenarios are included in a table (Table 5). The nature
of the predicted interaction is presented in Figure 3.

Table 5
Illustration of Expectancy Three-way Interaction Equations
Low E P
Low Valence
High Valence

Low P Pay
MF = 0.10 * 0.10 * 0.10 = 0.001
MF = 0.10 * 0.10 * 0.90 = 0.009

High P Pay
MF = 0.10 * 0.90 * 0.10 = 0.009
MF = 0.10 * 0.90 * 0.90 = 0.081

High E P
Low P Pay
High P Pay
Low Valence
MF = 0.90 * 0.10 * 0.10 = 0.009
MF = 0.90 * 0.90 * 0.10 = 0.081
High Valence
MF = 0.90 * 0.10 * 0.90 = 0.081
MF = 0.90 * 0.90 * 0.90 = 0.729
Note. The basic expectancy equation is: MFHE = E P * P Pay * Valence of Pay Outcome.
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Figure 3
Nature of Expectancy Three-way Interaction
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Individual Motivation Hypotheses. The preceding logic leads to the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 7: Individual E P expectancy is positively related to individual motivation.
Hypothesis 8: Individual P Pay expectancy is positively related to individual
motivation.
Hypothesis 9: Pay valence is positively related to individual motivation.
Hypothesis 10: The MFHE components (individual E P expectancy, individual P
expectancy, and pay valence) interact to predict individual motivation, such that:

Pay

Hypothesis 10a: Individual E P expectancy interacts with individual P Pay
expectancy to predict individual motivation; the positive relationship between
E P expectancy and motivation is strengthened as P Pay expectancy
increases.
Hypothesis 10b: Individual P Pay expectancy interacts with pay valence to
predict individual motivation; the positive relationship between P Pay
expectancy and motivation is strengthened as the pay valence increases.
Hypothesis 10c: Individual E P expectancy interacts with pay valence to predict
individual motivation; the positive relationship between E P expectancy and
motivation is strengthened as the pay valence increases.
Hypothesis 10d: There is a three-way interaction among the three MFHE
components, such that motivation is highest when all three components are high
and low when any one component is low. (see Figure 3 for the nature of this
interaction)
Individual Performance
The foundational concern of the pay variation literature is not simply that motivation
increases but that performance increases (Shaw, 2014). All else equal, intentions (i.e.
motivation) lead to behaviors (Ajzen, 1991). Research indicates a strong correlation between
motivated effort and performance (Broedling, 1975; Lawler & Porter, 1967).
The motivation and performance relationship has been discussed at length in prior
research (Broedling, 1975; Lawler & Porter, 1967; Vroom, 1964), but has been questioned by
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some recent pay researchers (Ariely, 2008; Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein, & Mazar, 2009; Pink,
2009). Some of this work has suggested that over-motivation created by incentives leads to
performance anxiety and prevents positive performance outcomes (Ariely et al., 2009).
However, a closer look at work in this area suggests that it is extreme rewards that may explain
this effect (e.g., $300 for a small amount of work). Thus, it is valuable to test this relationship in
a pay context where amounts vary by less extreme amounts.
Since the pay ranges tested in this study are more reasonable than those of the prior
research on this issue (Ariely et al., 2009), such that the over-motivation problem is unlikely, the
positive motivation to performance relationship is expected to hold. Specifically, greater
motivation will increase performance.
Returning to the prior discussion of expectancy theory, two tests are possible to explain
motivation and performance. In one, the motivation to perform the task predicts task
performance. This is based on the Expectancy Components Motivation Performance model.
This approach allows for the testing of hypotheses 7 through 10 with a subsequent test of the
motivation and performance relationship. In the second test, the high effort motivation force is
actually calculated (MFHE = E P * P O * VPay); this MF value is then used to predict
performance. Thus, hypotheses are presented to address both approaches to testing. The full
model is presented in Figure 4.
Hypothesis 11: Individual motivation is positively related to individual performance.
Hypothesis 12: Individual motivational force (MF=E P * P Pay * VPay) is positively
related to individual performance.
The model presented in Figure 4 depicts a complex network of relationships that explain
the effects of horizontal pay variation-related policies on individual performance. Each link has
been hypothesized above (hypotheses 4 through 12). Support for the hypothesized links will
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contribute to our understanding of individual performance as an outcome of pay variation-related
policies and individual ability. The mediated relationships presented in Figure 4 are also tested.

Figure 4
Full Model

Summary
The hypotheses and model presented here contribute to the conversation on pay variation
in a number of ways. First, allocation rules (i.e., equity and equality) are separated from pay
range (i.e., incentive intensity). This distinction leads to separate predictions. In fact, these pay
policies are expected to interact to predict performance outcomes. Furthermore, allocations rules
are predicted to influence P Pay expectancies while pay range, and specifically pay ceiling, is
predicted to affect valences. Ceilings are theorized as influencing the high effort equation,
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which influences subsequent performance. Kepes et al. (2009) reported that the ceiling was the
driver of pay range effects.
Second, the hypotheses presented are in regard to individual-level responses to pay
variation-related policies. While often theorized, individual-level responses have been somewhat
neglected by the management discipline in pay variation research. A test of the effects of
policies on individual level responses can test the assumption that individuals respond
differentially to pay variations. In addition, explicit incorporation of the expectancy theory
components tests the validity of expectancy theory as an explanatory motivational framework for
pay variation-related policies. Recent theoretical work has indicated that expectancy theory may
be ideal for explaining the effects of pay variation (e.g., Downes & Choi, 2014; Gupta et al.,
2012), but an empirical test is lacking.
Third, the hypotheses here also address other ongoing debates of the pay literature. The
effects of over-motivation in pay contexts have received much attention of late (Ariely, 2008;
Ariely et al., 2009). In this study, the motivation and performance relationship is hypothesized
to be positive (hypotheses 11 and 12). If it is found to be positive, this will provide evidence that
within realistic pay settings, where values are not extreme, pay-for-performance does not
negatively affect performance due to over-motivation. Another inconclusive area relates to
whether or not the multiplicative function of expectancy theory is valid (Van Eerde & Theirry,
1996). Expectancy interactions were hypothesized. Supported for these hypotheses would
provide evidence for the interactive effects proposed by expectancy theory.
In sum, the hypotheses provided here test old assumptions and provide a new treatment
of pay variation. The old assumptions refer to pay variation as an influence on individual
motivational and performance responses. The new conceptualization is a more nuanced policy
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view of pay variation. By separating allocation rules from pay range, the model is based on a
more precise and comprehensive approach to pay variation from an individual motivation and
performance perspective.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Overview
A primary purpose of this study is to address causal inferences regarding pay variation
and individual performance. An experiment was chosen as the research design because
experiments are the most appropriate design for internal validity purposes (Shadish et al., 2002).
The two primary independent variables for this study are pay range and allocation rule.
As noted earlier, pay range is a combination of pay ceilings and pay floors. If both pay
ceilings and pay floors differ across manipulations, it is not possible to know precisely whether
the ceiling or the floor is related to the dependent variable in a causal way. Thus, pay range was
separated into a pay ceiling manipulation and a pay floor manipulation. This means that three
independent variables were identified for manipulation: allocation rule, pay ceiling, and pay
floor. The combinations that result from the pay ceiling and pay floor manipulations represent
various pay ranges. For testing purposes, described in Chapter 4, each manipulation was entered
as an independent variable.
Allocation rule included two levels (i.e., equality and equity); pay ceiling included two
levels (i.e., high of $12 and low of $8); pay floor included two levels (i.e., high of $6 and low of
$2). This led to a 2x2x2 fully crossed factorial matrix, i.e., 8 cells or conditions, as depicted in
Table 6. Participants received pay within this range for performing a data entry task (addressed
in more detail below).
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Table 6
Experimental Conditions
Pay Ceiling/Top End of Range
Low $8.00
High $12.00
Pay Floor/
Bottom End of Range
Equality
Equity
Equality
Equity
Low
$2.00 - $8.00
$2.00 - $8.00
$2.00 - $12.00
$2.00 - $12.00
$2.00
Allocation based Allocation based Allocation based Allocation based
on group
on individual
on group
on individual
membership
contribution
membership
contribution
High
$6.00

$6.00 - $8.00
$6.00 - $8.00
$6.00 - $12.00
$6.00 - $12.00
Allocation based Allocation based Allocation based Allocation based
on group
on individual
on group
on individual
membership
contribution
membership
contribution

In this chapter, the study methodology is described. This includes information about the
task performed by participants, experimental procedures, manipulations, and measures. In
addition, pretesting and pilot testing results are discussed.
Subjects
Participants in the study were business students at a southern university. All students
participating in the study received extra credit in a business course for their participation.
Students were informed that they could earn extra credit for participating in a financial services
task study in the business behavioral research lab. In addition, they were told there was the
potential to earn money; however, no expected monetary amounts were communicated to
participants.
Because there were human subjects involved in this research, institutional review board
approval was necessary. Following initial protocol approval, modifications to the study design
were made. These modifications were mainly the addition of questionnaire items. Each
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modification has a separate approval letter. The institutional review board approval letters are
included in Appendix A.
Task and Materials
The task for the study was a computer task involving data entry of financial information.
This task was completed multiple times. The first time was a two minute training session free of
any manipulation. The second and third times were each five minutes. The second and third
sessions occurred following the manipulation, and were completed for pay. Completing the task
required participants to match an applicant ID number on a paper form to an applicant ID
number on an electronic form, then enter the income value from the paper form into the
electronic form.
The task required printed materials for each participant. These materials were included in
colored binders at each participant’s work station. The materials were identical for all
participants, and there were separate sets of material for each of the three sessions. The
participants were asked to use information from the printed material to enter data on the
computer (see Figure 6 for an example of the paper forms used by participants).
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Figure 6
Mortgage Application Example

Participants were told their task was a group task with other members in different
locations also working on the task with them. This group nature of the task was required because
the allocation rule involves distribution within a group context. In reality, the groups were
simulated in that actual groups did not exist, with the task set up to create the illusion of a group.
The study required some level of interdependence to ensure the task could feasibly
involve equality or equity allocation rules. That is, if there is no interdependence, such that
group performance was simply additive, an equality allocation rule would not make sense; if
there is full interdependence, such that individual contributions could not be identified, an equity
allocation rule would not make sense (DeMatteo, Eby, & Sundstrom, 1998). To ensure either
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pay approach was reasonable, the task was developed to reflect some level of interdependence
while retaining the ability to measure individual performance. The task program created the
feeling of a group by providing information on other participants during both the training video
(e.g., participants are at other universities) and during the login process (e.g., “all participants are
logged in” text box). Participants were asked to enter one piece of information related to
mortgage applications while other group members would input other information (see Figure 7
for the data entry form). This provided interdependence in that group members had separate
pieces of important information, and they were building an overall database as a group.
Furthermore, they were told that for the mortgage application to be processed, it was necessary
to have six pieces of information entered correctly. There was some reward interdependence in
all conditions because group performance was indicated to the participant as determining the
pool of pay for the group though the allocation rules differed across conditions.
The task was developed to reflect work of an entry level financial services employee.
Participants were told that the study would help researchers better understand the most effective
work design for this specific task.
An additional requirement for the task was that it allow for individual performance
measurement that could be completed quickly and efficiently. Thus, the program quickly
referenced the database entries completed by the participant to check for the number of accurate
entries completed during the data entry session. The data on performance was communicated to
a laptop in the debriefing room to allow for payment at the end of the study.
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Figure 7
Mortgage Application Task Data Entry Form

Experimental Procedure
Participants recruited through courses signed up to participate in the study through an
online experiment management system. Using the online system, participants could browse the
available times and selected a 1.5 hour timeslot to participate. Times were available during the
day and in the evening so that most individuals who wanted to participate could participate.
There were 47 sessions available for sign up with 18 timeslots per time period. This provided
846 available spots.
The full participant schedule is presented in Table 7. On the day of the session,
participants went to the business behavioral research laboratory at their assigned time. Once at
the lab, participants checked in at the front desk. Participants completed an informed consent
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form (see Appendix A for a copy of the informed consent form), then listed their instructor
information on a separate sign-in form so that extra credit could be assigned.
At the time the study was to start, participants were told their participant ID number and
given a notecard with both their participant ID number and laptop number written on the card.
They were told that the participant ID number should be entered correctly every time to ensure
payment at the end of the study and asked to write the ID number by their name on the sign in
sheet. This was done because the ID number was critical for the program to run correctly. The
computer program referenced the participant ID number to indicate the appropriate information
to display because the participant ID number contained the condition number. The participant
was then instructed to go to the computer lab, find his/her assigned laptop, and enter the
participant ID number on the laptop to begin the study.
During the study (i.e., after sign in and before the payment and debriefing), there was no
need for interaction with the experimenter except in the case of questions. At the end of the
session, participants were paid and debriefed by the experimenter. Because everything went
through the computer program, participants had as much time as needed to complete
questionnaires or read information. The only time-constrained activities were the training and
task performance sessions. This allowed for a staggered exit of participants, which was
beneficial during the payment and debriefing process.
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Table 7
Participant Schedule

Task
Participant Sign-In and Consent Form Completion

Approximate
Time (Minutes)
5

Brief Study Introduction Video, followed by Questionnaire I:
Motivational Traits, Big Five, Trait Affect, Social Desirability, Equity
Sensitivity, General Mental Ability

12

More Detailed Introduction & Training Video

7

Training Practice

2

Manipulation

2

Questionnaire II: Expectancy Components, Effort and Motivation,
Manipulation Checks

5

Task Performance 1

5

Questionnaire III: Individual performance, Group performance

2

Task Performance 1 Pay Information

5

Questionnaire IV: Pay Satisfaction, Fairness Perceptions, Emotions

10

Manipulation Repeated

2

Questionnaire IV (continued): Expectancy Components, Effort and
Motivation, Manipulation Checks

5

Task Performance 2

5

Questionnaire V: Individual performance, Group performance

2

Task Performance 2 Pay Information

5

Questionnaire VI: Pay Satisfaction, Fairness Perceptions, Emotion,
Feelings toward Group, Interest in Continuing Work

10

Pay, Debrief, Opportunity to Ask Questions

5
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Once seated at their laptops, participants entered their participant ID number, then watched a
short video introducing them to the study. The video included a professionally dressed man,
speaking to the participant. He said the following:
“Hello, my name is William. We really appreciate you being a part of our study today.
First, let me tell you about what we are doing.
This study is intended to help us understand the efficiency of data entry methods in the
financial services industry. Your participation in this study is very important because the
research findings may help banking organizations run more effectively.
Over the next couple of hours, you will work with a group to complete a financial
services task and respond to questionnaires multiple times. The directions for what you
are to do throughout the study will be included on your laptop.
Please read and follow all of the instructions provided throughout the study. Please
complete all questions to the best of your ability. If you have any technical difficulties
throughout the study, please simply raise your hand. You can now begin by completing
the first questionnaire. ”
Participants then completed a questionnaire that included several individual difference
measures. Following the questionnaire, participants watched a video on the laptop that provided
training on the experimental task. This training was a video made via screen capture and voice
over (see Appendix B for a copy of the slides and training language). Following the video,
participants were asked to use the training binder that included print mortgage application forms
to practice what they had learned from the training video. Performance in this practice session
was measured, but not communicated to participants. This performance measure was used as the
measure of ability.
Following the training practice session, the laptop screen provided additional information
about participating in the task as a member of a group and the method of payment for the
participant (i.e., the manipulation). The participant completed Questionnaire II after the
manipulation. Questionnaire II included motivation measures and manipulation checks. The
participant then began their first task performance session using a binder of printed materials
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labeled TASK1. This task performance session took place for five minutes. At the end of the
five minutes, participants responded to Questionnaire III regarding perceived individual and
group performance. At this point, the data collected were sufficient for testing all hypotheses
proposed in Chapter 2. However, in order to allow for a broader data collection that incorporated
important considerations in this area of research, such as affective and cognitive responses to
compensation after a payment is made, additional questionnaires were administered and the
manipulation was repeated. The next paragraph describes this extension. However, all
hypotheses were tested based on data from Questionnaire II, Questionnaire III, the training
performance session, and the TASKI performance session.
Following Questionnaire III, a message told the participants: a) their own performance
level (measured based on the number of accurate entries and performance cutoffs established
during pilot testing, discussed in detail later in this chapter), b) the group’s performance level
(average in all cases), and c) payment based on this information and the condition. The
participant then completed Questionnaire IV, which included responses to compensation after
being paid (e.g., emotions and pay satisfaction). After the first part of Questionnaire IV,
participants were told that they would be performing the task again for five minutes with the
same pay system in place (i.e., the manipulation was repeated). This was the same pay
manipulation used for the first five minute task performance session. The participants completed
the second part of Questionnaire IV next, which included motivation measures and manipulation
checks for the second paid round of the task. Questionnaire V was included following the task
performance session to measure perceived performance before actual performance information
was shared. Questionnaire VI measured responses to the pay and task. After finishing this
questionnaire, the screen indicated to the participants that they had completed the study, should
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now leave the computer lab quietly, and should go to the conference room to receive payment.
An illustration of the programming screens for the experimental session are provided in
Appendix C. A full copy of the questionnaire codebook is available in Appendix D.
When participants arrived for debriefing, the researcher asked for the index card
containing the participant ID number and laptop number. This information was used to look up
the participant’s payment. The participant was then paid and asked to sign the receipt book
regarding payment. The actual purpose of the study was then revealed to the participant. Here is
the script used for the debriefing:
“As we are still in the process of conducting this study, it is really important that you
keep information about this study confidential and don’t discuss it with anyone else.
In this study, we are trying to understand what causes people to be motivated and perform
well on a task. The groups in this study were simulated and all were rated as having
average performance. We were most interested in how your compensation influenced
your performance.
If you would like more information regarding this study, we can e-mail you a copy of the
paper once it has been published.”
Participants were also asked if they had any information about the study prior to arrival for the
study session and given the opportunity to ask questions or provide feedback. After debriefing,
the participant had completed the study.
Experimental Manipulations
As noted earlier, the study had 8 conditions. These conditions varied according to
allocation rule (equality and equity), pay ceiling (low and high), and pay floor (low and high).
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions. In selecting pay values, the potential total
payout for approximately two hours in the lab was considered. Assuming minimum wage is
viewed as appropriate, the average amount paid should be around $14 to $15 per participant.
Another consideration for determining pay ceilings and floors was the resulting range (i.e.,
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creating low floor, high ceiling conditions that were much larger than the high floor, low ceiling
conditions). Thus, the pay floor values were $2 and $6 and the pay ceiling values were $8 and
$12. This means that the range of payments received across all participants was between $4 and
$24 since there were two sessions for which participants were paid. Table 8 shows the pay
range-related condition information for one session.

Table 8
Pay Ceiling and Floor Conditions
Pay Ceiling/Top End of Range
Pay Floor/
Bottom End of
Range
Low
$2.00

High
$6.00

Low
$8.00
$2.00 - $8.00
Range = $6.00
Midpoint = $5.00

High
$12.00
$2.00 - $12.00
Range = $10.00
Midpoint = $7.00

$6.00 - $8.00
Range = $2.00
Midpoint = $7.00

$6.00 - $12.00
Range = $6.00
Midpoint = $9.00

In addition to the pay conditions, the allocation rule was also manipulated, such that some
individuals were paid under an equality allocation rule and others under an equity allocation rule.
Participants were told that pay for the job they were doing ranged from a low value to a high
value depending on their pay condition (see Table 8 above); they were also told that they had
been assigned to a workgroup to complete the task and that the performance of the workgroup
determined the pool available for payment. The participants were told that pay was either
distributed to the group members equally (in equality conditions) or based on individual
contributions (in the equity conditions). Following performance of the task, participants were
informed of their payment and the payments of other group members. All participants were paid
68

based on membership in an average performing group. Thus, individuals in the equality
conditions were paid based on equal distributions of the average group performance pool (all
group members received the same payment). Participants in equity conditions were paid based
on measurement of their actual performance (group members received different payments
depending on performance). Table 9 lists the actual payments that were made during the study.

Table 9
Actual Study Payments
Pay Ceiling/Top End of Range
Pay Floor/
Bottom End of
Range
Low
$2.00

High
$6.00

Low/$8.00
Group Range: $16 - $64
Ind. Range: $2 - $8
Reward Pool for Average
Performing Group of 8 = $40
Equity Condition:
High Perf = $8, Average Perf =
$5, Low Perf = $2
Equality Condition:
All = $5

High/$12.00
Group Range: $16 - $96
Ind. Range: $2 - $12
Reward Pool for Average
Performing Group of 8 = $56
Equity Condition:
High Perf = $12, Average Perf =
$7, Low Perf = $2
Equality Condition:
All = $7

Group Range: $48 - $64
Ind. Range: $6 - $8
Reward Pool for Average
Performing Group of 8 = $56
Equity Condition:
High Perf = $8, Average Perf =
$7, Low Perf = $6
Equality Condition:
All = $7

Group Range: $48 - $96
Ind. Range: $6 - $12
Reward Pool for Average
Performing Group of 8 = $72
Equity Condition:
High Perf = $12, Average Perf =
$9, Low Perf = $6
Equality Condition:
All = $9
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The text for the manipulation was as follows. Items in bold were populated based on
condition. As noted, the ‘group’ participants were in was a simulated group. Thus, each
participant represented one observation.
Before Task Performance Sessions 1 & 2:
You will be working in a group with 7 other people to enter the information from the
forms into the computer.
Pay is based on the performance of members of the group.
Individual performance is determined by the number of accurate entries made by an
individual. For you, this is the number of accurate entries made in the income field.
Group performance is determined by the number of applications that can be processed
and the accuracy of those applications.
To process an application, at least 6 of the 8 fields must be entered.
Your group can make between [GROUP FLOOR #] and [GROUP CEILING #].
This money will be distributed to individual members of the group [based on individual
contributions - OR - equally].
In other words, individual payments [depend on individual performance - OR - are the
same for everyone in your group].
Since this money will be distributed [based on individual contributions - OR - equally
among group members], your payment [is dependent on your performance as follows
- OR - is dependent on the group’s performance as follows]:
•
•
•

High individual performance – you will receive [individual ceiling].
Average individual performance – you will receive [individual midpoint].
Low individual performance – you will receive [individual floor].
- OR –

•
•
•

High performing group – you will receive [individual ceiling].
Average performing group – you will receive [individual midpoint].
Low performing group – you will receive [individual floor].
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Measures
Ability was measured as the number of correct entries made during the training
performance session. The expectancy components and motivation were measured using selfreported responses (see survey measures below). The performance dependent variable was
measured subjectively (self-reported, see survey measures below) and objectively. The objective
performance measure was the number of accurate entries in the income field by the participant
during the TASK1 session.
Survey Measures
Questionnaires were administered at six points during the session. For the purposes of
testing the hypotheses from Chapter 2, survey measures were collected related to the TASK1
session. Survey measures were used for the following variables: effort to performance
expectancy, performance to pay expectancy, valence of pay, motivation, and subjective
performance. See the codebook in Appendix D for all measures collected during the study.
For effort to performance expectancies, performance to pay expectancies and motivation,
participants were asked to: “Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the
following regarding the task you will be performing (TASK1).” Responses to items were on 5
point Likert scales ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The effort to performance
expectancy and performance to pay expectancy scales were adapted from scales used in a study
described in Djurdjevic (2013).
Effort to performance expectancy was measured using the following five items:
1. How well I do on this task depends on how much effort I put into it.
2. The effort that I put into this task is not related to my performance on this task.
(Reverse Coded)
3. If I try hard, I will do well on this task.
4. There is a good chance that my performance will be high on this task.
5. If I put my mind to it, I should be able to perform this task well.
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Performance to pay expectancy was measured using the following five items:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The better I perform on this task, the more money I will make.
How much money I make depends on how well I perform this task.
It is likely that I will make more money if I perform well on this task.
If I perform well, I will make more money.
My performance on this task will not affect how much money I make. (Reverse
Coded)

Motivation was measured in the pilot study using ten items:
1. I hope I do really well here.
2. I am very motivated to do well on this task.
3. I feel driven to do well on this task.
4. I really want to do well.
5. I am highly motivated to do well on this task.
6. I couldn't care less whether or not I perform well in this session. (Reverse Coded)
7. I am motivated to perform well on this task.
8. I don't care whether or not I do well here. (Reverse Coded)
9. I'm really not motivated to do well on this task. (Reverse Coded)
10. I do not care about my performance on this task. (Reverse Coded)
The measure was then reduced to the following five items for the full study (for details on
this reduction, see Pilot Testing later in this chapter):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

I am very motivated to do well on this task.
I feel driven to do well on this task.
I really want to do well.
I am motivated to perform well on this task.
I do not care about my performance on this task. (Reverse Coded)

For the pay valence associated with the pay ceiling, participants responded to three items
on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Specifically, the
participants were asked to: “Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the
following regarding the maximum amount you can make for the task you will be performing
(TASK1).” The valence scale was also adapted from scales used in a study described in
Djurdjevic (2013). The following three items in response to this question were used for the pay
valence scale:
72

1. I would really like to make this much money.
2. I want to make this amount of money.
3. I really value this amount of money.
Subjective performance was measured using 2 questions after performing the task, but
before pay information and performance feedback was given. Question 1 asked the following,
“How would you rate your performance on the task (TASK1)?” with responses on a 5-point
scale ranging from poor to excellent. Question 2 asked the following, “Individual performance is
rated as Low, Average, or High. Where do you expect your individual performance will be rated
for TASK1?” with responses on a three point scale of low, average and high.
Pretest
Pretesting was completed in June 2013. Eight PhD students went through the entire
program from a participant perspective to assess the flow and capacity of the task program and to
provide suggestions for improvement. There were not any incentives at this stage. Data from
this run through were not used for any analyses. Rather, feedback given during a group
roundtable discussion session of the PhD students was used to improve the study design.
Feedback from pretesting lead to two primary updates to the program. First, the training
video was revised to provide a stronger sense of the group nature of the task (see Appendix B for
the final video slides and script). Second, the program had a capacity issue that would not allow
it to run for all participants at once. This was corrected prior to pilot testing.
Pilot Test
Pilot testing was completed in June 2013 with four objectives: 1) a full run through of the
study to ensure logistical efficiency and computer operation, 2) a test of the manipulations, 3) a
test of measure reliability, and 4) a test of the appropriateness of performance cutoffs.
Undergraduate students in business courses were provided extra credit for participation in the
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pilot study. They were also paid for participation based on their condition, and in equity
conditions, individual performance.
Logistical Efficiency and Computer Operation
Twenty-nine undergraduates participated in the pilot study. Regarding the full run
through of the study, undergraduates were comfortable with the operation of the program and
were able to navigate the various screens. The training video was effective as most participants
completed the task as described.
The most significant issue that arose in the pilot study related to the participant
experience involved the participant ID number entry. One participant entered the ID incorrectly,
leading to problems with the manipulation/payout process. Thus, a new protocol was added that
participants would write their ID themselves on the sign in form to confirm they read it correctly,
and they would be told at sign in, “the participant ID number must be entered correctly so that
we can pay you at the end of the study.”
Manipulation Checks
Manipulation checks confirmed that participants were aware of the compensation policies
for the task. Most participants correctly entered their minimum and maximum pay amounts (i.e.,
the floors and ceilings). Tables 10 and 11 provide the frequency of responses by condition. For
ceilings, 86% of participants in the low ceiling condition and 87% of participants in the high
ceiling condition entered the correct value when asked to fill in the blank for the statement, “The
most money I can make in this session is $__________.” For floors, 100% of participants in the
low floor condition and 93% of participants in the high floor condition entered the correct value
when asked to fill in the blank for the statement, “The minimum amount of money I can earn
during this session is $__________.”
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Table 10
Pilot Response to Ceiling Manipulation Check
Item: The most money I can make in this session is
$_____________.
-Enter Dollar Amount Here
Low
High
Response
N=14
N=15
8
12
0
85.71%
0.00%
12
0
13
0.00%
86.67%
16
0
1
0.00%
6.67%
64
2
0
14.29%
0.00%
96
0
1
0.00%
6.67%

Table 11
Pilot Response to Floor Manipulation Check
Item: The minimum amount of money I can earn during this
session is $_____________.
-Enter Dollar Amount Here
Low
High
Response
N=15
N=14
2
15
0
100.00%
0.00%
6
0
13
0.00%
92.86%
48
0
1
0.00%
7.14%

When ceilings and/or floors were entered incorrectly, it was primarily due to participants
incorrectly entering the group minimum and maximum. To correct for this, when running the
full experiment, group minimum and maximum pay questions were added next to the individual
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minimum and maximum manipulation checks. This was to help the participants distinguish
between the group ceiling/floor and the individual ceiling/floor in their responses.
The means for the allocation rule manipulation checks were also in the expected
directions. Mean responses on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly
agree to the item, “Pay on this task is based on my individual performance,” were significantly
higher in the equity condition (M=3.92, N=13) than in the equality condition (M=2.75, N=16),
F(1, 27)=9.54, p<0.01. Mean responses on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree
to strongly agree to the item, “Pay on this task is based on my group's performance,” was
significantly higher in the equality condition (M=4.50, N=16) than in the equity condition
(M=3.38, N=13), F(1, 27)=7.75, p<0.05. See Table 12 for allocation rule manipulation checks.

Table 12
Allocation Rule Manipulation Checks

Item
Pay on this task is based on
my group's performance.

Pay on this task is based on
my individual performance.

Condition
equality

N
16

Mean
4.50

Std.
Deviation
0.73

equity

13

3.38

1.39

equality

16

2.75

0.93

equity

13

3.92

1.12

Measure Reliability
The third purpose of the pilot study was to assess the measurement items for the variables
in the study. For both effort to performance expectancies and for performance to pay
expectancies, each five item scale had high internal consistency (E P expectancy α=0.84;
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P Pay expectancy α=0.89), and all items were included for the final study. Table 13 and Table
14 provide detailed information for each of the items.

Table 13
Effort to Performance Expectancy Item Descriptive Statistics

Item (N=29)
How well I do on this task depends on how much effort I put into it.

Mean
4.28

Std.
Deviation
0.75

The effort that I put into this task is not related to my performance on
this task. (Mean is based on the item after it was recoded)

3.93

1.07

If I try hard, I will do well on this task.
There is a good chance that my performance will be high on this task.

4.38
4.34

0.62
0.77

If I put my mind to it, I should be able to perform this task well.

4.59

0.50

Mean

Std.
Deviation

The better I perform on this task, the more money I will make.

4.38

0.82

How much money I make depends on how well I perform this task.

3.93

1.03

It is likely that I will make more money if I perform well on this task.

4.41

0.63

If I perform well, I will make more money.

4.31

0.81

My performance on this task will not affect how much money I
make. (Mean is based on the item after it was recoded)

3.28

0.70

Table 14
Performance to Pay Expectancy Item Descriptive Statistics

Item (N=29)

Regarding the motivation measure, ten items were included in the pilot test, but this was
reduced to five items for the full experiment as feedback from participants indicated some survey
fatigue. The ten item measure had high internal consistency (α=0.96). Items with the strongest
intercorrelations, and thus contributing to internal consistency were selected for inclusion in the
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full study. See Table 15 for detailed information regarding the motivation items included in the
pilot study.

Table 15
Motivation Item Descriptive Statistics

Item (N=29)
I hope I do really well here.

Mean
4.55

Std.
Deviation
0.74

Item Used for
Full Study

I am very motivated to do well on this task.

4.28

0.96

X

I feel driven to do well on this task.

4.24

0.95

X

I really want to do well.

4.38

0.94

X

I am highly motivated to do well on this task.

4.17

0.97

3.79

1.32

4.28

0.96

4.10

0.98

3.72

1.31

4.14

0.99

I couldn't care less whether or not I perform well in
this session. (Mean is based on the item after it was
recoded)
I am motivated to perform well on this task.
I don't care whether or not I do well here. (Mean is
based on the item after it was recoded)
I'm really not motivated to do well on this task.
(Mean is based on the item after it was recoded)
I do not care about my performance on this task.
(Mean is based on the item after it was recoded)

X

X

Subjective performance was measured using two items: “How would you rate your
performance on the task (TASK1)?” with responses on a 5-point scale ranging from poor to
excellent and “Individual performance is rated as Low, Average, or High. Where do you expect
your individual performance will be rated for TASK1?” with responses on a 3-point scale of low,
average and high. The coefficient alpha for the two subjective performance items was 0.69. The
correlation for these two items was 0.60 for the pilot study. These low values may be because
the 3-point scale is limited while the 5-point scale allows for finer distinctions. No participants
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selected low for their performance level for the 3-point scale question. Both items were included
for the full study. Since the two items were on difference scales, for analysis purposes, both
items were standardized and then combined. The coefficient alpha based on the standardized
items was 0.75. See Table 16 for item descriptive statistics.

Table 16
Performance Item Descriptive Statistics

Item (N=29)
How would you rate your performance on the task (TASK1)? (5point response scale)
Where do you expect your individual performance will be rated
for TASK1? (3 point response scale)

Mean

Std.
Deviation

3.72

0.84

2.62

0.49

Three items were included for pay valence in the full study, but were not tested as part of
the pilot study. This was because the decision to measure the pay valence directly in relationship
to the pay maximum, which is truer to the expectancy theory application used here, was made
after the pilot study was completed. Initially, the questionnaire simply asked questions regarding
the valence of pay, in general, without reference to the maximum. Direct questions about the
pay maximum value were a better representation of the pay valence construct in the high effort
motivational force equation, and were used for the full study.
Performance Cutoffs
Regarding performance cutoffs (i.e., the number of accurate entries in the income field
required for each level of performance), the distribution of correct entries during the pilot was
considered in order to set the performance cutoffs for the full study. Performance cutoffs were
not critical to testing of the hypotheses in Chapter 2, but were important for paying participants
and for running the full study. For pretesting and pilot testing, performance cutoffs were set as
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follows: Low = 0 to 14 correct entries; Average = 15 to 19 correct entries; High = 20 or more
correct entries.
The distribution of performance for the pilot study is provided in Figure 8. Based on
this distribution, performance cutoffs were adjusted to ensure a distribution of low and high
performers across conditions.

Figure 8
Pilot Study Performance Distribution

Frequency

4
3
2
1
0
7

9

11

13

15

17

19

21

23

25

27

29

31

33

Based on the pilot study performance levels, the following cutoffs were established for
the full experiment: Low = 0 to 22 correct entries, Average = 23 to 26 correct entries, High = 27
or more correct entries.

Funding
The average payment for participation in this study was approximately $15. Funding for
payments to participants and other miscellaneous expenses was provided by the James H. Penick
Endowment ($10,000) and the SHRM Foundation Dissertation Grant Award ($5,000).
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Overview
The hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 were tested using the data collected according to
the methods described in Chapter 3. The results of these tests are reported here. Before
reporting the results of the hypothesis tests, the sample is described, manipulation checks are
reported, and the psychometric properties of variables are discussed.
Study Sample
The sample for this study was made up of 584 undergraduate business students at a large
university. Student participants were recruited in classrooms and were all given extra credit for
participation in the study. Sixty-two percent of participants reported their sex as male, and 78
percent reported their race as white. The average reported participant age was 21 years old.
Of 584 participants in the study, the data for 16 participants were removed from the
analysis. There were two reasons for which an observation was removed. First, some
participants were repeat participants, such that the second observation would not be independent
(N=3). Second, there were some technical difficulties that led to removal of observations
(N=13). The primary technical issue occurred during one session when the server disconnected,
which prevented data from being recorded. Other technical issues were specific to laptop
failures. The analysis described here is based on the remaining 568 participants.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Allocation rule, pay ceiling and pay floor were all manipulated variables. Individual
ability and objective individual performance were measured based on the count of correct entries
for the training and first paid task sessions, respectively. All mediators of the model and the
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subjective individual performance measure were measured using multiple survey response items.
Thus, a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to assess the construct validity of the items
used for the mediators and subjective performance measures. In addition, variables were
inspected to ensure they met parametric testing assumptions.
Prior to running any analysis, three items were re-coded (e.g., 1 was recoded to 5; 2 was
recoded to 4, and so on), so that the measurement scales would match other items tapping the
construct. The reverse coded item for E P expectancy was “The effort that I put into this task is
not related to my performance on this task.” The reverse coded item for P Pay expectancy was
“My performance on this task will not affect how much money I make.” The reverse coded item
for motivation was “I do not care about my performance on this task.”
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was completed to ensure items used to measure
each construct were related to the intended construct, and not cross-loading onto other related
constructs. The analysis was complete in AMOS 20.0 (Arbuckle, 2011). Missing information
limits the capability of AMOS to run full analyses. Some cases had missing responses on items
and had to be excluded for analysis in AMOS. For the CFA, 558 cases were included. The
reduction made for the CFA was not required for the hypothesis tests described later in this
chapter. The CFA involved five parts – individual model fit, convergent validity, reliability,
discriminant validity, and full measurement model fit.
Individual Construct Model Fit
Model fit for each construct was assessed by separately analyzing the measurement
model for each construct to the extent possible. In some cases, the latent variable had less than
four items, requiring fit to be assessed with two latent variables at a time. Significant χ2 values
indicate poor model fit when sample sizes are small or medium (Byrne, 2010). For large sample
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sizes, significant χ2 values are likely and are not a good indicator of model fit. Thus, to assess
model fit, alternative fit measures were also used with cutoff criteria based on Hu and Bentler
(1999). Specifically, CFI values greater than 0.95, SRMR values less than 0.08, and RMSEA
values less than 0.06 were treated as indications of good model fit.
For the full five item E P expectancy scale, the RMSEA value was greater than 0.06
and the χ2 p-value was less than 0.001. To determine the item that may be problematic, the items
were reviewed to assess their connection to the underlying construct.
E P Expectancy Items:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

How well I do on this task depends on how much effort I put into it.
If I try hard, I will do well on this task.
There is a good chance that my performance will be high on this task.
If I put my mind to it, I should be able to perform this task well.
The effort that I put into this task is not related to my performance on this task.
(R)

From a review of the items, one item in the E P expectancy scale appeared to be a poor
fit conceptually. Specifically, responses to the item, “there is a good chance that my
performance will be high on this task” could be based on one’s overall motivation rather than
exclusively one’s beliefs that effort leads to performance. After removing the item from the
analysis, model fit improved. For the four item E P expectancy scale, all fit indicators were
within recommended limits. CFI and SRMR values continued to be acceptable. χ2 p-values and
RMSEA values were improved and acceptable (χ2 p-value>0.05; RMSEA = 0.05).
For the P Pay expectancy scale, the RMSEA value was also greater than 0.06 and the χ2
p-value was less than 0.001. Similar to what was done for E P expectancy, the P Pay
expectancy items were reviewed to assess their connection to the underlying construct.
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P Pay Expectancy Items:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The better I perform on this task, the more money I will make.
How much money I make depends on how well I perform this task.
It is likely that I will make more money if I perform well on this task.
If I perform well, I will make more money.
My performance on this task will not affect how much money I make. (R)

The second item was somewhat inconsistent with a conceptual definition. Specifically,
responses to the item, “How much money I make depends on how well I perform this task”
seemed to include both P Pay expectancy (i.e., the belief that pay was tied to performance) and
the size of the pay. That is, rather than simply being a probability, this value indicated an
amount in a more distinct way than the other items. The last item “My performance on this task
will not affect how much money I make” had a similar issue, but it was not necessary to remove
additional items as the model fit improved and all model fit indices were satisfactory against the
cutoffs after removing one item (“How much money I make depends on how well I perform this
task” was removed, all other items were retained).
For the motivation scale, fit with the five item scale was acceptable. Thus, no items were
removed from the scale. For pay valence and subjective performance, there were less than four
items for each construct, so these constructs could not be analyzed individually. This is because
there would not be enough degrees of freedom to assess model fit (Kline, 2011). The four item
P Pay expectancy measure had very good fit, so each construct was run separately with the four
item P Pay expectancy measure to allow for a test of fit. All alternative fit indices for all three
constructs were acceptable. See Table 17 for fit information for each model.
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Table 17
Model Fit

Latent Construct
E P Expectancy
E P Expectancy
P Pay Expectancy
P Pay Expectancy
Motivation
Pay Valence (with
four item P Pay
Expectancy)
Subjective
Performance (with
four item P Pay
Expectancy)

# of
Items
5
4

χ2 (df)
23.18 (5)
5.20 (2)

χ2 p-value
<0.001
0.07

CFI
0.98
0.99

SRMR
0.03
0.02

RMSEA
0.08
0.05

5
4
5

56.15 (5)
1.53 (2)
6.05 (5)

<0.001
0.47
0.30

0.95
1.00
1.00

0.04
0.01
0.01

0.14
<0.001
0.02

3

25.78 (13)

0.02

0.99

0.03

0.04

2

10.50 (8)

0.23

1.00

0.02

0.02

Convergent Validity
Values for the average variance extracted (AVE) were calculated for all latent constructs
according to the method used above. That is, the AVE was calculated based on the model of the
construct alone if possible. When the item had fewer than four items, the model was run with the
construct and the four item P Pay expectancy construct. AVE represents the amount of
variance in observed measures due to the latent construct rather than error. A value greater than
0.5 indicates an acceptable AVE value (Kline, 2011) as it indicates the latent construct explains
more variance than error. Average variance extracted values for all scales, except the E P
expectancy scale, were acceptable (P Pay = 0.52; Motivation = 0.65; Pay Valence = 0.71;
Subjective Performance = 0.61).
The AVE for the four item E P expectancy scale was problematic. Specifically, the
AVE for the four item measure was 0.42. Analysis indicated that the item, “The effort that I put
into this task is not related to my performance on this task,” had a poor factor loading with a
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standardized lambda of 0.32 and a squared multiple correlation value of 0.10. This poor factor
loading explained the low AVE. This item was removed and the model was reanalyzed. Since
the removal of this item lead to a less than 4 items, the construct was analyzed with the P Pay
expectancy construct to ensure sufficient degrees of freedom. The reanalyzed model had an
improved AVE for E P expectancy (i.e., above the 0.50 threshold, AVE = 0.52) and the model
fit was acceptable (χ2 (13) = 42.95; p-value <0.001; CFI = 0.98; SRMR = 0.04; RMSEA = 0.06).
A final indicator of convergent validity are lambda values. If the standardized lambda
values (i.e., the standardized regression weights) are greater than 0.30 and the unstandardized
values are significant, this is an indication of convergent validity (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, &
Black, 1998). All of the separate models had lambda values that were acceptable.
Reliability
Coefficient alpha is a common measure of reliability that can be run in SPSS for each
variable separately. Coefficient alpha is a measure of the inter-correlation of items that is
sensitive to the number of items (i.e., it increases as the number of items increases, Nunnally &
Bernstein, 1994). The coefficient alpha values indicated acceptable levels of reliability. All
values exceeded the 0.70 value (E P = 0.76; P Pay = 0.74; Pay Valence = 0.84; Motivation =
0.89; Subjective Performance = 0.75). The alpha reported for subjective performance is based
on the standardized items, since the items were standardized prior to creating the variable for
hypothesis testing.
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Table 18
Reliability
Construct

Coefficient Alpha

E P Expectancy
P Pay Expectancy
Pay Valence
Motivation

0.76
0.74
0.84
0.89

Subjective Performance

0.75

Discriminant Validity
There are two approaches that can be used to demonstrate discriminant validity across
constructs. The first is the pairwise χ2 difference test. In this test, a model with two constructs is
analyzed unconstrained where the correlation between the latent constructs is free to vary and
then constrained (i.e., nested) where the correlation between the latent constructs is restricted to
1. If there is a significant difference between the χ2 values for the two models, such that the
unconstrained model is a better fit than the constrained model, this provides evidence for
discriminant validity. Essentially, this indicates that allowing the constructs to be conceptually
distinct is superior to treating them as equivalent. A series of comparisons was run. For all
comparisons, it was found that the unconstrained model was a significantly better fit than the
constrained model (see Table 19). According to this test, there was discriminant validity across
the construct measures.
The second approach is the Fornell-Larcker test (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). This test can
be run when the full measurement model is analyzed (i.e., the model that includes all measures
and constructs). Thus, this test is discussed next in the full measurement model section.
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Table 19
χ2 Difference Tests of Discriminant Validity

Unconstrained

Constrained/
Nested

χ2 Difference Test

χ

df

χ

df

χ2
Difference

E P & P Pay

42.95

13

169.50

14

126.55

1

<0.001

E P & Motivation

36.18

19

97.33

20

61.15

1

<0.001

E P & Pay
Valence

18.02

8

367.08

9

349.06

1

<0.001

E P & Subjective
Performance

1.42

4

222.50

5

221.08

1

<0.001

P Pay &
Motivation

61.41

26

522.74

27

461.33

1

<0.001

P Pay & Pay
Valence

25.78

13

673.93

14

648.15

1

<0.001

P Pay &
Subjective
Performance

10.50

8

248.81

9

238.31

1

<0.001

Motivation & Pay
Valence

35.30

19

926.31

20

891.01

1

<0.001

Motivation &
Subjective
Performance

11.04

13

245.43

14

234.39

1

<0.001

Pay Valence &
Subjective
Performance

3.32

4

242.62

5

239.30

1

<0.001

Construct Pairing

2

2

df

p-value

Full Measurement Model Fit
All constructs were combined to test overall model fit, assess convergent validity, and
assess discriminant validity within the context of the full measurement model. E P expectancy
and P Pay expectancy were analyzed based on the shortened scales. Overall model fit of the
full model was acceptable (χ2 (109) = 201.46, p<0.001; CFI = 0.98; SRMR = 0.04; RMSEA =
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0.04). See Figure 9 for the full measurement model. Standardized lambda values are
represented by the arrows from the latent construct to the indicators.
Based on the full model, the standardized AVEs were acceptable for all latent constructs
(E P = 0.52; P O =0.52; Motivation = 0.65; Pay Valence = 0.71; Subjective Performance =
0.62) and standardized lambdas were all acceptable (> 0.30, Hair et al., 1998), indicating
convergent validity.
Running the full model did identify a problem with discriminant validity. The FornellLarker test involves comparison of the AVE values to correlation values. If the AVE value is
less than the correlation squared value, discriminant validity is questionable (Fornell & Larcker,
1981). When this threshold is not met, it indicates that shared variance between latent constructs
is greater than the shared variance of the observed measures for their own construct. The results
of the Fornell-Larker test are presented in Table 20. The test indicates that E P expectancy
may not have discriminant validity from the P Pay expectancy and motivation variables.
Specifically, the AVE values for E P expectancy (0.52) and motivation (0.65) were less than
the squared correlation value for the latent variables (0.74). In addition, the AVE values for
E P expectancy (0.52) and P Pay expectancy (0.52) were less than the squared correlation
value for the latent variables (0.54).
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Figure 9
Full Measurement Model
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Table 20
Fornell-Larker Test Matrix

E P Expectancy
P O Expectancy

E P
P O
Motivation
Expectancy Expectancy
0.52
0.74
0.86
0.54
0.52
0.61

Pay
Valence
0.41
0.39

Subjective
Performance
0.32
0.22

Motivation
0.74
0.37
0.65
0.42
0.25
Pay Valence
0.16
0.15
0.17
0.71
0.21
Subjective Performance
0.10
0.05
0.06
0.04
0.62
Note. Values based on standardized weights; AVE values are along the diagonal; correlations are
above the diagonal; squared correlations are below the diagonal.

Summary
The confirmatory factor analysis provided evidence of the following. One, items from the
E P expectancy variable and the P Pay expectancy scales were dropped due to poor fit and
variance explained. Two, there was strong evidence for convergent validity and reliability for all
variables after items were removed for E P expectancy and P Pay expectancy. Three, there
was evidence for discriminant validity for all variables, though this evidence was somewhat
weaker for E P expectancy. For this variable, there was support for discriminant validity via
the χ2 difference test; however, the more conservative Fornell-Larker test indicated that the E P
expectancy measure may not have sufficient discriminant validity. The evidence seemed
sufficient for analyzing the model proposed; however, caution is urged in interpretation of the
findings around the E P expectancy variable.
Based on this analysis, variables for hypothesis testing were constructed as follows.
Variables were computed as means of item responses on 1 to 5 scales for E P expectancies
(three items), P Pay expectancies (four items), motivation (five items), and pay valence (three
items). Because the scales for subjective performance were different (i.e., one question was on
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5-point scale and the other was on a 3-point scale), the responses were standardized, and the
mean of the two standardized responses was calculated. For objective performance, a count of
correct entries during the task session was used. For ability, correct entry counts during the
training session (prior to manipulation information) were used.
Tests of Analytic Assumptions
Completing parametric tests (i.e., multiple regression and ANOVA) is more effective
when the sampling distribution is normal and variances are homogeneous across conditions
(Field, 2009). Thus, variables were tested for homogeneity of variance and normality prior to
hypothesis testing.
Homogeneity of Variance
The homogeneity of variance assumption concerns the variance of variable values across
conditions. The variance should not differ significantly across conditions. All measured
variables were tested for homogeneity of variance.
To test for homogeneity of variance, Levene’s test can be used (Levene, 1960). If
Levene’s test is significant, it indicates that variances differ across condition. All tests were not
significant. Thus, we can assume homogeneity of variance for all variables across conditions.
See Table 21 for the results of the test for each variable.
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Table 21
Homogeneity of Variance Tests
Levene
Statistic (F)
1.05
0.35

df1
7
7

df2
560
560

p-value
0.40
0.93

E P Expectancy
P Pay Expectancy
Motivation

0.72
0.64
0.21

7
7
7

560
560
560

0.66
0.72
0.98

Subjective Performance
Objective Performance

1.10
0.30

7
7

560
560

0.36
0.95

Variable
Training Performance
Pay Valence

Normality
By testing for normality of sample data, it is possible to infer whether the sampling
distribution is normal (Field, 2009). The data for all variables were tested for normality visually
and using skewness and kurtosis statistics.
To check for normality visually, frequency distributions and P-P plots (i.e., probabilityprobability plots) were constructed. Comparison of the frequency distribution to the normal
curve provides a visual representation of the extent of non-normality. Visual inspection of the
frequency distributions led to concern regarding the normality of the E P expectancy, P Pay
expectancy, and pay valence measures. These distributions are presented in Figures 10, 11, and
12. The distributions for all variables appeared negatively skewed.
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Figure 10
E

P Expectancy Histogram

94

Figure 11
P Pay Expectancy Histogram
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Figure 12
Pay Valence Histogram

Inspections of P-P plots, however, only raised concerns about the objective performance
variable. When data on the P-P plots fall along the line, there is evidence that the data are
normal. When they do not, there may be an issue with the normality of the data. See Figure 13
for the P-P plot for objective performance. The individual performance count distribution is
provided in Figure 14.
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Figure 13
P-P Plot for Objective Performance
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Figure 14
Individual Performance Histogram

The results overall were rather ambiguous as to whether normality was a serious concern.
To further investigate normality, kurtosis and skewness quantitative values were analyzed and
are presented in Table 22. Standardized kurtosis and skewness values reported in SPSS were
assessed for deviations from 0. Skewness and kurtosis values were a concern for objective
performance and pay valence. For objective performance, the absolute skewness value was
greater than 1. For pay valence, absolute skewness and kurtosis values were both greater than 1.
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Table 22
Skewness and Kurtosis Values
Variable

Skewness

SE

Kurtosis

SE

Ability
E P Expectancy
P Pay Expectancy
Pay Valence

-0.77
-0.48
-0.83
-1.05

0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10

0.27
-0.06
0.90
1.92

0.21
0.21
0.21
0.21

Motivation
Subjective Performance
Objective Performance

-0.80
-0.05
-1.01

0.10
0.10
0.10

0.64
-0.84
0.75

0.21
0.21
0.21

With experimental design, non-normality is primarily a concern within conditions. That
is, with 8 conditions, normality should be checked in each condition before concluding that it is a
concern. Thus, separate normality checks were run for each condition for the pay valence and
objective performance variables. This check of skewness and kurtosis once again confirmed an
issue with normality for both variables. See Table 23 for the values by condition. Overall, the
pay valence and objective performance measures remained the only concern. The problems
found in the data indicate that two approaches were possible to correct for normality issues 1)
outliers could be dropped from the analysis, or 2) the data could be transformed.
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Table 23
Skewness and Kurtosis by Condition
Condition Variable
Pay Valence
1
Objective Performance

N
69
69

Skewness
-0.86
-0.94

SE
0.29
0.29

Kurtosis
2.02
0.43

SE
0.57
0.57

Pay Valence
Objective Performance
Pay Valence
Objective Performance

73
73
73
73

-0.95
-1.24
-1.31
-0.70

0.28
0.28
0.28
0.28

0.71
1.66
3.51
-0.10

0.56
0.56
0.56
0.56

Pay Valence
Objective Performance

71
71

-0.26
-0.96

0.29
0.29

-1.34
0.67

0.56
0.56

Pay Valence
Objective Performance
Pay Valence
Objective Performance

70
70
74
74

-0.89
-1.23
-1.56
-1.08

0.29
0.29
0.28
0.28

1.84
1.99
3.75
0.85

0.57
0.57
0.55
0.55

Pay Valence
Objective Performance
Pay Valence
Objective Performance

70
70
68
68

-0.78
-1.09
-1.39
-1.10

0.29
0.29
0.29
0.29

1.14
0.71
2.55
1.36

0.57
0.57
0.57
0.57

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Outliers. One of the potential explanations for non-normality is outliers. For pay valence
and objective performance, box plots for outliers in each condition were analyzed. Both sets of
plots indicated outliers below the mean. In addition, z-scores were calculated for each case with
respect to the condition (i.e., the group) mean and standard deviation. For pay valences, ten
cases were more than 3 standard deviations from the group mean. For objective performance,
three cases were more than 3 standard deviations from the group mean. Outliers were all below
the mean (see Figures 12 and 14 for the distributions). This suggests that the overall nonnormality of the data may be due somewhat to these outliers creating negative skew. It is
possible for there was an ability ceiling to the number of correct entries that could be made in the
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time provided while motivation likely explains extreme outliers at the bottom of the distribution.
Another explanation for low values may be that individuals were trying to help group members
by entering value in other fields (e.g., entering down payment).
Transformations. Both the pay valence and objective performance variables were
negatively skewed (i.e., had a left tail) and kurtotic (i.e., had peaks above a normal distribution).
To address this violation, data transformations were investigated.
Box-Cox transformations are the ideal transformation for increasing the normality of data
(Osborne, 2010). A Box-Cox transformation specifically identifies the transformation needed
based on the shape of the sample data rather than applying a more general transformation, such
as the square root or the natural log. The appropriate transformation for each variable was
identified using SPSS syntax provided in Osborne (2010). The ideal λ for objective performance
was found to be 2.3; for pay valence, the ideal λ was found to be 2.8. Skewness and kurtosis
values were improved using the Box-Cox transformation. For objective performance, the revised
variable had a skewness value of 0.0, a kurtosis value of -0.24 and a correlation with the
untransformed performance variable of 0.97. For pay valence, the transformed variable had a
skewness value of 0.01, a kurtosis value of -1.102, and a correlation with the untransformed pay
valence variable of 0.96.
Selected Strategy. Based on the analysis, outlier deletion or data transformation both had
potential to improve the results of the analysis. At the same time, both of these approaches have
drawbacks. Removal of outliers means removing real data points from the sample data. Data
transformations may complicate interpretation of results, especially when both a mediating
variable and outcome variable undergo a transformation. In this case, the Box-Cox
transformations would be different for more than one variable, further confusing interpretations.
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The central limit theorem indicates that when samples are sufficiently large, we can make
normality assumptions about the sampling distribution regardless of the normality of the data
collected (Field, 2009). The data collected here have over 60 observations per condition, far
above the requirements of the central limit theorem.
In order to deal with the issues aforementioned, hypotheses were tested in three ways.
First, data were analyzed using all original data with no outlier removal or transformations made.
Second, data were analyzed with both sets of outliers removed. Third, data were analyzed with
both pay valences and objective performance measures transformed using the Box-Cox
transformation. Findings were generally consistent across tests (see Table 31 at the end of this
chapter for a comparison), and the unchanged dataset provides for easier interpretation and
inference. Thus, the results reported here are based on the full, unchanged dataset. Deviations
from these findings are noted in the text and in Table 31.
Manipulation Checks
Manipulation checks were conducted to ensure that participants were aware of the
compensation policies for the task. Most participants correctly entered their minimum and
maximum pay amounts (i.e., the floor values and ceiling values). For ceilings, 94% of
participants in the low ceiling condition and 87% of participants in the high ceiling condition
entered the correct value when asked to fill in the blank for the statement, “The most money I,
individually, can make in this session is $___.” Results of a one-way ANOVA also indicate that
individuals recognized the size of the pay ceiling. The values for the high ceiling condition
(M=$13.40) were significantly higher than the values for the low condition (M=$8.80) (F(1,
566)=60.85, p<0.001).
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For floors, 92% of participants in the low floor condition and 92% of participants in the
high floor condition entered the correct value when asked to fill in the blank for the statement,
“The minimum amount of money I, individually, can earn during this session is $___.” One-way
ANOVA results indicate that the values for the high floor condition (M=$7.09) were
significantly higher than the values for the low condition (M=$2.73) (F(1,566)=75.19, p<0.001).
The means for the allocation rule manipulation checks were also in the expected
directions. Mean responses on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly
agree to the item, “Pay on this task is based on my individual performance,” were significantly
higher in equity conditions (M=3.72) than in equality conditions (M=2.80) (F(1, 566)=111.75,
p<0.001). Mean responses on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly
agree to the item, “Pay on this task is based on my group's performance,” were significantly
higher in equality conditions (M=4.43) than in equity conditions (M=3.57) (F(1, 566)=119.79,
p<0.001).
Correlations
Means, standard deviations, and correlations are presented in Table 24.
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Table 24
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Variable

Mean

Ability
Allocation Rule
Ceiling
Floor
E P Expectancy
P Pay Expectancy

6.92
0.50
0.50
0.50
4.31
4.26
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7. Pay Valence
8. Motivation
9. Subjective Performance
10. Objective Performance

SD

1

2

3

2.68
0.50
0.00
0.50
0.01
0.00
*
0.50
0.09
-0.01 -0.02
0.56 0.17***
0.03 0.00
***
0.64 0.15
0.14** -0.01

4.08 0.80
0.08*
4.30 0.61 0.17***
0.00 0.90 0.15***
23.07 6.74 0.58***

4

5

6

7

8

9

-0.01
-0.02 0.54***

-0.02 0.10* -0.04 0.35*** 0.30***
0.00 0.05
0.00 0.72*** 0.49*** 0.40***
-0.03 0.00 -0.10* 0.23*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.21***
0.07ᵻ

0.02

Note. ᵻp<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (2-tailed), N=568

0.00

0.14**

0.13**

0.09*

0.13** 0.22***

Hypothesis Tests
Main and Interaction Effects of Pay Policies on Performance Hypotheses
To test the relationship between pay range, allocation rules, and performance (hypotheses
1, 2, and 3), the manipulated variables were entered as fixed factors in a univariate ANOVA with
individual performance entered as the dependent variable. The hypotheses were tested for both
the subjective performance and the objective performance dependent variables. Regarding the
entry of the pay range, pay ceilings and pay floors were both entered as fixed factors. Different
inferences can be drawn depending on which factors are significant at predicting performance.
A significant relationship between pay ceiling and performance would indicate that the ceiling of
the range drove the performance effect while a significant relationship between the pay floor and
performance would indicate that the floor of the range drove the performance effect.
Based on this analysis, none of the manipulations or their interactions had a significant
relationship with objective individual performance. For subjective performance, the floor of the
pay range had a significant effect. Specifically, high floors had lower subjective performance
(on a standardized scale, M=-0.09) than low floors (M=0.09) (F(1, 560) = 5.68, p<0.05).
Overall, this analysis indicated that allocation rules were not significantly related to performance
outcomes while pay range, and specifically pay floors, explained subjective performance
outcomes. Thus, based on the full, untransformed dataset, hypotheses 2 and 3 were not
supported while hypothesis 1 received partial support with the floor of the pay range affecting
self-reported performance levels.
Interestingly, the analysis completed on the transformed objective performance variable
and the analysis completed with outliers deleted, resulted in significant findings for the allocation
rule and objective performance relationship. Specifically, equity allocation rules (M=23.83,
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based on the outlier deletion method) had significantly higher mean correct income entries than
equality allocation rules (M=22.60, based on the outlier deletion method; F(1, 548) = 4.85,
p<0.05). Thus, based on the transformed and outlier deletion datasets, hypothesis 2 received
partial support.1
Expectancy Component Hypotheses
Hypotheses 4 through 6 addressed the effects of ability, allocation rules, and ceilings on
the components of expectancy theory. Hypothesis 4 predicted that ability would be positively
related to E P expectancy. Ability was a continuous variable rather than an experimental
condition, so this relationship was tested by regressing E P expectancy on ability. The
relationship was positive and significant, supporting hypothesis 4 (B =0.04, SE=0.01, β=0.17,
p<0.001). Ability explained 3 percent of the variance in E P expectancy. An increase in one
correct entry during the ability training session was related to a 0.04 increase in reported E P
expectancy.
Since allocation rules and ceilings were all experimental manipulations, separate
ANOVAs were run to test their effects. Hypothesis 5 predicted that P Pay expectancies were
higher in equity allocation rule conditions than in equality allocation rule conditions. There was
a significant effect of allocation rule on P Pay expectancies (F(1, 566) = 12.00, p<0.01).
P Pay expectancies were higher in equity allocation rule conditions (M=4.35) than equality
allocation rule conditions (M=4.17). The partial eta squared was 0.02, which can be interpreted
as an indication that 2 percent of the variance in P Pay expectancies could be explained by the
allocation rule.

1

Analyses of a subset of data that included only the widest range ($2-$12) and the narrowest
range ($6-$8) did not yield any findings beyond those reported above.
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Hypothesis 6 predicted that the mean valence of ceilings in the high ceiling condition
would be significantly higher than the mean valence of ceilings in the low ceiling condition.
There was a significant effect of ceiling condition on valences of ceilings (F(1, 566) = 5.69,
p<0.05). The valences of high ceilings (M=4.16) were higher than valences of low ceilings
(M=4.00). The partial eta squared was 0.01, which can be interpreted as an indication that 1
percent of the variance in pay valences could be explained by the ceiling condition.
Ability and pay policy components were significant predictors of expectancy components
in the expected directions. Thus, hypotheses 4 through 6 were all supported, although the effect
sizes were quite small.
Motivation Hypotheses
Hypotheses 7 through 9 predicted that the expectancy components for exerting high effort
levels (i.e., E P expectancies, P Pay expectancies, and pay valences) would be positively
related to motivation. Regression analysis was used to test these hypotheses. Motivation was
entered as the dependent variable and E P expectancy, P Pay expectancy, and pay valence
were all entered as independent variables. The main effects of the expectancy factors explained
55 percent of the variance in motivation. The overall model of direct effects was significant
(F(3, 564) = 233.95, p<0.001).
Each of the components was significant. E P expectancies were positively related to
motivation (β=0.60, p<0.001), supporting hypothesis 7. P Pay expectancies were positively
related to motivation (β=0.12, p<0.001), supporting hypothesis 8. Pay valences were positively
related to motivation (β=0.15, p<0.001), supporting hypothesis 9. See Table 25 for the
regression results.
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Table 25
Hypotheses 7, 8, and 9 Regression Results

Variable

B
0.50
0.66
0.12
0.12
0.55

Constant
E P Expectancy
P Pay Expectancy
Pay Valence
R2
Adj. R2

0.55

N

568

Motivation
SE
0.15
0.04
0.03
0.02

β
0.60***
0.12***
0.15***

Note. ***p<0.001
One concern raised from the CFA was that the E P variable may be indistinguishable
from the P O variable. Thus, multicollinearity statistics were reviewed for the regression
analysis. Tolerance statistics for all variables were greater than 0.20 (E P = 0.67; P Pay =
0.69; Valence = 0.86), indicating that a problem of multicollinearity was unlikely (Field, 2009).
VIF statistics were below 10 (E P = 1.49; P Pay = 1.45; Valence = 1.16), another indication
that multicollinearity was not a serious concern (Hair et al., 1998).
Hypothesis 10 predicted interaction effects of the expectancy theory components on
motivation. Models that exclude important variables and interaction terms are misspecified
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Thus, the motivation regression was completed with all
interaction terms included. That is, a full regression including all variables from hypotheses 7
through 10 was completed. This analysis provided a complete model of motivation using the
expectancy components.
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To test the interaction effects, E P expectancy, P Pay expectancy and pay valence
were first mean-centered. These mean-centered terms were then multiplied to create interaction
terms (hypothesis 10a: E P * P Pay; hypothesis 10b: P Pay * pay valence; hypothesis 10c:
E P * pay valence; hypothesis 10d: E P * P Pay * pay valence. All main effects were
entered in step 1 (i.e., E P, P Pay, pay valence), two-way interaction effects were entered in
step 2 (hypotheses 10a, 10b, and 10c), and the three-way interaction effect was entered in step 3
(hypothesis 10d).
In step 1 the three expectancy components from hypotheses 7, 8, and 9 (E P, P Pay,
Pay Valence) remained significant, explaining 55 percent of the variance in motivation. In step
2, two of the two-way interactions were significant and one was not. Specifically, the P Pay
expectancy by pay valence interaction (β=0.14, p<0.001), and the E P expectancy by pay
valence interaction (β=-0.11, p<0.01) were both significant. The E P expectancy by P Pay
expectancy was not significant. The addition of two-way interactions explained an additional 1.3
percent of the variance in motivation (F Change (3, 561) = 5.60, p<0.01). In step 3, the three
way interaction was not significant. The full regression results are presented in Table 26.
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Table 26
Hypothesis 10 Regression Results

Variable
Step 1
E P Expectancy
P Pay Expectancy
Pay Valence

Model 1
β

Motivation
Model 2
β

Model 3
β

0.60***
0.12***
0.15***

0.60***
0.11***
0.17***

0.60***
0.12**
0.18***

-0.06
0.14***
-0.11**

-0.07
0.12**
-0.11**

Step 2
E P x P Pay
P Pay x Pay Valence
E P x Pay Valence
Step 3
E P x P Pay x Pay Valence
R2
∆R2
N
Note. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

-0.05
0.55

0.57
0.01
568

0.57
0.00

Based on the lack of significance, hypotheses 10a and 10d were not supported.
Hypotheses 10b and 10c could possibly be supported as the interaction terms were significant for
each. In order to determine if the hypotheses were supported, it was necessary to assess the
nature of the interaction. Thus, the interactions for 10b and 10c (see Figures 15 and 16) were
plotted. The plot for hypotheses 10b indicated that the hypothesis was supported (Figure 15).
Specifically, the positive P Pay motivation relationship was not present when the pay valence
was below the mean. This was confirmed by a simple slopes test at pay valence values of -0.8,
0, 0.8, where 0 is the mean value, -0.8 represents one standard deviation below the mean, and 0.8
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represents one standard deviation above the mean. Below the mean, the P Pay slope was not
significant (p=ns); at the mean, the slope was significant (p<0.01); above the mean, the slope
was significant (p<0.001). In other words, when the pay valence was low, there was not a
positive P Pay and motivation relationship.
The plot for hypothesis 10c indicated that the hypothesis was not supported (see Figure
16). Interestingly, the E P expectancy and motivation relationship was positive for both high
and low pay valences; however, in each case, the moderator (i.e., pay valence) appeared to
strengthen the E P and motivation relationship as it declined. Thus, the nature of the
interaction indicates that hypothesis 10c is not supported. Only hypothesis 10b was supported.
Figure 15
P Pay Expectancy and Pay Valence Interaction Plot
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Figure 16
E P Expectancy and Pay Valence Interaction Plot

Overall, the regression tests provided support for the P Pay by pay valence interaction
(hypothesis 10b), and no support for hypotheses 10a, 10c, and 10d.
Performance Hypotheses
Hypothesis 11 predicted that individual motivation would be positively related to
individual performance. This hypothesis was tested for both the subjective performance and the
objective performance dependent variables. First, the subjective performance dependent variable
was regressed on motivation. Motivation explained 4.3 percent of the variance in subjective
performance (F(1, 566)=25.45, p<0.001). The relationship between motivation and subjective
performance was significant and in the expected direction. Specifically, increases in motivation
were related to increases in reported performance (B=0.31, SE=0.06, β=0.21, p<0.001). Second,
the objective performance dependent variable was regressed on motivation. Motivation
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explained 1.8 percent of the variance in the objective performance measure (F(1, 566)=10.23,
p<0.01). The relationship between motivation and objective performance was positive and
significant (B=1.47, SE=0.46, β=0.13, p<0.01). Together, this analysis indicates support for
hypothesis 11. Motivation has a positive relationship with both measures of performance though
the effect sizes are quite small.
Hypothesis 12 made a similar prediction to hypothesis 11. However, rather than
predicting a relationship between motivation and performance, a positive relationship between
MFHE (i.e., high effort motivation force) and performance was predicted. To test this, the E P
expectancy, P Pay expectancy, and pay valence values were multiplied by one another to create
a motivational force term. All variables were on 5-point scales. Checks for normality
demonstrated that the motivational force term did not violate normality assumptions.
Performance measures were regressed on the motivational force term. For the subjective
performance measure, high effort motivation force explained 5.8 percent of the variance in
performance (F(1, 566)=35.15, p<0.001). The relationship between MFHE and performance was
significant and in the expected direction (B=0.01, SE=0.001, β=0.24, p<0.001). For the objective
performance measure, MFHE explained 2.1 percent of the variance (F(1, 566)=12.17, p<0.01).
The relationship was positive and significant (B=0.04, SE=0.01, β=0.15, p<0.01). Together, this
analysis indicates support for hypothesis 12. MFHE has a positive relationship with both
measures of performance. While the effect size is small, more variance in performance is
explained by the MFHE term than the motivation measure. The correlation between motivational
force and motivation was 0.65.
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Tests of Mediational Paths
Mediational paths were implicitly proposed based on the full model developed. Thus, in
this section, mediational paths are tested. Mediation was tested using the Baron and Kenny
(1986) approach. For this approach the model was separated into two parts, such that tests were
conducted to test for 1) a mediating relationship between the independent variables and
motivation through the expectancy components and 2) a mediating relationship between the
expectancy components and performance.
The Baron and Kenny (1986) approach involves four steps. First, the relationship
between the independent variable and the dependent variable is tested. If this relationship is
significant, this is an indicator that a relationship exists and may be mediated. Second, the
independent variable and the mediator are tested for a relationship. Third, controlling for the
independent variable, the mediator and dependent variable relationship is tested. If the
relationships in step 1, step 2 and step 3 are significant and in the direction predicted, then
mediation is possible. The final step is to test for a relationship between the independent
variable and the dependent variable while controlling for the mediator. If the relationship falls to
non-significance, a case can be made for full mediation. If the relationship is small but still
significant, partial mediation is established.
The first Baron and Kenny (1986) test conducted was of E P expectancies as a mediator
to the ability and motivation relationship. Step 1 required a significant bivariate relationship
between ability and motivation. Referring back to Table 24, the correlation between ability and
motivation was positive and significant (r=0.17, p<0.001). Step 2 required the ability and E P
relationship be significant. This relationship was tested for hypothesis 4 and was supported
(β=0.17, p<0.001). For the third and fourth steps, both ability and E P expectancy were entered
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as independent variables in a multiple regression model with motivation as the dependent
variable. This analysis indicated that E P expectancy fully mediated the ability to motivation
relationship. The E P expectancy and motivation relationship remained significant (β=0.71,
p<0.001) while the ability and motivation relationship became non-significant. See Table 27 for
the analysis. A Sobel test was completed to confirm the mediated relationship (Sobel, 1982).
Results support full mediation (t=3.95, p<0.001). E P expectancy fully mediated the
relationship between ability and motivation.

Table 27
Ability, E P Expectancy, and Motivation Step 3 and 4 Regression Results
Variable
Constant
Ability
E P Expectancy
R2
Adj. R2
N

B
0.88
0.01
0.78
0.52
0.52
568

Motivation
SE
0.14
0.01
0.03

β
0.05
0.71***

Note. ***p<0.001
Similarly, P Pay expectancies were expected to mediate the allocation rule and
motivation relationship. Step 1 required a significant bivariate relationship between allocation
rule and motivation. Referring back to Table 24, the correlation between allocation and
motivation was not significant. In addition, pay valences were expected to mediate the pay
ceiling and motivation relationship. The bivariate relationship between pay ceiling and
motivation was not significant, indicating there was not a mediated relationship. Overall, only
the ability and motivation relationship was fully mediated by the expectancy theory components.
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Testing the second part of the model, motivation was expected to mediate the relationship
between the expectancy theory components and performance. Each expectancy component was
tested using the Baron and Kenny (1986) method. Referring back to Table 24, the correlation
between E P expectancy and performance was positive and significant for both subjective
(r=0.23, p<0.001) and objective (r=0.14, p<0.01) performance. The E P expectancy and
motivation relationship was tested for hypothesis 7 and was supported. For the third and fourth
steps, both E P expectancy and motivation were entered as independent variables in a multiple
regression model with performance as the dependent variable (see Table 28). For subjective
performance, E P expectancy remained significant while motivation dropped to nonsignificance. For objective performance, neither E P expectancy nor motivation were
significant. Thus, there was not support for motivation as a mediator between E P expectancy
and performance.

Table 28
E P, Motivation, and Performance Mediation Steps 3 and 4 Regression Results
Objective
Subjective
Variable
Performance
Performance
E P Expectancy
0.08
0.17**
0.07
0.09
Motivation
2
0.02
0.06
R
2
0.02
0.05
Adj. R
568
568
N
Note. Standardized regression coefficients are reported; **p<0.01.

Next, motivation was tested as a mediator of the P Pay expectancy and performance
relationship. The correlation between P Pay expectancy and performance was positive and
significant for both subjective (r=0.15, p<0.001) and objective (r=0.13, p<0.01) performance,
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indicating support for Step 1 of the Baron and Kenny (1986) test. Step 2 required the P Pay
expectancy and motivation relationship to be significant. This relationship was tested for
hypothesis 8 and was supported. The bivariate correlation between the two variables was also
significant (r=0.49, p<0.001). For the third and fourth steps, both P Pay expectancy and
motivation were entered as independent variables in a multiple regression model with
performance as the dependent variable (see Table 29). For subjective performance, P Pay
expectancy dropped to non-significance while motivation remained significant. For objective
performance, both P Pay expectancy and motivation were non-significant. A Sobel test was
completed to confirm the mediated relationship between P Pay expectancy and subjective
performance (Sobel, 1982). Results support mediation for subjective performance (t=3.62,
p<0.001). Overall, this provides partial support for mediation; motivation mediated the
relationship between P Pay expectancy and subjective performance, but not the relationship for
objective performance.
Table 29
P Pay, Motivation, and Performance, Mediation Steps 3 and 4 Regression Results
Objective
Subjective
Variable
Performance
Performance
P Pay Expectancy
0.08
0.06
Motivation
0.09
0.18***
2
R
0.02
0.05
2
Adj. R
0.02
0.04
N
568
568
Note. Standardized regression coefficients are reported; ***p<0.001.
Motivation was also expected to mediate the pay valence and performance relationship.
For step 1, the correlation between pay valence and performance was positive and significant for
both subjective (r=0.19, p<0.001) and objective (r=0.09, p<0.05) performance. Step 2 required
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the pay valence and motivation relationship to be significant. This relationship was tested for
hypothesis 9 and was supported. The bivariate correlation between the two variables was also
significant (r=0.40, p<0.001). For the third and fourth steps, both pay valence and motivation
were entered as independent variables in a multiple regression model with performance as the
dependent variable (see table 30). For objective performance, pay valence dropped to nonsignificance while motivation remained significant. For subjective performance, both pay
valence and motivation were both significant, indicating there may be partial rather than full
mediation. The coefficient for pay valence and subjective performance dropped from the
bivariate relationship. Results of the Sobel test support mediation for both objective
performance (t=2.50, p<0.05) and subjective performance (t=3.29, p<0.001). Overall, there is
support for motivation as a mediator of the pay valence and performance relationship.
Table 30
Pay Valence, Motivation, and Performance, Mediation Steps 3 and 4 Regression Results

Variable
Pay Valence
Motivation
R2
Adj. R2
N

Objective
Performance
0.04
0.12*
0.02
0.02
568

Subjective
Performance
0.13**
0.16**
0.06
0.05
568

Note. Standardized regression coefficients are reported; *p<0.05; **p<0.01.
The expectancy components were also expected to interact to predict motivation, which
predicted performance, indicating motivation mediated the relationship between the interactions
and performance. These relationships can also be tested using Baron and Kenny’s (1986)
method as well by testing the relationship between the interactions and the dependent variable
(step 1), the relationship of the interactions with the mediator (step 2), and the relationship of the
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mediator with the outcome variable when controlling for the interaction variable (steps 3 & 4).
The only difference from the prior tests of mediation presented above is that for interactions, the
lower order terms are entered in the regressions that include the interaction variable (Baron &
Kenny, 1986; Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005). This approach is sometimes called the
“Moderated Causal Steps Approach” to testing first stage moderation (Edwards & Lambert,
2007, p. 5).
A check of support of prior hypotheses indicated that mediation for most interactions
would not be supported and did not require further testing. The three-way interaction and
motivation relationship was not supported (hypothesis 10d) and the relationships between the
E P interactions and motivation were not supported (hypothesis 10a and 10c). Thus, these first
stage moderation relationships did not require further testing.
Only the P Pay expectancy by pay valence interaction required further testing for first
stage moderation since hypothesis 10c was supported. However, the P Pay by pay valence
interaction term did not have a significant relationship with the subjective or objective
performance variables. Thus, there is not evidence that motivation mediates the relationship
between the P Pay by pay valence interaction and performance.
Follow-up Analyses
Based on the full model, the relationship between pay policies and individual
performance may be best specified by controlling for individual ability. Ability is expected to
both affect performance directly and through E P expectancies. To isolate the pay policy
motivational effect on performance, including ability in the model specification may be a better
test. Thus, a follow-up test for hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 was conducted by entering ability as a
covariate in a univariate ANOVA with individual performance as the dependent variable.
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For objective performance, ability (F(1, 562)=290.52, p<0.001) and allocation rules
(F(1,562)=4.54, p<0.05) were both significant predictors. Performance was higher for those
high in ability versus those low in ability as would be expected. Equity allocation rules
(M=23.57) had higher mean correct income entries than equality allocation rules (M=22.58),
consistent with hypothesis 2.
For subjective performance, ability (F(1, 562)=14.51, p<0.001) and pay floors (F(1,
562)=7.58, p<0.01) were significant predictors. As with objective performance, performance
was higher for those high in ability than for those low in ability. The high floor, as in the prior
analysis, had lower mean subjective performance ratings (on a standardized scale, M=-0.09) than
low floors (M=0.09). Overall, the evidence provided through direct tests suggests that ability is a
consistent predictor of performance, that allocation rules significantly predict objective, but not
subjective performance, and that pay floors significantly affect subjective, but not objective
performance. There is no evidence to indicate that pay ceilings significantly affect performance
outcomes.
Summary
A summary of the results for all hypotheses is provided in Table 31. The intention of this
table is to demonstrate that findings are consistent across attempts to correct for potential
problems in the data related to normality and outliers. As can be seen in the table, results were
robust across remedies. The notable difference is that allocation rules are significant when the
dependent variable is transformed, when objective performance outliers are removed from the
analysis, and when ability is controlled for in the analysis. Overall, the results reported here
indicate that the basic linkages were as hypothesized, while only a few of the interaction
hypotheses were supported.
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Table 31
Hypotheses Tests

Reported
N=568

Transformed Variables
(Pay Valence &
Objective Performance)
N=568

Outlier Deletion
N=556

Hypothesis 1

Not supported for
objective performance
Supported for floor and
subjective performance

Not supported for
objective performance
Supported for floor and
subjective performance

Not supported for
objective performance
Supported for floor and
subjective performance

Hypothesis 2

Not supported;
Supported in follow-up
analysis with ability as a
covariate

Supported for objective
performance

Supported for objective
performance

Hypothesis 3

Not supported

Not supported

Not supported

Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 5

Supported
Supported
Supported

Supported
Supported
Supported

Supported
Supported
Supported

Supported
Supported
Supported

Supported
Supported
Supported

Supported
Supported
Supported

10a: Not Supported
Hypothesis 10 10b: Supported
10c: Not Supported
10d: Not Supported

10a: Not Supported
10b: Supported
10c: Not Supported
10d: Not Supported

10a: Not Supported
10b: Supported
10c: Not Supported
10d: Not Supported

Hypothesis 11 Supported
Hypothesis 12 Supported

Supported
Supported

Supported
Supported

Hypothesis 6
Hypothesis 7
Hypothesis 8
Hypothesis 9

Results about the relationship between ability and pay policies and expectancy equation
components were all as hypothesized. Ability was related to E P expectancies, equity
allocation rules lead to higher P Pay expectancies than equality allocation rules, and high pay
ceilings had higher valences than low pay ceilings. Variance explained for each expectancy
component by its respective predictor was less than 3 percent.
121

Motivation was well-explained by the expectancy components. In fact, 56 percent of the
variance in motivation could be explained by E P expectancy, P Pay expectancy and pay
valence. These relationships cannot be treated as causal since random assignment was applied to
the pay policy conditions rather than the expectancy components; however, the power of the
expectancy components in explaining motivation is an important contribution. Each component
contributed significantly to explaining motivation when all were run in the same regression.
E P expectancy was the strongest in this relationship, but P Pay expectancy and pay valence
also contributed.
Interactions of the expectancy components added only 1.3 percent of variance explained
in motivation. P Pay expectancy interacted with pay valences according to the expectancy
theory formulation. Motivation was flat across P Pay expectancy levels when pay valences
were low, but the P Pay expectancy and motivation relationship was positive when pay
valences were high. Interestingly, E P expectancy also interacted with pay valence, but not in
the way hypothesized. In fact, the slope of the E P expectancy and motivation relationship was
steeper when pay valence was low. One explanation for the lack of interaction findings is that
the measures for the expectancy components had range restrictions issues, which reduces power
(Aguinis & Stone-Romero, 1997). Specifically, the mean for E P expectancy was 4.31 with a
standard deviation of 0.56, the mean for P Pay expectancy was 4.26 with a standard deviation
of 0.64, the mean for pay valence was 4.08 with a standard deviation of 0.80, and the mean for
motivation was 4.30 with a standard deviation of 0.61.
The performance hypotheses modeled the motivation and performance relationship two
ways. In hypothesis 11, the five item motivation scale variable was treated as the predictor; in
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hypothesis 12, the motivational force for high effort (per expectancy theory’s formulation, Porter
& Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964) was treated as the predictor.
Both approaches lead to a significant explanation of performance; however, the
motivational force variable consistently explained a greater proportion of the variance in the
performance dependent variable. This was the case across both performance measures. For
objective performance, the five item motivation measure explained 1.8 percent of the variance
while motivational force explained 2.1 percent. This may seem small, but in fact, the variance
explained by motivational force was around 15 percent more than the variance explained by the
five item motivation measure. For subjective performance, motivation explained 4.3 percent of
the variance while motivational force explained 5.8 percent of the variance. The motivational
force variance explained was around 30 percent higher than the variance explained by the five
item motivation scale.
All of the model links, except for some of the interactions, were supported. Mediation
test results were less supportive. Support was found for E P expectancy as a mediator of the
ability and motivation relationship. The other expectancy components did not mediate the
relationship between pay policies and motivation. Interestingly, there was evidence that
motivation mediated the relationship between both ceiling valances and P Pay expectancies and
performance measures. Motivation did not, however, mediate the relationship between E P
expectancies and performance measures. It is interesting that in the first set of mediational tests,
mediation was not found for the pay policies, but in the second set of mediational tests,
mediation was found for their associated expectancy components. Based on this set of tests,
there is no evidence for a fully mediated path between pay policies and performance outcomes.
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Still, the pay policies do appear to affect expectancy components in a causal way, and these
components are important to motivation and performance outcomes.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
Overview
Despite an abundance of empirical work on the topic of pay variation, the accumulation
of pay variation research has been inconclusive regarding the relationship between pay variation
and performance outcomes (Conroy et al., in press; Shaw, 2014). As such, recent work has
focused on revising theoretical frameworks to reveal the nuances of the pay variation construct
and its relationship with organizational outcomes. Gupta et al. (2012) recognized the importance
of the type and source of pay variation. Downes and Choi (2014) drew attention to employee
reactions in response to pay variation. And Conroy et al. (in press) noted that cross-level issues
of both the pay variation construct and its effects were important to work focusing on pay
variation. Each of these papers raised important issues, but none conducted an empirical test. In
this study, these more nuanced views of pay variation were recognized and taken into account.
Boundary conditions established a central focus on horizontal performance-based pay variation.
Individual reactions were tested. And rather than assuming pay variation was the same as
allocation rules, it was treated as pay range using a pay policy approach.
Allocation rules were significantly related to objective individual performance, when
controlling for ability and when outliers were removed from the analysis. Pay range did not have
a significant relationship with objective individual performance while the floor of the pay range
had a significant relationship with self-reported, subjective individual performance. In this
section, I return to the original purposes of this study and discuss the findings within the context
of the broader pay variation literature. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed and
limitations are noted.
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Theoretical Implications
The overarching purpose of this research was to investigate a number of underlying
assumptions applied in research addressing the pay variation and firm performance relationship.
Three specific assumptions were identified and tested: 1) the assumption that allocation rule
arguments are appropriate for explaining pay variation’s effects, 2) the assumption that pay
variation has a relationship with individual motivation and performance, and 3) the assumption
that pay variation is the cause of individual motivation and performance outcomes.
Allocation Rule Arguments Applied to Pay Variation
A central concern of this study was to distinguish equity/equality arguments from pay
variation arguments. Comparing the theory and results for allocation rules and pay range
provides compelling evidence that these are conceptually distinct policies and that using
allocation rule arguments to explain pay variation’s effects is questionable. In this study, pay
range was manipulated as a separate variable from allocation rules. The arguments made for
allocation rules differed from those for pay range. Allocation rules affected P Pay expectancies
while the pay range, and specifically the pay ceiling, affected the valence of the pay outcome for
high effort. This leverage on different parts of the expectancy equation is one important piece of
evidence indicating separation of these constructs and their theoretical arguments is important to
pay variation research.
Furthermore, allocation rules had a reasonably consistent effect on objective individual
performance while pay range did not have a significant effect. Perhaps what is rewarded is more
influential in explaining behaviors than the size of the reward. Of course, there exist a limitless
number of levels of pay range. The test presented here was based on one set of ranges. A
potential explanation for the lack of a range effect is a common limitation in laboratory studies.
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Specifically, the ranges used for this short-term study are of less importance than the ranges
associated with one’s professional career. The valence difference between a $1,000 bonus and a
$10,000 bonus is likely to be much more influential than the difference between $2 and $12 for a
short time period of work. Still, the reality that the allocation rule was influential but pay range
was not certainly provides evidence of the difference and uniqueness of these constructs and the
importance of treating them separately in pay research.
Considering these results in the context of the pay variation research stream provides
some interesting implications. Many of the studies conducted on the pay variation and
performance relationship have found a significant relationship between pay variation and
performance, though whether this relationship is positive and negative varies (Ding, Akhtar, &
Ge, 2009; Frick, Prinz, & Winkelmann, 2003; Lee et al., 2008; San & Jane, 2008). The
significant findings of prior research combined with the lack of significant findings for pay range
in this study raise the question: what do the significant pay variation and firm performance
findings of prior research actually represent?
Much of the work that has reported a significant pay variation and firm performance
relationship has not ensured that pay differences are based on performance, such that pay
variations were likely the result of many factors. Pay variations may be indicative of seniority
differences in seniority-based pay organizations, of favoritism when managers allocate pay, of
variations in team performance in organizations that have team-based incentive pay, or variations
in individual performance in organizations with individual performance-based pay (Conroy et
al., in press; Gupta et al., 2012; Gupta & Jenkins, 1996). As noted in the Chapter 2 critique of
the pay variation research, papers reporting a negative relationship may be conducted in contexts
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where pay variation is based on non-performance factors or where performance-based pay is
controlled.
Regarding papers reporting a positive relationship, in some cases, these papers address
pay variation in performance-based pay contexts and address team-level performance outcomes
(e.g., Simmons & Berri, 2011). When this occurs, the relationship that is found may actually be
representative of allocation rules. Specifically, repeated implementation of an equity allocation
rule on a team should lead to greater pay variation over time if the same individuals tend to have
low and high performance. When empirical tests get closer to an allocation rule test (e.g., teamlevel tests, individual performance-based pay contexts), the effect of allocation rules may explain
positive findings; when empirical tests move away from allocation rule tests (e.g., firm-level
tests, controls for performance-based pay, lack of performance-based pay contexts, differences in
within and between group distributions), negative relationships become more likely to emerge.
Thus, some of the prior research on pay variation may actually test allocation rules in a distal
way. Directly testing allocation rules would likely lead to clearer, more consistent results. The
confounding of allocation rules, incentive intensity, pay basis and other factors helps to explain
the variety of findings in the literature.
In all, the lack of clarity in the meaning of the pay variation construct seems to drive
much of the confusion in this literature. Taking a different approach to measuring compensation
policies may yield clarity for the field of compensation; it may also provide more consistent
findings with greater effect sizes.
Pay Variation and Individual Performance
A second assumption tested in this study was the relationship between pay variation and
individual motivation and performance. Specifically, it is often assumed that pay variation
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influences individual outcomes and these outcomes can be aggregated to explain firm-level
outcomes. A test of this argument has been lacking, however. In this study, the relationship
between pay range and individual performance was tested to address this concern. The findings
of this study support that, to some extent, individual responses are related to pay policies (e.g.,
expectancy components were affected by policies), though support for objective individual
performance effects is less clear. Allocation rules appeared to have a relationship with objective
performance while pay range, specifically pay floor, only affected subjective, or more precisely,
self-reported performance.
As part of recognizing the difference between allocation rules and pay range, the
difference between pay ceilings and pay floors within the pay range was addressed empirically.
Subjective performance was related to pay range. Narrower pay ranges were associated with
lower self-reported, individual performance than wider pay ranges. Because the study design
allowed for separation of ceilings and floors, this finding can actually be interpreted as more
nuanced. The ceiling did not have a significant effect on subjective, self-reported performance;
rather the floors were related to self-reported, subjective performance. More specifically, when
floors were low, subjective performance reports were higher than when floors were high.
In trying to understand the results for self-reported performance, it is possible that floors
affect these reported values in either a conscious or an unconscious way. In comparing condition
means, high floors had higher objective performance means and lower subjective performance
means while low floors had lower objective performance means and higher subjective
performance means. The relationships for objective performance are not significant, but it is
interesting that the means are in opposite directions, indicating the possibility of intentional or
unintentional inaccurate reporting.
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One potential explanation for the finding that floors were influential is that when lower
floors characterize the pay system, individuals may be more likely to 'fudge' estimates of their
own performance in hopes that they will receive a higher pay amount. If this is the case, it may
be that wider pay ranges encourage dishonest behaviors in an effort to avoid the lower end of the
range. The repercussions of low performance (i.e., lower pay) may provide motivation to report
higher performance levels (Lawler & Rhode, 1976). When participants reported their
performance levels, they did not actually have knowledge of the performance measurement
system. It seems possible that, given this uncertainty, some participants might have believed
their own performance evaluation would determine their payouts.
Another possibility is that the floor engages a certain mindset around performance. For
example, low floors may engage an avoidance motivation (e.g., a motivation to avoid pain, Elliot
& McGregor, 2001). This avoidance motivation may be to avoid being the lowest performer and
may manifest in self-reports that are somewhat inflated for low floors. Essentially, participants
may not have consciously chosen to over-report performance, yet may have done so because of
this underlying mindset.
Regardless, the issue with self-reported performance in a pay-for-performance system
should encourage researchers to be careful of generalizing self-reported performance findings to
objective performance implications of compensation systems. Objective performance is
arguably more important than subjective performance to firm outcomes. Furthermore, additional
work teasing out the effects of pay ceilings, pay floors, and pay ranges seems important for
future work on pay variation.
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Causal Inferences in Pay Variation Research
The third assumption addressed in this study was in regard to whether there is a causal
relationship between pay variation and individual responses. In regard to performance, discussed
at length above, pay range was not found to have a causal relationship with objective
performance. This is interesting because the link between pay range and individual performance
is an important one to much of the pay variation research (Conroy et al., in press; Downes &
Choi, 2014; Gupta et al., 2012). As previously noted, one possible explanation is the artificiality
of the laboratory setting. Another related explanation is that the pay manipulations may not have
been sufficiently different, such that the narrow range was not small enough to find an effect.
Mitra, Gupta, and Jenkins (1997) reported that a just noticeable difference for a raise in pay was
around 7 percent. The difference between $6 and $8, the smallest range in this study, is much
more than 7 percent. It may be that distinctions in pay must simply meet a threshold of
noticeability to affect performance. Finally, it is possible that allocation rules are actually a more
important pay policy than pay range for influencing performance outcomes. That is, what
matters is how pay is distributed not how much pay is distributed. If this is the case, it seems
possible that fairness might explain performance responses. Research that simultaneously
addressed how motivation and fairness operate in the relationship between allocation rule and
performance could address this possibility.
Interestingly, the allocation rule was a more consistent, significant predictor when ability
was controlled in the model. The effect of allocation rule was significant across all datasets (i.e.,
untransformed, transformed, and with outlier removal) when ability was included as a covariate.
This has implications for the pay variation literature as there has been discussion that controlling
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for ability removes important variance related to the pay variation and performance relationship
(Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). Research that has addressed this issue has been conflicting.
In this study, controlling for ability allowed the allocation rule effect to emerge. This
finding contrasts Gerhart and Rynes (2003) argument that controlling for ability suppresses a
positive pay variation and performance relationship. The difference may be explained by sorting
effects (i.e., attraction and retention of employees due to firm policies and practices, Gerhart &
Rynes, 2003). That is, firms with pay-for-performance are likely to attract and retain a higher
caliber of employee, which is called a sorting effect. This sorting effect has been established in
prior work. For example, Shaw and Gupta (2007) reported higher performers were less likely to
turn over from firms with highly communicated, performance-based pay variation. Since the
study reported here was experimental and at the individual-level, the result is not surprising.
That is, there are not sorting effects in this study design as participants were randomly assigned
to conditions. Thus, the only effect of the manipulated pay policy would be a motivational effect.
By controlling for ability, the motivational effect could be isolated. Much of the research on pay
variation and firm performance may be representative of both sorting effects and incentive
effects. By not allowing for sorting effects, it is expected that the overall pay policy and
performance relationship should be smaller than in organizations, though this does not prevent
the motivation effect from emerging in the study. This suggests that the small effects in this
study may be due to a lack of the sorting opportunities in the experiment. Additional work
teasing out these models would be of great value.
Some of the findings presented here do speak to causal effects of pay range. Expectancy
theory components were related to pay policies as hypothesized. Ceilings affected pay valences
and allocation rules affected P Pay expectancies. With random assignment to conditions, the
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results are supportive of a causal relationship between the policies and expectancy theory
mechanisms proposed. Testing the expectancy theory framework was an additional contribution
to the individual responses assumption prevalent in pay variation research. Expectancy theory
has been applied to pay variation theorizing in multiple papers (e.g., Downes & Choi, 2014;
Gupta et al., 2012; Conroy et al., in press), but has not been tested specifically.
Summary and Recommendations
In all, the differences in findings across allocation rules and pay range seem to provide
strong evidence that pay range and equity/equality arguments should not be confused. They
address different pay policies in organizations and their confounding is inappropriate. I suggest
an end to this confusion, a shift to separating the policies and arguments that have become so
entwined in this area of research.
An important point raised in this study is that pay variation is most representative of the
incentive intensity policy of the firm. This is an issue often raised when the competing
hypotheses approach is used to explain the pay variation and performance relationship. That is,
pay variation is viewed as a proxy for high incentive intensity and this is hypothesized to be
motivational. If this is the logic, why not measure incentive intensity rather than a proxy for
incentive intensity? Similarly, why not measure allocation rules if the effects of allocation rules
are of interest?
It seems likely that prior work has taken the pay variation approach because pay variation
data are available through public sources for certain groups. These data sources may be
convenient, but work taking this approach continues to muddy the literature around incentive
intensity and allocation rules. Pay variation measures may be representative of an accumulation
of individual equity allocation rules over time with the same employees increasingly performing
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highly; these measures may also represent a multitude of organizational factors related to pay.
Most current models do not fully address these issues theoretically or empirically.
The study presented here does not provide clear evidence of a pay range and individual
performance relationship. The causality of high incentive intensity policies that create pay
variation and firm performance continues to be unclear. It may be more beneficial to actually
ask firms about their pay policies if this is the interest of the researcher. Much of the field work
on pay variation is unclear regarding what the pay variation construct actually represents.
Another recommendation is that researchers put an end to the old model of correlating
pay variation measures and firm performance to test competing hypotheses that postulate a
positive effect of pay variation based on tournament/agency/expectancy arguments versus a
negative effect of pay variation based on equity/relative deprivation arguments. Rather, the field
of pay research would benefit from a move toward multi-level frameworks.
Pay variation from a multi-level perspective would account for the correct levels of
theoretical arguments. For example, in this study, a positive relationship between pay range and
individual performance was proposed based on expectancy theory. Extensions of this study
could address the relationship between pay range and individual affective responses based on
theories more proximal to affective responses than motivation (e.g., justice theories). Both
motivational and affective responses may be important to the aggregation of individual-level
effects to the group-level and to the firm-level. Simply testing the pay variation and firm
performance ignores far too much of the complexity involved in this research area, nuances
across levels must be addressed. In sum, studying pay policies (rather than rough measures) and
developing multi-level models has the potential to increase the value of strategic compensation
research.
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Practical Implications
One study alone cannot sufficiently answer the many questions that arise for
organizational leaders and managers in the realm of how to allocate resources to the workforce.
It is important to keep in mind that in addition to motivation and performance, employees also
experience feelings of unfairness and deprivation in response to pay policies and decisions.
These feelings may lead to sorting effects, such that good employees leave the firm while poor
employees stay (Gerhart & Fang, 2014; Shaw & Gupta, 2007). As such, the practical
implications noted here must be considered within a broader context of the pay variation
literature.
For organizational leaders designing pay programs, this study provides evidence that pay
policies affect the motivational responses of employees. Allocation rules appear to be important
to influencing individual performance while pay range effects are unclear. The results of this
study give greater support to the idea of making distinctions among employees, but little support
is provided regarding the size of these distinctions.
Drawing on the findings related to expectancy theory, it appears that employees have
stronger perceptions that pay will be tied to their own performance when equity rules are used
than when equality rules are used. A long tradition in expectancy theory research, as well as the
results of this study, has shown that these expectancies do influence motivation and performance
behaviors (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010; Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996). When employees
can see the relationship between their performance and their outcomes, it creates an impetus to
perform, assuming the outcomes are valued. This aligns with Shaw’s (2014) recommendation
that identifiability (i.e., the ability to measure performance) is important to understanding pay
variation’s effects. When performance can be measured at the individual-level, organizations
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may benefit from allocating pay in a way that recognizes individual contributions through
rewards.
Valences of outcomes are also influenced by the pay policies. When employees see
greater value in the rewards they can earn, they are likely to be more motivated to perform well.
In fact, the interaction between P Pay expectancies and pay valences suggests that it is not
simply important to align pay and performance for individuals. Rather, it is important to tie
rewards of value to high performance as this increases the strength of the P Pay relationship
with motivation. Together, these findings indicate that pay policies which increase P Pay
expectancies and high effort outcome valences simultaneously may have the most profound
effects on employee behaviors.
This study also speaks to issues facing supervisors and managers. The clear importance
of P Pay expectancies and pay valences on motivation and performance suggests managers
should create environments where employees experience increased P Pay expectancies and pay
valences. One clear way to do this is to measure individual performance and reward such
performance. While managers may have less power over the budgets in their firms, they may be
able to make allocation decisions that ensure employees have a clear line of sight regarding the
performance to pay relationship. When these performance measures and allocation approaches
are in place, good communication with employees can also increase employee perceptions of the
relationship between pay and performance.
As expected, ability was found to have a relationship with E P expectancies, which
mediated the relationship between ability and motivation. In fact, E P expectancies were the
greatest predictor of motivation in this study. Managers may benefit from creating an
environment that increases the E P expectancies of their individual employees. This may be
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accomplished through stronger communication around good performance to increase feelings of
self-efficacy (Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993) or through training and selection practices that
ensure highly capable employees.
In sum, the importance of the expectancy components in affecting motivation and
performance indicates that perceptions are central to explaining employee motivation. So, it is
not simply important that policies create an environment where performance is tied to valued
outcomes. It is also important that sufficient communication ensures employees are aware of
these policies.
Limitations
Studies must be designed with consideration of the costs and benefits associated with a
selected research design. This investigation is no different. A number of limitations note
caution in interpreting results and may explain unsupported findings. Here, these limitations are
noted. Limitations of one study may suggest future directions for follow-up studies. These
potential directions are also addressed.
Generalizability
In order to strengthen internal validity, an experimental design in a laboratory setting was
used. The use of a laboratory setting limits the realism of the pay policies and work
environment. Individuals in the study were not actual employees; they were not trying to
maintain employment or dealing with the host of pressures that are generally experienced in
organizations. The focus of this study was almost entirely on pay, such that other important
outcomes to individuals, such as group relationships were weak. Individuals did not know other
members of their group or have concerns about a long-term working relationship. In
organizations, these relationships are likely to be important to the motivational force equation.
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For example, acceptance from coworkers may be an important outcome for consideration in the
motivational force equation. Research in the field that measures other outcomes and individual
differences regarding the value of these outcomes by employees could address this limitation.
Prior field research findings in this area have been ambiguous, leading to a need to isolate pay
policies in a lab setting and use experimental design to address causality. This study has taken a
step in that direction. The knowledge gained from this study can be used to improve future field
research on strategic compensation issues. Specifically, as discussed earlier, pay policies may
represent a better approach to measuring compensation strategies in future field research rather
than simply pay variation.
Another issue is the use of undergraduate students as a sample. It would be reasonable to
question the generalizability of this sample to the working population. However, there are a
number of reasons why the undergraduate sample may be appropriate. One, undergraduate
business majors represent a population of current and future employees in organizational entrylevel positions. Two, the pay ranges that could be paid in this study were more likely to be
meaningful to an undergraduate than to individuals that are currently employed. If we want to
see how individuals react to different pay ranges, there is a need to use meaningful ranges. It is
unlikely that a manager would respond to the amounts of pay available in this study; however,
undergraduates may view these potential payouts as valuable spending money. In order to test
for causality, an experimental approach was valuable, it would be far too expensive to conduct
this kind of test with large amounts of money at stake. Since students represent current and
future employees at a time in their lives where lower amounts of money may be seen as valuable,
this was an ideal sample for an experimental test despite its limitations.
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In general, a tradeoff was made in this study between external validity and internal
validity, such that internal validity was given priority. This study allowed for causal inference
and helped identify problems in pay variation field research. The knowledge from this study can
be valuable for future research in field settings. Addressing incentive intensity and allocation
policies in actual organizations, rather than using pay variation as a proxy measure, can build on
this study’s findings and address external validity concerns.
Motivation-related Variance in Performance
Another study limitation is the restricted amount of time that participants were actually
engaged in the paid task. This limitation may explain a lack of motivation-related variance in the
dependent performance measure. The amount of variance explained in performance by
motivation was around 1 to 2 percent for objective performance and 5 percent for subjective
performance. Considering that performance is a function of motivation and ability (Campbell,
1990), this is a small amount.
It may be that the performance measured in this study was more reflective of maximum
performance than typical performance (Klehe & Anderson, 2007). Maximum performance
represents ability more than motivation and occurs when three conditions are met (Klehe &
Anderson, 2007; Sackett, Zedeck, & Fogli, 1988). One, individuals are aware they are being
evaluated. This was part of the study since evaluation was required in order to distribute
payment. Two, the participant accepts the expectation that performance is maximized. This may
vary some, and is likely to be the reason that motivation had any relationship with performance.
Three, the time duration is short. The five minute intervals in this study were short. This
decision was made to ensure that the overall study did not take too long, as this might have
lowered participation and engagement in the study. However, future research would benefit
139

from using tasks that take more time to complete. Overall, a valuable modification to this study
design would be to extend the task performance time, so that motivation would be required for a
participant to continue performing the task well. This would allow for greater variation in the
performance variable and this variance would assist in detecting effects of pay policies.
Group-level Outcomes and Affective Responses
This study was also limited in that it focused entirely on individual-level responses. This
was the scope of the study. Yet, we know that some sort of pay variation and performance
relationship exists at the firm level based on prior research (Conroy et al., in press; Shaw, 2014).
The cross-level nature of pay variation has been explicated in recent work (Conroy et al., in
press). The study presented here can be taken as evidence that there is a link between pay
policies and motivational mechanisms, but it does not say anything about group-level or firmlevel outcomes of these policies.
There may be interesting changes in effects as levels change. For example, the
heterogeneity and homogeneity of the motivation mechanisms within a group may influence
what occurs at the group-level. Similarly, the interdependence of the group may affect the extent
to which individual motivation and performance are actually related to group motivation and
performance. This suggests two areas for additional work. One, as noted earlier, is testing the
multi-level and cross-level relationships inherent in pay variation research. Conroy et al. (in
press) outlined a starting point of propositions for such an endeavor. The other is to vary the
level of interdependence of groups to assess how the effects of allocation rules and incentive
intensity on both individual-level and group-level outcomes may change across levels of
interdependence.

140

The sorting effects (i.e., retention of certain types of employees) of pay variation policies
were also not addressed in this study. Still, these effects are important to consider. Gerhart and
Fang (2014) proposed that sorting effects are an important part of the pay-for-performance
puzzle. Though it was beyond the scope of this investigation to address sorting effects, the study
presented here has identified a potential approach to addressing the sorting issue in the pay
variation literature by separating incentive intensity and allocation rules rather than confounding
them in one pay variation measure. Incentive intensity may make the pay system more salient to
employees and lead them to have stronger positive or negative affective reactions to allocation
rules, leading to retention and turnover among employees, respectively. These responses may
also differ by the performance level of the employee. Supporting this conjecture, Shaw and
Gupta (2007) reported that highly-communicated, performance-based pay variation was related
to lower turnover among high performing employees. The sample was truck drivers, arguably an
environment dominated by individual performance-based pay (i.e., similar to equity allocation
rules). Thus, a potential prediction is that high performers will have strengthened reactions to
allocation rules as the incentive intensity increases with equity allocation being more desirable
and equality allocations being less desirable. Addressing these sorting questions is valuable to
the area of pay variation because findings would have implications for firm performance
outcomes. The loss of good employees could have serious negative implications for the firm
while the loss of poor employees may be desirable.
Conclusion
This investigation identified and tested assumptions of pay variation research. The value
of separating equality/equity arguments from pay variation arguments is the primary contribution
of this work. Most importantly, this study leads to the recommendation that strategic
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compensation research would benefit by moving toward a more policy-based approach to
addressing important compensation issues rather than using blunt proxy measures, such as pay
variation. Only by continually studying the effects of pay can the academic knowledgebase
provide appropriate guidance to practitioners.
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If you have questions or need any assistance from the IRB, please contact me at 210
Administration Building, 5-2208, or irb@uark.edu.
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If you have questions or need any assistance from the IRB, please contact me at 210
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DATE: ____________
PROJECT TITLE: Financial services task
INVESTIGATORS: Samantha Conroy, Nina Gupta
RESEARCH PURPOSE AND DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES: The purpose of this
research is to study performance on a financial services task. You will watch a training video
that teaches you how to perform a financial services task. Then, you will have the chance to
practice the task. Finally, you will perform the task over two different sessions. Throughout
the study, you will also be completing a number of surveys. You will receive course extra
credit for completing this study. You also have an opportunity to earn money by working on
the task in this study.
TIME COMMITMENT INVOLVED: About 100 to 120 minutes
RISKS AND CONFIDENTIALITY: No risk is anticipated in this study. In addition, your
responses will be kept confidential to the extent allowed by law and University policy. Data
from the experiment will be saved into an electronic format that is identifiable only by
number. GPA and SAT/ACT score data will be matched to participant ID numbers using
student ID numbers. Student ID numbers will then be deleted and only participant ID
numbers will remain in the electronic data.
BENEFITS: Increased understanding of the academic research process.
CONSENT
I have been fully informed of the above-described procedure with its possible benefits and risks.
I understand that my responses will be kept confidential to the extent allowed by law and
University policy. I voluntarily give permission for my participation in this study. I know that the
investigator and his/her associates will be available to answer any questions I may have. If, at
any time, I feel my questions have not been adequately answered, I may request to speak with
the primary investigator, Samantha Conroy, at 479-575-6105. If I have any questions about my
rights as a research participant, I can contact the University’s Compliance Coordinator, Ro
Windwalker, at 479-575-2208.
We need your GPA and SAT/ACT score to help us with the statistical analysis of the data. Your
information will be kept confidential to the extent allowed by law and University policy.
I give the researchers permission to obtain my GPA and SAT/ACT score from my student
records.
I do NOT give the researchers permission to obtain my GPA and SAT/ACT score from my
student records.
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION
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Participation in this study is voluntary and you may choose not to participate without any
negative consequences. You may also choose to stop at any time during your participation.
__________________________________________
Student ID Number
__________________________________________
Name (Printed)
__________________________________________
Signature
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__________________________
Date

APPENDIX B
Training Video Slides and Script

Thank you for participating in our study.
Today you will work with a group to complete a mortgage data entry task.

This is a multi-university study, and members of your group are at other universities.
There are many people simultaneously working on the task at universities across the United
States.
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Individuals participating in the study will be organized into groups of 8 to enter information from
paper applications into an electronic database. You and other members of your group will be able
to work together to complete the task through an electronic system.
There are 8 group members because there are eight fields to be entered per application. Each
member of your group will be responsible for entering a different piece of information.
Your group’s participation in the task will help us assess data entry effectiveness when there are
multiple people working together in different locations. I will now explain how to complete the
task.

There are three binders at your work station – a blue binder marked training, a green binder
marked TASK1, and a yellow binder marked TASK2.
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Inside the binders you will see mortgage applications.
These documents were developed to look like actual loan applications, so that we can determine
how well this multi-location data entry system works.
These documents contain pieces of information that will be entered into an electronic database
by your group.

The applicant ID on the mortgage application will be important for matching the paper forms to
the electronic forms.
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The information that your group will enter includes:
Monthly payments and total liabilities…

…Income, Cash, Investments and Property….
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…Loan Request and Down Payment…

Of these entries, each group member has a different value that he or she is responsible for
entering.
Look for your university in this table. In the same row, you will see the field that you are
responsible for entering.
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You are at the University of Arkansas, so you will be responsible for entering income

To begin the task, you will first login.
Each login screen is color-coded to match the binder used for data entry.
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Your username is your four digit participant ID number given to you on an index card when you
arrived for the study.

Your password will be provided to you electronically when it is time to begin the task.
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Enter your participant ID and password, then click ok.
If you made a mistake, click cancel and enter the information again.

The program will tell you when it is time to begin and remind you of the appropriate binder to
use.
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You should click ok as soon as you have your materials ready.

You will then see an entry form.
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Different group members will be making entries for different fields and will see the forms in
different orders.

As a reminder, participants at the University of Arkansas, enter income. That means once you
have entered income, you can move on to the next form.
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To enter the data, start by checking the applicant ID number on the electronic form and matching
it to the paper application.
PLEASE NOTE: The paper applications are in numerical order from lowest to highest inside the
binder; however, the electronic forms are likely to show up in a different order. So it is important
that you always match the applicant ID on the electronic form to the applicant ID on the paper
form before you enter a value.

Once you have matched the ID, enter the value for income from the paper form into the field on
the electronic form.

171

You should enter only numbers; the program will not accept any other characters, such as dollar
signs, letters or slashes.

When you are completing the task with your group, you will notice that various other fields will
have entries. This is because other group members are simultaneously entering information.
You may edit the other fields if you feel like helping your group members. But your main job is
to enter the information in your assigned field.
When you are finished with a form click “Save and Next,” and a new form will appear.
Please note once you click “Save and Next,” you cannot go back to make changes to the form.
Repeat the steps for each new form.
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You will have a limited amount of time for data entry.
For the training practice session, you will have 2 minutes. For the TASK1 session, you will have
5 minutes. For the TASK2 session, you will have 5 minutes.
Time is tracked on a timer as you work on the task.
When the timer reaches zero, the entry session is complete.

If you have questions about entering information on forms, you may replay this video before
moving forward. You can also refer to the mortgage data entry help card inside the training
binder at any time during the study. When you are comfortable that you are ready to practice the
task, you should click next. During the practice session, you will practice the task alone.
But you will begin working with a group for the TASK1 session. And you will continue
working with the same group for the TASK2 session.
Thank you for viewing this instructional video.
173

APPENDIX C
Task Programming Screens
PROGRAM SCREEN 1:

PROGRAM SCREEN 2:
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PROGRAM SCREEN 3:

PROGRAM SCREEN 4:
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PROGRAM SCREEN 5:

PROGRAM SCREEN 6:
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PROGRAM SCREEN 7:

PROGRAM SCREEN 8:
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PROGRAM SCREEN 9:

PROGRAM SCREEN 10:
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PROGRAM SCREEN 11:

PROGRAM SCREEN 12:
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PROGRAM SCREEN 13:

PROGRAM SCREEN 14:
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PROGRAM SCREEN 15:

PROGRAM SCREEN 16:
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PROGRAM SCREEN 17:

PROGRAM SCREEN 18:
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PROGRAM SCREEN 19:

PROGRAM SCREEN 20:
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PROGRAM SCREEN 21:

PROGRAM SCREEN 22:
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PROGRAM SCREEN 23:

PROGRAM SCREEN 24:
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PROGRAM SCREEN 25:

PROGRAM SCREEN 26:
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PROGRAM SCREEN 27:

PROGRAM SCREEN 28:
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Abbreviation
A
ACO
AFO
ANG
APAP
APAV
C
CA
CV
DJ
E
EFT
EP
ES
FG
FR
FT
FTC
FV
GL
GLT
HOP
HPP
I
IC
IJ
MCAR
MCC

APPENDIX D
Questionnaire Codebook
Construct
Scale Source
Agreeableness
Goldberg, 1999
Achievement Orientation
Jackson, 1984
Affiliation Orientation
Jackson, 1984
Izard, 1971; Shaver, Schwartz,
Anger
Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987
Achievement Performance Approach
Elliot & McGregor, 2001
Motivation Trait
Achievement Performance Avoidance
Elliot & McGregor, 2001
Motivation Trait
Conscientiousness
Goldberg, 1999
Cognitive Ability
NA
Ceiling Pay Valence
NA
Distributive Justice
Colquitt, 2001
Extraversion
Goldberg, 1999
Effort
NA
E P Expectancy for Task
Adapted from the full study
Performance
described in Djurdjevic (2013)
Emotional Stability
Goldberg, 1999
Feeling of being in a Group
NA
Fear
Izard, 1971; Shaver et al., 1987
Folger & Cropanzano, 2001;
Fairness
Nicklin, Greenbaum, McNall,
Folger, & Williams, 2011
Folger & Cropanzano, 2001;
Fairness Counterfactual
Nicklin et al., 2011
Floor Valence
NA
Group Liking
Henry, Arrow, & Carini, 1999
Guilt
Izard, 1971; Shaver et al., 1987
Hope
Izard, 1971; Shaver et al., 1987
Happiness
Izard, 1971; Shaver et al., 1987
Intellect or Imagination
Goldberg, 1999
Interest in Continuing
NA
Informational Justice
Colquitt, 2001
Manipulation Check Allocation Rule

NA

Manipulation Check Ceiling

NA
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Abbreviation
MCF
MCR
MOT

Construct
Manipulation Check Floor
Manipulation Check Range
Motivation

Scale Source

PA
PJ

Positive Affect
Procedural Justice

POI

P O Expectancy Intrinsic

POM

P Pay Expectancy, Money

PSA
PSL
PSS

Pay Satisfaction Administration
Pay Satisfaction Level
Pay Satisfaction Structure

NA
NA
NA
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988
Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, &
Arbach, 2005
Watson et al., 1988
Colquitt, 2001
Adapted from the full study
described in Djurdjevic (2013)
Adapted from the full study
described in Djurdjevic (2013)
Heneman & Schwab, 1985
Heneman & Schwab, 1985
Heneman & Schwab, 1985

RLF

Relief

Izard, 1971; Shaver et al., 1987

SD

Social Desirability

short form, Crowne & Marlow,
1960; Reynolds, 1982

SDN

Sadness

Izard, 1971; Shaver et al., 1987

SGP
SIP

Subjective Group Performance
Subjective Individual Performance

SVI

State Valence Intrinsic

SVM

State Valence Money

TVI

Trait Valence Intrinsic

TVM

Trait Valence Money

NA
NA
Adapted from the full study
described in Djurdjevic (2013)
Adapted from the full study
described in Djurdjevic (2013)
Adapted from the full study
described in Djurdjevic (2013)
Adapted from the full study
described in Djurdjevic (2013)
Schmitt et al., 2005

NA
OJSS

Negative Affect
Observer Justice Sensitivity

VJSS
Victim Justice Sensitivity
-RReverse Coded
Note. NA indicates scale used was not an established scale; for repeat scales: 1=TASK1,
2=TASK2.
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QUESTIONNAIRE I
We would like to ask you some questions about yourself. Please answer these questions as
candidly as you can. Remember that your answers are completely confidential. No one
outside the project staff will ever know your answers.

Purposeful
Achieving
Loyal
Enterprising
Good-willed
Capable
Resourceful
Attaining

[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]

Very Accurate

Moderately
Accurate

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

Neither Accurate
Nor Inaccurate

ACO
ACO
AFO
ACO
AFO
ACO
ACO
ACO

Moderately
Inaccurate

QI1_a
QI1_b
QI1_c
QI1_d
QI1_e
QI1_f
QI1_g
QI1_h

Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you.

Very Inaccurate

1.

[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]

Very
Accurate

Connected
Industrious
Pleasant
Good-natured
Companionable
Aspiring
Kind

Moderately
Accurate

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Neither
Accurate Nor
Inaccurate

AFO
ACO
AFO
AFO
AFO
ACO
AFO

Moderately
Inaccurate

QI2_a
QI2_b
QI2_c
QI2_d
QI2_e
QI2_f
QI2_g

Very
Inaccurate

2. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you.

[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
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AFO
AFO
AFO
ACO
ACO
ACO
ACO
ACO

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

Warm
Neighborly
Cooperative
Driven
Accomplishing
Ambitious
Competitive
Striving

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]

Very Accurate

[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]

Neither
Accurate Nor
Inaccurate
Moderately
Accurate

Moderately
Inaccurate

QI3_a
QI3_b
QI3_c
QI3_d
QI3_e
QI3_f
QI3_g
QI3_h

Very
Inaccurate

3. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you.

[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]

Very Accurate

Diplomatic
Friendly
Sociable
Productive
Self-improving
Approachable
Hospitable

Moderately
Accurate

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Neither Accurate
Nor Inaccurate

AFO
AFO
AFO
ACO
ACO
AFO
AFO

Moderately
Inaccurate

QI4_a
QI4_b
QI4_c
QI4_d
QI4_e
QI4_f
QI4_g

Very Inaccurate

4. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you.

[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
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Neither Accurate
Nor Inaccurate

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

Moderately
Accurate
Very Accurate

Moderately
Inaccurate

QI5_a APAP a. It is important for me to do well
compared to other people.
QI5_b
E
b. I don't mind being the center of
attention.
I-R
c. I have difficulty understanding
QI5_c
abstract ideas.
QI5_d OJSS d. I am upset when someone is treated
worse than others.
QI5_e AFO e. I enjoy being with friends.
QI5_f ACO f. I respond positively to competition.
QI5_g
E
g. I talk to a lot of different people at
parties.
QI5_h E-R h. I have little to say.

Very Inaccurate

5. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you.
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Very Accurate

C
E-R
I
ES-R
I

Moderately Accurate

QI6_b
QI6_c
QI6_d
QI6_e
QI6_f

a. I am willing to work toward distant
goals.
b. I am always prepared.
c. I don't talk a lot.
d. I have a rich vocabulary.
e. I have frequent mood swings.
f. I spend time reflecting on things.

Neither Accurate Nor
Inaccurate

ACO

Moderately
Inaccurate

QI6_a

Very Inaccurate

6. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you.

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]

ES
VJSS

c.
d.

QI7_e

E-R

e.

QI7_f

APAV

f.

QI7_g
QI7_h

A
APAV

g.
h.
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Very Accurate

QI7_c
QI7_d

I often feel blue.
My fear of performing poorly is
often what motivates me.
I seldom feel blue.
It makes me angry when others
get an award which I have
earned.
I don't like to draw attention to
myself.
My fear of performing poorly on
new tasks is often what motivates
me.
I take time out for others.
I just want to avoid doing poorly
when I start new tasks.

Moderately Accurate

a.
b.

Neither Accurate Nor
Inaccurate

ES-R
APAV

Moderately Inaccurate

QI7_a
QI7_b

Very Inaccurate

7. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you.

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]

ACO

b.

QI8_c
QI8_d
QI8_e

I
I
OJSS

c.
d.
e.

QI8_f
QI8_g

E
A-R

f.
g.

Very Accurate

QI8_b

I make an effort to maintain
associations with people.
I am willing to put forth effort to
attain excellence.
I am full of ideas.
I am quick to understand things.
I am upset when someone does
not get a reward he/she has
earned.
I feel comfortable around people.
I feel little concern for others.

Moderately Accurate

a.

Neither Accurate Nor
Inaccurate

AFO

Moderately Inaccurate

QI8_a

Very Inaccurate

8. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you.

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]

ES-R
AFO

e.
f.

QI9_g

APA
V
ACO

g.

QI9_h

h.

I just want to avoid doing poorly.
I aspire to accomplish difficult
tasks.
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Very Accurate

QI9_e
QI9_f

I am easily disturbed.
I get irritated easily.
I like order.
It bothers me when others receive
something I deserve.
I change my mood a lot.
I make an effort to win
friendships.

Moderately Accurate

a.
b.
c.
d.

Neither Accurate Nor
Inaccurate

ES-R
ES-R
C
VJSS

Moderately Inaccurate

QI9_a
QI9_b
QI9_c
QI9_d

Very Inaccurate

9. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you.

[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

I-R
E
APA
V
A
E
C

c.
d.
e.

QI10_f
QI10_g
QI10_h

f.
g.
h.

Very Accurate

QI10_c
QI10_d
QI10_e

I make a mess of things.
I get upset when I see someone
else treated unfairly.
I do not have a good imagination.
I am the life of the party.
My goal is to avoid performing
poorly.
I have a soft heart.
I start conversations.
I pay attention to details.

Moderately Accurate

a.
b.

Neither Accurate Nor
Inaccurate

C-R
OJSS

Moderately Inaccurate

QI10_a
QI10_b

Very Inaccurate

10. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you.

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]

[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]

[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]

ACO
I-R

e.
f.

QI11_g
QI11_h

I
C-R

g.
h.
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Very Accurate

QI11_e
QI11_f

I make people feel at ease.
I am quiet around strangers.
I feel others' emotions.
I get upset when I feel unfairly
treated.
I maintain high standards.
I am not interested in abstract
ideas.
I have excellent ideas.
I shirk my duties.

Moderately Accurate

a.
b.
c.
d.

Neither Accurate Nor
Inaccurate

A
E-R
A
VJSS

Moderately Inaccurate

QI11_a
QI11_b
QI11_c
QI11_d

Very Inaccurate

11. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you.

[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]

A
ES-R
APAP

b.
c.
d.

QI12_e

OJSS

e.

QI12_f
QI12_g

ES-R
I

f.
g.

Very Accurate

QI12_b
QI12_c
QI12_d

I often forget to put things back in
their proper place.
I am interested in people.
I worry about things.
It is important for me to do better
than others.
It gets me down to see someone
being criticized for things that are
ignored with others.
I get stressed out easily.
I use difficult words.

Moderately Accurate

a.

Neither Accurate Nor
Inaccurate

C-R

Moderately Inaccurate

QI12_a

Very Inaccurate

12. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you.

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
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Very Accurate

I get upset easily.
I am not really interested in others.
I accept people readily.
I get chores done right away.
I have a vivid imagination.
I am relaxed most of the time.
I am exacting in my work.

Moderately Accurate

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Neither Accurate Nor
Inaccurate

ES-R
A-R
AFO
C
I
ES
C

Moderately Inaccurate

QI13_a
QI13_b
QI13_c
QI13_d
QI13_e
QI13_f
QI13_g

Very Inaccurate

13. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you.

[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]

AFO
E-R
VJSS

b.
c.
d.

QI14_e

A-R

e.

Very Accurate

QI14_b
QI14_c
QI14_d

My goal in performance situations
is to do better than other people.
I enjoy being with people.
I keep in the background.
I get upset when other people are
treated better than me.
I am not interested in other people's
problems.

Moderately Accurate

a.

Neither Accurate Nor
Inaccurate

APAP

Moderately Inaccurate

QI14_a

Very Inaccurate

14. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you.

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]
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Moderately Inaccurate

Neither Accurate Nor
Inaccurate

Moderately Accurate

Very Accurate

QI15_a
C
a. I follow a schedule.
QI15_b OJSS b. I am upset when someone is
undeservingly worse off than
others.
QI15_c
A
c. I sympathize with others' feelings.
QI15_d VJSS d. It bothers me when others receive
something that ought to be mine.
QI15_e C-R e. I leave my belongings around.
QI15_f A-R f. I insult people.

Very Inaccurate

15. Please indicate how much each of the following is an accurate description of you.

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]

Always

Active
Upset
Ashamed
Strong
Jittery
Afraid
Excited
Attentive

Most of the Time

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

Some-times

PA
NA
NA
PA
NA
NA
PA
PA

Rarely

QI16_a
QI16_b
QI16_c
QI16_d
QI16_e
QI16_f
QI16_g
QI16_h

Never

16. Below are a number of words describing different feelings and emotions. Please
indicate how often you have experienced each of these feelings in the last year.

[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]

Always

Hostile
Proud
Enthusiastic
Alert
Inspired
Determined
Scared
Interested

Most of the
Time

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

Sometimes

NA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
NA
PA

Rarely

QI17_a
QI17_b
QI17_c
QI17_d
QI17_e
QI17_f
QI17_g
QI17_h

Never

17. Below are a number of words describing different feelings and emotions. Please
indicate how often you have experienced each of these feelings in the last year.

[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
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Always

Distressed
Nervous
Guilty
Irritable

Most of the
Time

a.
b.
c.
d.

Sometimes

NA
NA
NA
NA

Rarely

QI18_a
QI18_b
QI18_c
QI18_d

Never

18. Below are a number of words describing different feelings and emotions. Please
indicate how often you have experienced each of these feelings in the last year.

[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]

TVI
SD

c.
d.

QI19_e

SD

e.

QI19_f
QI19_g
QI19_h

TVM
TVM
TVM

f.
g.
h.
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Strongly Agree

QI19_c
QI19_d

Doing the right thing is important to me.
I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t
get my way.
I value doing the right thing.
I’m always willing to admit it when I
make a mistake.
I am sometimes irritated by people who
ask favors of me.
I value money a lot.
I really like money.
Money is important to me.

Agree

a.
b.

Neither

TVI
SD

Disagree

QI19_a
QI19_b

Strongly Disagree

19. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]

QI20_a

SD

a.

QI20_b

SD

b.

QI20_c

c.

QI20_d

TVMR
SD

d.

QI20_e

SD

e.

QI20_f

SD

f.

QI20_g
QI20_h

TVI
SD

g.
h.

I have never deliberately said something
that hurt someone’s feelings.
No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always
a good listener.
Most things in life are more important
than money.
There have been times when I was quite
jealous of the good fortune of others.
I have never been irked when people
expressed ideas very different from my
own.
There have been occasions when I took
advantage of someone.
I want to do things that are important.
It is sometimes hard for me to go on with
my work if I am not encouraged.
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Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

20. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

QI21_a

SD

a.

QI21_b

SD

b.

QI21_c

SD

c.

QI21_d

SD

d.

QI21_e

TV
I

e.

I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive
and forget.
On a few occasions, I have given up doing
something because I thought too little about
my ability.
I am always courteous, even to people who
are disagreeable.
There have been times when I felt like
rebelling against people in authority even
though I knew they were right.
Doing a job right is important to me.

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

21. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

Now we would like to ask you a few questions about your background and experiences. Please
remember that your answers are completely confidential. Please answer honestly. Type in the
required information or mark the indicated spaces for your responses.
[QI22] 22. Are you currently a student at the University of Arkansas (pick one)?
[1] Yes ------------------ Go to Question 22a
[2] No ------------------ Go to Question 23
[QI22a CA] 22a. What is your current college GPA? _______
[QI23] 23. Have you taken the SAT (pick one)?
[1] Yes ------------------ Go to Question 23a
[2] No ------------------ Go to Question 23
[QI23a CA] 23a. What is your SAT score? _______
[QI24] 24. Have you taken the ACT (pick one)?
[1] Yes ------------------ Go to Question 24a
[2] No ------------------ Go to End of Questionnaire I
[QI24a CA] 24a. What is your ACT score? _______
Thank you for completing Questionnaire I!
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QUESTIONNAIRE II
Before you start TASK1, we have some questions for you. Please answer these questions as
candidly as you can. Remember that your answers are completely confidential. No one
outside the project staff will ever know your answers.

QII1_a

1POM

a.

QII1_b

b.

QII1_c

1POIR
1POM

QII1_d

1MOT

d.

QII1_e

1EFT

e.

c.

The better I perform on this task, the more
money I will make.
My performance on this task will not
affect how content I feel about this task.
How much money I make depends on
how well I perform this task.
I am very motivated to do well on this
task.
I want to work hard in this session.
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Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

1. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following regarding
the task you will be performing (TASK1).

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

a.

QII2_b
QII2_c

1MOT
1POI

b.
c.

QII2_d
QII2_e

1MOT
1SVM

d.
e.

QII2_f

1EP

f.

I will probably exert a lot of effort on
this task.
I feel driven to do well on this task.
How good I feel about this task depends
on how well I perform.
I really want to do well.
The money I can make on this task is
important to me.
How well I do on this task depends on
how much effort I put into it.

[2]

[3] [4] [5]

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3] [4] [5]
[3] [4] [5]

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3] [4] [5]
[3] [4] [5]

[1]

[2]

[3] [4] [5]

Strongly Agree

[1]

Agree

Neither

1EFT

Disagree

QII2_a

Strongly Disagree

2. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following regarding
the task you will be performing (TASK1).

a.

QII3_b

1SVI

b.

QII3_c

1POM

c.

QII3_d

1SVM

d.

The effort that I put into this task is not
related to my performance on this task.
I want to feel good about myself by
performing well on this task.
It is likely that I will make more money
if I perform well on this task.
I value the money that I can earn for
this task.
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[2]

[3] [4] [5]

[1]

[2]

[3] [4] [5]

[1]

[2]

[3] [4] [5]

[1]

[2]

[3] [4] [5]

Strongly Agree

[1]

Agree

Neither

1EP-R

Disagree

QII3_a

Strongly Disagree

3. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following regarding
the task you will be performing (TASK1).

a.

QII4_b

1MOT

b.

QII4_c

1POI

c.

QII4_d

1SVM

d.

QII4_e

1POM

e.

I want to do the right thing by
performing well on this task.
I am motivated to perform well on this
task.
The better my performance on this
task, the better I will feel about myself.
I want the money I can make for this
task.
If I perform well, I will make more
money.

[2]

[3] [4] [5]

[1]

[2]

[3] [4] [5]

[1]

[2]

[3] [4] [5]

[1]

[2]

[3] [4] [5]

[1]

[2]

[3] [4] [5]

Strongly Agree

[1]

Agree

Neither

1SVI

Disagree

QII4_a

Strongly Disagree

4. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following regarding
the task you will be performing (TASK1).

QII5_d

a.
b.
c.
d.

I plan to take it easy while performing
this task.
If I try hard, I will do well on this task.
I do not care about my performance on
this task.
There is a good chance that my
performance will be high on this task.
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[2]

[3] [4] [5]

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3] [4] [5]
[3] [4] [5]

[1]

[2]

[3] [4] [5]

Strongly Agree

[1]

Agree

Neither

QII5_b
QII5_c

1EFTR
1EP
1MOTR
1EP

Disagree

QII5_a

Strongly Disagree

5. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following regarding
the task you will be performing (TASK1).

QII6_a

1EP

a.

QII6_b

1POI

b.

QII6_c
QII6_d

1EFT
1POI

c.
d.

QII6_e
QII6_f

1EFT
1POM
-R
1SVM

e.
f.

QII6_g

g.

If I put my mind to it, I should be able to
perform this task well.
If I perform this task well, I will feel that I
have done something worthwhile.
I plan to work hard in this session.
It is likely that I will feel that I have done
something worthwhile if I perform well
on this task.
I will try really hard on this task.
My performance on this task will not
affect how much money I make.
Getting paid for this task is quite valuable
to me.
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Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

6. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following regarding
the task you will be performing (TASK1).

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

QII7_a

1MCR

a.

QII7_b

1MCC

b.

QII7_c

1FTC

c.

QII7_d

1FT-R

d.

QII7_e

1FT

e.

QII7_f

1FTC

f.

QII7_g

1MCR

g.

QII7_h

1MCA
R

h.

There is a small difference in the most and
the least money I could make in this
session.
The maximum amount of money I can
earn on this task is large.
Pay for this task could be distributed to
group members differently.
I really don't agree with how I will be paid
for this session.
The approach to distributing pay for this
task is fair.
I think my pay should be based only on
my own performance.
There is a large difference in the most and
the least money I could make in this
session.
I hope my group performs well.
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Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

7. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following regarding
the task you will be performing (TASK1).

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

a.

QII8_b

1FTC

b.

QII8_c

1MCRR

c.

QII8_d

1FTC

d.

QII8_e

1MCR

e.

QII8_f

1MCAR

f.

I don't think how much I make should
depend on my group's performance.
I think pay should be distributed to
group members differently for this
session.
There is a small difference in the most
and least money my group could make
in this session.
I wish they had used a different way to
distribute pay to group members in
this study.
There is a big difference in the most
and least money my group could make
in this session.
My own performance will make a big
difference in how much money I make
in this session.
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[2]

[3] [4] [5]

[1]

[2]

[3] [4] [5]

[1]

[2]

[3] [4] [5]

[1]

[2]

[3] [4] [5]

[1]

[2]

[3] [4] [5]

[1]

[2]

[3] [4] [5]

Strongly Agree

[1]

Agree

Neither

1FTC

Disagree

QII8_a

Strongly Disagree

8. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following regarding
the task you will be performing (TASK1).

QII9_b

1MCAR

b.

QII9_c

1FT

c.

QII9_d

1MCAR

d.

QII9_e

1MCAR

e.

QII9_f

1FT

f.

Pay on this task is based on my
group's performance.
I really want my group to do well in
this session.
The way pay is distributed in this
study is fair.
How much I make in this session
depends on my group's performance.
How much money I make in this
session depends on my own
performance.
The pay for this task is fair.
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[1]

[2]

[3]

[4] [5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4] [5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4] [5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4] [5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4] [5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4] [5]

Strongly Agree

Agree

a.

Neither

1MCAR

Disagree

QII9_a

Strongly Disagree

9. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following regarding
the task you will be performing (TASK1).

1MCF

b.

QII10_c

1FTC

c.

QII10_d

1MCAR

d.

QII10_e

1MCAR

e.

QII10_f

1FT

f.

Strongly Agree

QII10_b

I really want to do well in this
session.
The minimum amount of money I
can earn on this task is small.
Pay for this task should be
distributed to group members
differently.
Pay on this task is based on my
individual performance.
The group's performance will
make a big difference in how
much money I make in this
session.
Distributing pay based on
performance is fair.

Agree

a.

Neither

1MCAR

Disagree

QII10_a

Strongly Disagree

10. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following regarding
the task you will be performing (TASK1).

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

11. Below are several statements regarding the maximum compensation for the task you
will be performing (TASK1). Each statement has a missing value. Please fill in the
blank for the missing value in each statement in the text box that follows the statement.

QII11_a

1MCC

a.

QII11_b

1MCC

b.

The most money my group can make in this
session is
The most money I, individually, can make
in this session is
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$_____________.
$_____________.

1CV

b.

QII12_c

1CV

c.

Strongly Agree

QII12_b

I would really like to make this
much money.
I want to make this amount of
money.
I really value this amount of
money.

Agree

a.

Neither

1CV

Disagree

QII12_a

Strongly Disagree

12. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following regarding
the maximum amount you can make for the task you will be performing (TASK1).

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

13. Below are statements regarding the minimum compensation for the task you will be
performing (TASK1). Each statement has a missing value. Please fill in the blank for
the missing value in each statement in the text box that follows the statement.
QII13_a

1MCF

a.

QII13_b

1MCF

b.

The minimum amount of money my
group can make in this session is
The minimum amount of money I,
individually, can make in this session is

$_____________.
$_____________.

1FV

QII14_c

1FV

I would really like to make this
[1]
much money.
b. I want to make this amount of
[1]
money.
c. I really value this amount of
[1]
money.
Thank you for completing Questionnaire II!
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Strongly Agree

QII14_b

a.

Agree

1FV

Neither

QII14_a

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

14. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following regarding
the minimum amount you can make for the task you will be performing (TASK1).

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

QUESTIONNAIRE III
We have a few quick questions for you while we calculate performance.
[QIII1 – 1SIP] 1. How would you rate your performance on the task (TASK1)?
[1] Poor
[2] Fair
[3] Good
[4] Very Good
[5] Excellent
[QIII2 – 1SGP] 2. How would you rate your group’s performance on the task (TASK1)?
[1] Poor
[2] Fair
[3] Good
[4] Very Good
[5] Excellent
[QIII3 – 1SIP] 3. Individual performance is rated as Low, Average, or High. Where do you
expect your individual performance will be rated for TASK1?
[1] Low
[2] Average
[3] High
[QIII4 – 1SGP] 4. Group performance is rated as Low, Average, or High. Where do you expect
your group’s performance will be rated for TASK1?
[1] Low
[2] Average
[3] High
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QUESTIONNAIRE IV
Please answer the following questions as candidly as you can. Remember that your
answers are completely confidential. No one outside the project staff will ever know your
answers.

To a Very
Large Extent

Upset
Hopeful
Worried
Relief
Tense
Irritated
Nervous
Enthusiastic
Mad

To a Large
Extent

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

To Some
Extent

1SDN
1HOP
1FR
1RLF
1FR
1ANG1
1FR
1HPP2
1ANG2

To a Small
Extent

QIV1_a
QIV1_b
QIV1_c
QIV1_d
QIV1_e
QIV1_f
QIV1_g
QIV1_h
QIV1_i

Not at all

1. Below are a number of words describing different feelings and emotions you may have
right now. Please indicate the extent to which you are currently experiencing each
emotion.

[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
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To a Large
Extent

To a Very
Large Extent

Discouraged
Cheerful
Eager
Sad
Annoyed
Disappointed
Guilt
Anxious
Shame

To Some
Extent

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

To a Small
Extent

QIV2_a 1SDN
QIV2_b 1HPP1
QIV2_c 1HOP
QIV2_d 1SDN
QIV2_e 1ANG1
QIV2_f 1SDN
QIV2_g 1GLT
QIV2_h
1FR
QIV2_i 1GLT

Not at all

2. Below are a number of words describing different feelings and emotions you may have
right now. Please indicate the extent to which you are currently experiencing each
emotion.

[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]

To a Large
Extent

To a Very Large
Extent

Optimistic
Excited
Joyful
Thrilled
Happy
Angry
Regret
Aggravated
Hostile

To Some Extent

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

To a Small
Extent

QIV3_a 1HOP
QIV3_b 1HPP2
QIV3_c 1HPP1
QIV3_d 1HPP2
QIV3_e 1HPP1
QIV3_f 1ANG2
QIV3_g 1GLT
QIV3_h 1ANG1
QIV3_i 1ANG2

Not at all

3. Below are a number of words describing different feelings and emotions you may have
right now. Please indicate the extent to which you are currently experiencing each
emotion.

[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]

QIV4_a

1PJ

a.

QIV4_b

1PJ

b.

QIV4_c

1PJ

c.

QIV4_d

1PJ

d.

QIV4_e

1PJ

e.

Pay is distributed fairly among my group
members.
I think the way pay is distributed among
group members is just.
I like the way pay is distributed in my
group.
It makes sense to distribute money across
group members this way.
I agree with the way my group members
were paid.
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Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

4. We would like to know how you feel about the way pay was distributed in your group
for TASK1. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following.

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

1DJ

b.

QIV5_c

1DJ

c.

QIV5_d

1DJ

d.

To a Very Large
Extent

QIV5_b

...reflect the effort you have put
into your work?
…reflect what you have
contributed to the task?
…reflect how hard you worked on
the task?
…reflect what you should have
made?

To a Large
Extent

a.

To Some Extent

1DJ

To a Small
Extent

QIV5_a

Not at all

5. In this section, we would like your reactions to how much money you made for the
TASK1 session. Please answer these questions as honestly as possible. To what extent
does how much money you made...

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

QIV6_c
QIV6_d

1DJ
1IJ

c.
d.

QIV6_e

1DJ

e.

QIV6_f

1DJ

f.
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To a Very
Large Extent

b.

…really unfair considering your
hard work?
…consistent with what you
expected?
…fair?
…consistent with what you were
told?
...appropriate for the work you
have completed?
...justified, given your
performance?

To a Large
Extent

a.

To Some Extent

QIV6_b

1DJR
1IJ

To a Small
Extent

QIV6_a

Not at all

6. In this section, we would like your reactions to how much money you made for the
TASK1 session. Please answer these questions as honestly as possible. To what extent
is how much money you made...

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

QIV7_d 1PSL

d.

QIV7_e 1PSL

e.

QIV7_f

f.

1PSS

Very Satisfied

b.
c.

Satisfied

QIV7_b 1PSS
QIV7_c 1PSS

…the size of your pay for performance
on this task?
…the pay structure used for this task?
…the differences in pay across
performance levels on the task?
…the level of pay you earned for
performance on this task?
…the level of pay you earned for this
task?
…the way pay was distributed among
group members?

Neutral

a.

Dissatisfied

QIV7_a 1PSL

Very Dissatisfied

7. The statements below describe various reactions that you may have about how much
money you made for the TASK1 session. For each statement, decide how satisfied or
dissatisfied you feel about that aspect of your pay. How satisfied are you with...

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]
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Neutral

Satisfied

Very Satisfied

a. …the size of your pay for this task?
b. …the way pay was administered to
group members?
QIV8_c 1PSS c. …the way pay was determined?
QIV8_d 1PSL d. …the amount of money you made for
performing this task?
QIV8_e 1PSA e. …the information you were given
about the pay structure?
QIV8_f 1PSL f. …the amount of money you made for
this task?

Dissatisfied

QIV8_a 1PSL
QIV8_b 1PSS

Very Dissatisfied

8. The statements below describe various reactions that you may have about how much
money you made for the TASK1 session. For each statement, decide how satisfied or
dissatisfied you feel about that aspect of your pay. How satisfied are you with...

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

QIV9_a
QIV9_b
QIV9_c

1GL-R
1GL
1GL-R

a.
b.
c.

I would prefer to be in a different group.
I like the people in my group.
I don’t like the other people in my
group.
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Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

9. The statements below describe how you feel about the group with which you worked
on this task. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the
following.

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

QUESTIONNAIRE IV (CONTINUED)
Before you start TASK2, we have a few more questions for you. Please answer these
questions as candidly as you can. Remember that your answers are completely
confidential. No one outside the project staff will ever know your answers.

2POIR

b.

QIV10_c

2POM

c.

QIV10_d 2MOT

d.

2EFT

e.

QIV10_e

Strongly Agree

QIV10_b

The better I perform on this task, the
more money I will make.
My performance on this task will not
affect how content I feel about this
task.
How much money I make depends on
how well I perform this task.
I am very motivated to do well on this
task.
I want to work hard in this session.

Agree

a.

Neither

2POM

Disagree

QIV10_a

Strongly Disagree

10. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following
regarding the task you will be performing (TASK2).

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

QIV11_a

2EFT

a.

QIV11_b
QIV11_c

2MOT
2POI

b.
c.

QIV11_d
QIV11_e

2MOT
2SVM

d.
e.

QIV11_f

2EP

f.

I will probably exert a lot of effort on
this task.
I feel driven to do well on this task.
How good I feel about this task depends
on how well I perform.
I really want to do well.
The money I can make on this task is
important to me.
How well I do on this task depends on
how much effort I put into it.
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Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

11. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following regarding
the task you will be performing (TASK2).

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

QIV12_a

2EP-R

a.

QIV12_b

2SVI

b.

QIV12_c

2POM

c.

QIV12_d 2SVM

d.

The effort that I put into this task is not
related to my performance on this task.
I want to feel good about myself by
performing well on this task.
It is likely that I will make more money
if I perform well on this task.
I value the money that I can earn for this
task.

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

12. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following
regarding the task you will be performing (TASK2).

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

2MOT

b.

QIV13_c

2POI

c.

QIV13_d

2SVM

d.

QIV13_e

2POM

e.
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Strongly Agree

QIV13_b

I want to do the right thing by
performing well on this task.
I am motivated to perform well on
this task.
The better my performance on this
task, the better I will feel about
myself.
I want the money I can make for this
task.
If I perform well, I will make more
money.

Agree

a.

Neither

2SVI

Disagree

QIV13_a

Strongly Disagree

13. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following
regarding the task you will be performing (TASK2).

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

d.

Strongly Agree

b.
c.

I plan to take it easy while performing
this task.
If I try hard, I will do well on this task.
I do not care about my performance on
this task.
There is a good chance that my
performance will be high on this task.

Agree

a.

Neither

2EFTR
2EP
QIV14_b
QIV14_c 2MOTR
QIV14_d
2EP

Disagree

QIV14_a

Strongly Disagree

14. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following
regarding the task you will be performing (TASK2).

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

2POI

b.

QIV15_c
QIV15_d

2EFT
2POI

c.
d.

QIV15_e
QIV15_f

2EFT
2POMR
QIV15_g 2SVM

e.
f.
g.
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Strongly Agree

QIV15_b

If I put my mind to it, I should be able
to perform this task well.
If I perform this task well, I will feel
that I have done something
worthwhile.
I plan to work hard in this session.
It is likely that I will feel that I have
done something worthwhile if I
perform well on this task.
I will try really hard on this task.
My performance on this task will not
affect how much money I make.
Getting paid for this task is quite
valuable to me.

Agree

a.

Neither

2EP

Disagree

QIV15_a

Strongly Disagree

15. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following
regarding the task you will be performing (TASK2).

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

QIV16_c

2FTC

QIV16_d

2FT-R

QIV16_e

2FT

QIV16_f

2FTC

QIV16_g

2MCR
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Strongly Agree

2MCC

There is a small difference in the most
and the least money I could make in
this session.
b. The maximum amount of money I can
earn on this task is large.
c. Pay for this task could be distributed to
group members differently.
d. I really don't agree with how I will be
paid for this session.
e. The approach to distributing pay for
this task is fair.
f. I think my pay should be based only on
my own performance.
g. There is a large difference in the most
and the least money I could make in
this session.

Agree

QIV16_b

a.

Neither

2MCR

Disagree

QIV16_a

Strongly Disagree

16. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following
regarding the task you will be performing (TASK2).

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

2FTC

b.

QIV17_c

2MCRR

c.

QIV17_d

2FTC

d.

QIV17_e

2MCR

e.

QIV17_f

2MCAR

f.

QIV17_h

2MCAR

h.
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Strongly Agree

QIV17_b

I don't think how much I make
should depend on my group's
performance.
I think pay should be distributed to
group members differently for this
session.
There is a small difference in the
most and least money my group
could make in this session.
I wish they had used a different way
to distribute pay to group members
in this study.
There is a big difference in the most
and least money my group could
make in this session.
My own performance will make a
big difference in how much money I
make in this session.
I hope my group performs well.

Agree

a.

Neither

2FTC

Disagree

QIV17_a

Strongly Disagree

17. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following
regarding the task you will be performing (TASK2).

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

QIV18_a

2MCAR

a.

QIV18_b

2MCAR

b.

QIV18_c

2FT

c.

QIV18_d

2MCAR

d.

QIV18_e

2MCAR

e.

QIV18_f

2FT

f.

Pay on this task is based on my
group's performance.
I really want my group to do well in
this session.
The way pay is distributed in this
study is fair.
How much I make in this session
depends on my group's performance.
How much money I make in this
session depends on my own
performance.
The pay for this task is fair.
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Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

18. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following
regarding the task you will be performing (TASK2).

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

QIV19_a

2MCAR

a.

QIV19_b

2MCF

b.

QIV19_c

2FTC

c.

QIV19_d

2MCAR

d.

QIV19_e

2MCAR

e.

QIV19_f

2FT

f.

I really want to do well in this
session.
The minimum amount of money I
can earn on this task is small.
Pay for this task should be
distributed to group members
differently.
Pay on this task is based on my
individual performance.
The group's performance will make a
big difference in how much money I
make in this session.
Distributing pay based on
performance is fair.

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

19. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following
regarding the task you will be performing (TASK2).

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

20. Below are several statements regarding the maximum compensation for the task you
will be performing (TASK2). Each statement has a missing value. Please fill in the
blank for the missing value in each statement in the text box that follows the statement.

QIV20_a

2MCC

a.

QIV20_b

2MCC

b.

The most money my group can make in
this session is
The most money I, individually, can
make in this session is
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$_____________.
$_____________.

QIV21_a

2CV

QIV21_b
QIV21_c

2CV
2CV

a.

I would really like to make this much
money.
b. I want to make this amount of money.
c. I really value this amount of money.

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

21. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following regarding
the maximum amount you can make for the task you will be performing (TASK2).

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

22. Below are statements regarding the minimum compensation for the task you will be
performing (TASK2). Each statement has a missing value. Please fill in the blank for
the missing value in each statement in the text box that follows the statement.
QIV22_
a
QIV22_
b

2MC
F
2MC
F

a.
b.

The minimum amount of money my group
can make in this session is
The minimum amount of money I,
individually, can make in this session is

$_____________.
$_____________.

QIV23_a

2FV

QIV23_b
QIV23_c

2FV
2FV

a.

I would really like to make this much
money.
b. I want to make this amount of money.
c. I really value this amount of money.

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

Thank you for completing Questionnaire IV!
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Disagree

Strongly Disagree

23. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following regarding
the minimum amount you can make for the task you will be performing (TASK2).

QUESTIONNAIRE V
We have a few quick questions for you while we calculate performance.
[QV1 – 2SIP] 1. How would you rate your performance on the task (TASK2)?
[1] Poor
[2] Fair
[3] Good
[4] Very Good
[5] Excellent
[QV2 – 2SGP] 2. How would you rate your group’s performance on the task (TASK2)?
[1] Poor
[2] Fair
[3] Good
[4] Very Good
[5] Excellent
[QV3 – 2SIP] 3. Individual performance is rated as Low, Average, or High. Where do you
expect your individual performance will be rated for TASK2?
[1] Low
[2] Average
[3] High
[QV4 – 2SGP] 4. Group performance is rated as Low, Average, or High. Where do you expect
your group’s performance will be rated for TASK2?
[1] Low
[2] Average
[3] High
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QUESTIONNAIRE VI
Please answer the following questions as candidly as you can. Remember that your
answers are completely confidential. No one outside the project staff will ever know your
answers.

Upset
Hopeful
Worried
Relief
Tense
Irritated
Nervous
Enthusiastic
Mad

[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]

To a Very
Large
Extent

To a Large
Extent

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

To Some
Extent

2SDN
2HOP
2FR
2RLF
2FR
2ANG1
2FR
2HPP2
2ANG2

To a Small
Extent

QVI1_a
QVI1_b
QVI1_c
QVI1_d
QVI1_e
QVI1_f
QVI1_g
QVI1_h
QVI1_i

Not at all

1. Below are a number of words describing different feelings and emotions you may
have right now. Please indicate the extent to which you are currently
experiencing each emotion.

[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
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[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]

To a Very
Large
Extent

To a Large
Extent

Discouraged
Cheerful
Eager
Sad
Annoyed
Disappointed
Guilt
Anxious
Shame

To Some
Extent

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

To a Small
Extent

QVI2_a 2SDN
QVI2_b 2HPP1
QVI2_c 2HOP
QVI2_d 2SDN
QVI2_e 2ANG1
QVI2_f 2SDN
QVI2_g 2GLT
QVI2_h
2FR
QVI2_i 2GLT

Not at all

2. Below are a number of words describing different feelings and emotions you may
have right now. Please indicate the extent to which you are currently
experiencing each emotion.

[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]

To Some
Extent

To a Large
Extent

To a Very
Large Extent

Optimistic
Excited
Joyful
Thrilled
Happy
Angry
Regret
Aggravated
Hostile

[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]
[5]

QVI4_b

2PJ

b.

QVI4_c

2PJ

c.

QVI4_d

2PJ

d.

QVI4_e

2PJ

e.

Pay is distributed fairly among my group
members.
I think the way pay is distributed among
group members is just.
I like the way pay is distributed in my
group.
It makes sense to distribute money across
group members this way.
I agree with the way my group members
were paid.
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Strongly Agree

a.

Agree

2PJ

Neither

QVI4_a

Disagree

We would like to know how you feel about the way pay was distributed in your
group for TASK1. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the
following.
Strongly Disagree

4.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

To a Small
Extent

QVI3_a 2HOP
QVI3_b 2HPP2
QVI3_c 2HPP1
QVI3_d 2HPP2
QVI3_e 2HPP1
QVI3_f 2ANG2
QVI3_g 2GLT
QVI3_h 2ANG1
QVI3_i 2ANG2

Not at all

3. Below are a number of words describing different feelings and emotions you may have
right now. Please indicate the extent to which you are currently experiencing each
emotion.

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

2DJ

b.

QVI5_c

2DJ

c.

QVI5_d

2DJ

d.

To a Very Large
Extent

QVI5_b

...reflect the effort you have
put into your work?
…reflect what you have
contributed to the task?
…reflect how hard you
worked on the task?
…reflect what you should
have made?

To a Large
Extent

a.

To Some Extent

2DJ

To a Small
Extent

QVI5_a

Not at all

5. In this section, we would like your reactions to how much money you made for the
TASK1 session. Please answer these questions as honestly as possible. To what extent
does how much money you made...

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

QVI6_c
QVI6_d

2DJ
2IJ

c.
d.

QVI6_e

2DJ

e.

QVI6_f

2DJ

f.
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To a Very
Large Extent

b.

…really unfair considering
your hard work?
…consistent with what you
expected?
…fair?
…consistent with what you
were told?
...appropriate for the work
you have completed?
...justified, given your
performance?

To a Large
Extent

a.

To Some
Extent

QVI6_b

2DJR
2IJ

To a Small
Extent

QVI6_a

Not at all

6. In this section, we would like your reactions to how much money you made for the
TASK1 session. Please answer these questions as honestly as possible. To what extent
is how much money you made...

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

QVI7_d 2PSL

d.

QVI7_e 2PSL

e.

QVI7_f

f.

2PSS

Very Satisfied

b.
c.

Satisfied

QVI7_b 2PSS
QVI7_c 2PSS

…the size of your pay for performance
on this task?
…the pay structure used for this task?
…the differences in pay across
performance levels on the task?
…the level of pay you earned for
performance on this task?
…the level of pay you earned for this
task?
…the way pay was distributed among
group members?

Neutral

a.

Dissatisfied

QVI7_a 2PSL

Very Dissatisfied

7. The statements below describe various reactions that you may have about how much
money you made for the TASK1 session. For each statement, decide how satisfied or
dissatisfied you feel about that aspect of your pay. How satisfied are you with...

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]
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Very Satisfied

QVI8_f

Satisfied

QVI8_e

a. …the size of your pay for this task?
b. …the way pay was administered to
group members?
2PSS c. …the way pay was determined?
2PSL d. …the amount of money you made for
performing this task?
2PSA e. …the information you were given
about the pay structure?
2PSL f. …the amount of money you made for
this task?

Neutral

QVI8_c
QVI8_d

2PSL
2PSS

Dissatisfied

QVI8_a
QVI8_b

Very Dissatisfied

8. The statements below describe various reactions that you may have about how much
money you made for the TASK1 session. For each statement, decide how satisfied or
dissatisfied you feel about that aspect of your pay. How satisfied are you with...

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

b.
c.

I would prefer to be in a different
group.
I like the people in my group.
I don’t like the other people in my
group.

Strongly Agree

a.

Agree

QVI9_b
QVI9_c

2GLR
2GL
2GLR

Neither

QVI9_a

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

9. The statements below describe how you feel about the group with which you worked
on this task. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the
following.

[1] [2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1] [2]
[1] [2]

[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]

[5]
[5]

QVI10_a

IC

a.

QVI10_b

IC

b.

QVI10_c

IC-R-

c.

QVI10_d

IC-R-

d.

QVI10_e

IC

e.

QVI10_f

IC-R-

f.

I would continue working on this
task if I were getting paid.
I am interested in doing additional
work on this task for pay.
I don't want to work on this task
again even if I am paid to do so.
Working on this task in the future
does not interest me even if I would
be paid to do so.
I am interested in future work on this
task for pay.
I'm not interested in working on this
task again.
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Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

10. It is possible that we will be able to pay people to do this task in the future. The
statements below describe your interest in continuing work on this task. Please
indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements.

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

[QVI11 - IC] 11. Would you like us to contact you if we need people to work on this task in
the future?
[1] Yes
[2] No

FG

b.

QVI12_c

FG

c.

QVI12_d

FG

d.

QVI12_e

FG

e.

We just have a few additional questions about you.
[QVI13] 13. Are you (pick one)?
[1] Male
[2] Female
[QVI14] 14. What is your race (pick one)?
[1] White
[2] Black or African-American
[3] Hispanic or Latino/Latina
[4] Native American or Alaskan Native
[5] Asian, Pacific Islander, or Indian (from India)
[6] Other, including mixed
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To a Very Large
Extent

QVI12_b

…you were working with
others.
…you were part of a
group.
…you completed the task
as a member of a group.
…the task was a group
task.
…you were working
alone.

To a Large Extent

a.

To Some Extent

FG

To a Small Extent

QVI12_a

Not at all

12. When completing the tasks today, to what extent did you feel...

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[QVI15] 15. How old were you on your last birthday? _______ years
[QVI16] 16. Which of the following best describes your current relationship status (pick
one)?
[1] Never Married
[2] Currently Married
[3] Divorced
[4] Widowed
[5] Other
[QVI17] 17. About how much money do you spend each month? Include all your monthly
expenses, such as utilities, groceries, and entertainment. $_______
[QVI18] 18. Are you currently employed (select one)?
[1] Yes ------------------ Go to Question 18a
[2] No ------------------ Go to End of Study
[QVI18_a] 18a. How long have you been employed (in months) by your current
organization? _______ months
[QVI18_b] 18b. How many hours per week do you work for pay? _______ hours
[QVI18_c] 18c. In what industry is your main job?
[1] Agriculture, Forestry, or Fishery
[2] Mining and Construction
[3] Manufacturing
[4] Public Administration
[5] Transportation
[6] Communications
[7] Retail
[8] Finance, Insurance, or Real Estate
[9] Restaurant Service
[10] Repair Service
[11] Recreation Service
[12] Other

Thank you!
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